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CHAPTER I
Optimal Degree of Foreign Ownership Under Uncertainty
1.1 Introduction
In a comprehensive empirical and theoretical review of multinational firms, Navaretti
and Venables (2004) identify three facts about foreign direct investment (FDI) ac-
tivity. First, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) account for the dominant share of
FDI flows; this share increased steadily from 66.3% in the 1980s to 76.2% in the late
1990s. Second, most FDI is concentrated in skill- and technology-intensive industries.
Third, multinational firms are increasingly engaged in international production net-
works, which gives rise to intra-firm trade that currently takes up around one third
of world trade (Antras, 2003).
The incomplete contracts setting of Antras (2003) has proved extremely useful
in explaining the recent trend in intra-firm trade and how it depends on industry-
level factor intensities. Antras and Helpman (2004) extend this approach to the
integration strategies of multinational firms but have restricted attention to two forms
of sourcing inputs abroad: complete outsourcing and complete integration. However,
the prevalence of M&As suggests that multinationals may split ownership shares
with domestic partners every time they engage in FDI. As Desai et al. (2004) note,
multinational firms frequently have the option to own 100%, majority, or minority
1
2shares of newly created foreign entities. In their words, “the appropriate ownership
of productive enterprise is a central issue in economic theory and a practical question
for multinational firms establishing new foreign affiliates.”
The choice of the degree of foreign ownership raises issues of incentives and gov-
ernance at the acquired firm. Traditional theories of FDI posit that MNEs engage
in operations abroad to exploit firm-specific (often intangible) assets. Yet, as Caves
(2007) argues: “Collaborator A in a joint venture cannot agree to reward party B
highly for B ’s contribution of proprietary technology to the project, without evidence
of the technology’s worth.” Hence, a multinational seeking to acquire a firm abroad
faces idiosyncratic uncertainty about the complementarity of its proprietary assets
and the production technologies and organization of the target firm. This uncer-
tainty will surely affect the multinational’s choices at the acquisition stage as well as
its behavior about the delivery of its proprietary assets over time.
I refer to the variety of organizational forms that entail less than 100% ownership
for a multinational abroad as partial integration. Using detailed plant-level data from
the census of Turkish manufacturing firms over the period 1993-2001, I demonstrate
three empirical findings. First, there is a substantial degree of partial integration
among multinationals and their domestic partners, regardless of the industry they
operate in. Second, the average degree of foreign ownership at a multinational plant
rises over time (conditional on survival). Third, firms display substantial hetero-
geneity within sectors in their factor use and productivity. These findings motivate
the theoretical model in this paper, which incorporates partial integration into an
existing model of FDI. I focus on integration strategies by a foreign direct investor
in a search and matching framework under a setting of incomplete contracts and
uncertainty. Given the long-term nature of the investment relationship with a host
3country firm, I study not only a static problem of integration, but also a dynamic
problem of optimal takeover strategies.
Specifically, I extend the model in Antras and Helpman (2004) to describe the
optimal path of integration when there is uncertainty over the quality of the match
between integrated firms. The uncertainty is modeled as the lack of sufficient in-
formation on the joint productivity of the integrated firms in the first period of
production. The parties to the match learn about their joint productivity only after
joint production has taken place. The model delivers a nondegenerate distribution
of foreign ownership at the firm level and shows that the optimal level of integration
rises with the age of the multinational firm. Additionally, the model highlights the
role of heterogeneous firms in determining the level of integration and accounts for
heterogeneity in factor use within sectors. The driving force behind the optimal path
of integration is the search and learning framework that is built on Jovanovic (1979).
This framework helps reconcile some potentially conflicting results concerning the
direction of causation between foreign ownership and productivity and the manner
in which they interact.
In contrast to the framework of Antras and Helpman (2004), which highlights
industry-specific intensities of intermediate inputs, my major results are driven by
the joint productivity between the multinational firm and its input supplier within
an industry. The key comparative static of the model says that the degree of foreign
ownership is an increasing function of joint productivity. The search and match-
ing framework, along with this comparative static, imply that multinationals follow
reservation strategies with regard to observed productivity levels when they make
their investment decisions. In equilibrium, we only see the highly productive firms
being targeted by multinationals, and the most productive staying in a long-lasting
4relationship. Multinationals increase their degree of equity participation when they
find themselves in a fruitful match, while they divest (dissolve their match) if revealed
joint productivity does not meet their expectations. This selection mechanism im-
plies that equity investment decisions precede physical investment decisions. Since
the degree of equity participation determines the factor intensity of the production
line, the optimal ratio of intermediate inputs by the multinational firm to that by the
supplier rises as the match endures. As such, the model identifies increased control
by the multinational as the source of the transfer of proprietary assets.
Consider Honda Turkey, which is the second European production facility of the
well-known Japanese automaker Honda. Honda Turkey represents a story of for-
eign direct investment which the theoretical model developed in this paper aims to
capture.1 The company was established in 1992 under the name Anadolu Honda
Otomobil with a 50 percent stake controlled by each of Honda Motor Co and its
Turkish business partner Anadolu Group. Production started in 1998 and focused
on serving the Turkish market with the Civic Sedan model. Production of the Civic
averaged around 7,000 until 2003, when Honda Motor Co acquired its Turkish part-
ner’s shares in its totality and became a fully integrated subsidiary assuming its
current name. Honda Turkey started producing a second model, City, in 2005 and
started an ambitious investment project worth $100 million to increase its yearly
production capacity to 50,000 in 2006. By 2008, Honda Turkey reached its pro-
duction goal of 50,000 units, 70 percent of which were destined for export markets.
While Honda Turkey imports key mechanical pieces as well as engine and electrical
1Data related to Honda Turkey are retrieved from http://www.honda.com.tr/honda turkiye.aspx. Simi-
lar patterns of equity and physical investment, not necessarily resulting in complete takeover, can be found
with other multinationals in Turkey. For instance, Ford Motor Company was a much earlier entrant to the
Turkish market and it assumed 11 percent of ownership in 1983 at Otosan, which operated as the Ford
assembler in Turkey. Ford increased its stake first to 30 percent in 1987, and later to 41 percent in 1997,
and it continues production with Ford Motor Co and Otosan holding 41.04 percent each of the equity, the
remainder of which is traded publicly.
5components, it either produces the remaining components on-site or sources them
domestically.
The multi-period model developed here is also motivated by and able to explain
several findings from the literature on FDI. Firstly, the most common argument in
the literature is that domestic firms that are controlled by foreign direct investors are
typically the cream (Razin and Sadka, 2007).2 Second, citing Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2005)
and Chari et al. (2010), Razin and Sadka (2007) argue that control by multinationals
increases the efficiency and value of the firm. Similarly, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006)
suggest that higher wages observed at multinationals may be explained if a majority
foreign ownership share is required to transfer technology. Third, Barbosa and Louri
(2002) argue that a foreign partner will demand higher ownership in case of profitable
affiliates and large intangible assets to be transferred. The model I present here sheds
light on these predictions by linking the investment decision of foreign investors to
firm-level productivity. Moreover, it is able to account for the intensive margin of
imports when intrafirm trade occurs through vertical integration, on which theory
has essentially been silent (Corcos et al., 2010).
I test the predictions of my model using data from the census of manufacturing
firms in Turkey. After constructing plant-level estimates of total factor productivity
(TFP) to proxy match quality, I study the determinants of the degree of foreign
ownership and its relationship with productivity. I find that match quality can
explain more of the variation in the degree of foreign ownership as compared to
sectoral measures of capital and skill intensity. This finding remains even after taking
into account firm-level heterogeneity in factor use. Moreover, I test the existence
2Harris and Robinson (2002) and Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) provide empirical evidence in favor
of “cream-skimming” in their studies of the UK and Italian manufacturing industries, respectively. Djankov
and Hoekman (2000) provide similar evidence for transition economies.
6of a causal effect from productivity to the degree of foreign ownership and find
strong evidence in favor of this effect. My empirical analysis also documents, using
nonparametric and semi-parametric methods of survival analysis, ample evidence for
the existence of a selection mechanism that is key to the theory. In line with the
model’s predictions, I find that multinational firms with lower productivities are most
likely to engage in divestment.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the Turkish data
to demonstrate three empirical regularities. Sections 3 and 4 develop the static and
dynamic sides of the theoretical model, respectively. The multi-period model is able
to generate the empirical regularities identified as well as “cream-skimming.” Section
5 discusses the construction of the productivity measure to be used in the econometric
analysis, lays out the econometric strategy to test the model, and presents the results
from this analysis. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Plant-Level Evidence on Extent of Integration
Plant-level data for the current study come from the Industrial Analysis Database
collected by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). TurkStat annually conducts
a census of all manufacturing establishments in Turkey with ten or more employees
with detailed information on plant characteristics such as size, wages, investment,
inventories, and value added. The database has been recently used in a study of
export decision by Ozler et al. (2009) and discussed in more detail there. Most im-
portantly for the current study, the database indicates whether the plant is vertically
integrated with a multinational firm and provides a breakdown of equity ownership
between the foreign direct investor and the Turkish plant operator.3 I focus on the
3The database includes further information about the foreign direct investor as surveyed in the census
form. If a plant is vertically integrated, plants are asked to report the countries of the top three shareholders
and their respective shares at the plant. Since I do not focus on this further breakdown, I simply work with
7period 1993-2001, which is a period of stable capital inflows to Turkey.4 Since Turkey
did not impose any limitations on the foreign ownership of manufacturing plants in
this period, I am able to observe maximal amount of variation in the degree of foreign
ownership at the plant level and document the extent of partial integration.
Table 1.1 summarizes the presence of multinationals by year and sector in the
sample of Turkish manufacturing plants used for the empirical analysis in this paper.
I define a plant to be a multinational enterprise (MNE) in any given year if it has any
positive level of equity held by a foreign direct investor. In the sample, the minimum
degree of foreign ownership is 1% and the maximum degree is 100%. Panel (b) shows
that while MNEs are most prevalent in industries such as other chemicals, transport
equipment, and electrical machinery, they also operate actively in industries such as
food, wearing apparel, textiles, and non-electrical machinery.5 Hence, we observe
vertical integration not only in those industries that are relatively intensive in their
use of headquarter services, as predicted by Antras and Helpman (2004), but also in
industries where manufactured inputs constitute the primary factor of production.6
What is more interesting, however, is that a majority of the multinationals operating
in Turkey choose to do so in a partially integrated setting with a domestic partner,
regardless of their industry. Figure 1.1 depicts the distribution of foreign equity
participation in the pooled sample of plant-year observations, which points to a
the total foreign equity participation at the plant level.
4Although the period of analysis is 1993-2001, I use data starting from 1990 for plants with 25+ employees
and 1991 for plants with 10+ employees to compute the capital stock series. Inclusion of plant identification
codes enables me to construct a panel and follow the plants over time. Construction of the capital stock
series and variables used in the analysis is explained in the Data Appendix, which also describes the cleaning
procedure of the data used for the analysis. Table A1 reports the number of plants that were in the raw
data before cleaning.
5In addition, multinationals are big players in their industries. Despite their small number in the overall
population of plants, multinationals have employed 381 employees on average in a year compared to 117
in wholly owned domestic plants. This discrepancy is more pronounced in value added terms, with MNEs
creating almost ten times as much value added as domestic plants. See Table 1.3.
6A similar finding is reported by Corcos et al. (2010), who find that intrafirm trade and outsourcing
coexist in virtually all the manufacturing industries in their database of French multinationals, which
roughly includes one hundred industries at the NACE Rev1 3-digit level.
8non-trivial distribution of the equity share owned by multinationals. There is a
sizable variation in plant-level FDI which stretches from very low stakes in the single
digits to complete integration cases. In unreported figures, I find this pattern to be
fairly robust to the type of industry and plant size. Both of the facts that vertical
integration exists in all sectors and that it mostly occurs through partial integration
are unaccounted for in previous theoretical models.
A more arresting picture emerges when we examine how the distribution of foreign
equity participation changes over time. Define the “age” of an MNE to be the nth
consecutive year that a multinational carries out joint production with a domestic
partner; for example, age 1 is the time of acquisition by the multinational with at
least 1 percent equity share and the first year that joint production takes place, age
2 is the second year of joint production, and so on. Figure 1.2 shows how the extent
of integration evolves with the age of the MNE.7 As joint production continues into
future years, the weight of the distribution moves to the right, suggesting that MNEs
have higher extent of integration with age. Note the drop in the fraction of MNEs
under minority foreign control and the rise in the fraction of MNEs under majority
control with age. As an alternative way to see these dynamics, I plot the mean foreign
equity participation against the age of the MNE in Figure 1.3.8 While average foreign
equity participation is around 52 percent at age 1, it jumps to 60 percent by age 3,
and rises further to 65 percent by age 7. Hence, multinationals typically increase their
equity participation at their subsidiaries conditional on continued joint production
7Note that the sample used to construct this figure includes those MNEs that would be classified as
“greenfield FDI,” i.e. plants which have always had 100 percent foreign equity participation. Hence the
abundance of observations at the far right end of the distribution. These MNEs are included in the figure to
give an idea about how the prevalence of partial integration compares to the case of complete integration.
In the sample, only around 25% of all MNEs are fully integrated.
8In the figure, predicted foreign equity participation is a univariate fractional-polynomial estimate. I
exclude greenfield FDI plants when constructing Figure 1.3, as these plants typically do not show any
variation in their degree of foreign ownership. Inclusion of these plants does not change the main point of
Figure 1.3, but makes the jump from age 1 to age 2 less pronounced.
9and this adjustment mostly occurs at the earlier ages of the MNE. These trends are
again robust to type of industry and plant size (employment).
Table 1.2 provides a summary of the (logs of) key variables used in the empiri-
cal analysis, including their standard deviations decomposed into a between- and a
within-sector component. In line with previous evidence (see, for instance, Corcos
et al. (2010)), I find substantial variation in productivity and factor intensities over-
all. More importantly, almost all of this variation is due to firm-level heterogeneity
within sectors, and not between them. Panel (a) reveals that 82.8% of the variation
in TFP, 90.9% of the variation in skill intensity, and 97.3% of the variation in capital
intensity come from within-sector differences in the covariates, which indicate that
the sector is a poor indicator of factor intensities. These figures are slightly higher
than the ones reported for the French data by Corcos et al. (2010), and they support
the authors’ observation that the firm is the correct unit of analysis in order to study
the determinants of internalization identified by the theory.
There are three empirical regularities that emerge from the Turkish data. First,
the majority of multinationals operate in a partially integrated setting with a domes-
tic partner regardless of industry characteristics, which implies that partial integra-
tion is a more prevalent form of foreign direct investment than complete integration.
Moreover, there is significant heterogeneity in the degree of integration among MNEs.
Second, the average share of ownership by foreign direct investors increases over time
conditional on continued joint production. This suggests that multinationals follow
a dynamic policy of integrating with their supplier and choose high levels of equity
participation if they find themselves in a long lasting contractual relationship. This
pattern could also arise if more highly integrated firms are more likely to survive.
Lastly, there is significant within-sector heterogeneity; the variation in productivity
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and factor intensities across firms cannot be explained by sector-specific characteris-
tics.
1.3 Optimal Integration
In this section, I modify the model in Antras and Helpman (2004), henceforth
AH, to incorporate partial integration in the study of foreign direct investment.
There are two countries, North and South, and a single factor of production,
labor. Preferences are as in AH, so that the world population consists of a unit
measure of consumers with identical preferences given by:
U = x0 +
1
µ
J∑
j=1
Xµj , 0 < µ < 1,
where x0 represents consumption of a homogeneous good, µ is a parameter, and
aggregate consumption in sector j is a CES function,
Xj =
[ˆ
xj(i)
αdi
]1/α
, 0 < α < 1,
of the consumption of different varieties xj(i). I retain the AH assumption that
varieties within a sector are more substitutable for each other than they are for x0
or for varieties from a different sector; i.e. α > µ. These preferences imply that
final goods producers face the following inverse demand function for each variety i
in sector j:
(1.1) pj(i) = X
µ−α
j xj(i)
α−1
There is a perfectly elastic supply of labor in each country, and wages are given by
wN and wS in the North and the South, respectively. Assume wN > wS. Output is
produced using a combination of two inputs that are specific to the variety, hj(i) and
mj(i), where the headquarter services input hj(i) can be produced only in the North.
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The manufactured components mj(i) can be produced in either country. Essentially,
however, every final good producer needs to contract with a manufacturing plant
operator for the provision of the variety-specific components (Antras and Helpman,
2004). This means that an input that is crafted to be used in a certain variety has no
valuable use in the production of some other variety. Accordingly, output is produced
following the Cobb-Douglas function:
(1.2) xj(i) = θ
[
hj(i)
ηj
]ηj [mj(i)
1− ηj
]1−ηj
, 0 < ηj < 1,
where θ is a match-specific productivity parameter that is unknown to both the
final good producer and the manufacturing supplier at the time of the match.9 The
parameter, ηj, controls the headquarter intensity of the production and is sector-
specific.
A major assumption built into the model is that there exists a nondegenerate
distribution of productivities for a final good producer across different suppliers. I
interpret θ as a measure of how complementary the two sides to the match are and as
reflecting the cost-saving advantages to the final good producer of monitoring and su-
pervising the supplier. This will show variation across suppliers due to plant-specific
factors such as location, industry, organizational form, or skill composition. The
match-specific productivity is unknown in the first period and is revealed to both
sides only after continued joint production in the second period. As in Jovanovic
(1979), θ is distributed independently across suppliers, which means that the “infor-
mational capital” generated through joint production is completely match-specific.
Hence, the final good producer’s previous experience with other suppliers carries no
information about its productivity with new suppliers.
9Note that the match-specific parameter should in fact be denoted as θi; I drop the subscript to simplify
notation.
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The distribution of θ in the population is known and I follow the common as-
sumption regarding firm productivities: i.e. θ ∼ Pareto(b, γ), where b > 0 is the
scale parameter and γ > 2 is the shape parameter.10 Accordingly, the cdf is given
by:
G(θ) = 1−
(
b
θ
)γ
, θ ≥ b
In order to draw the match-specific parameter with a manufacturing supplier, the
final good producer pays a fixed cost of entry wNfE. Upon payment of this fixed cost,
the final good producer matches with a supplier with probability one and receives
a noisy signal about the true value of its joint productivity with its supplier. If the
match persists, the final good producer decides on the organizational form of the
match (“the firm”), which determines the additional fixed organizational costs to be
incurred. Following AH, I interpret the fixed organizational costs as the sum of all
costs that pertain to the search for a supplier in the South and to the management
of the firm, which entails “supervision, quality control, accounting, and marketing”
among other things.
I assume in addition that the fixed organizational costs are increasing in the final
good producer’s ownership share. This assumption reflects the idea, for instance,
that a multinational firm may be required to hire a larger team of management and
devote more time to establish a firm in which it has majority share. Due to economies
of scale in operation, however, a multinational may not incur as high fixed costs once
it achieves effective control of the firm. Hence, the fixed organizational costs are
denoted as wNδ
φ, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of the multinational at the firm and
φ ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous parameter.
I focus specifically on vertical integration as the organizational form of the firm in
10γ > 2 is required for the distribution to have finite variance.
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this paper. I assume that the multinational has already made its decision to obtain
the manufactured input from a vertically integrated supplier in the South; i.e. foreign
direct investment. AH establish that there always exist high productivity final good
producers that choose to acquire manufactured inputs via FDI. The crucial question
I ask is: where does the multinational draw its boundaries in controlling/owning
the manufacturing plant operator in any given period? In other words, is there an
optimal level of integration, δ∗ ∈ (0, 1), for each period given the multinational’s
characteristics?
I adopt the incomplete contracts setting due to Antras (2003), where ownership
of the suppliers entitles final good producers to some residual rights of control. Fol-
lowing the property-rights approach to the boundaries of the firm, input suppliers
and final good producers cannot sign enforceable contracts specifying the purchase
of a certain type of intermediate input for a certain price (Antras, 2003). As such,
the division of the firm’s revenue is determined by an ex post bargaining procedure
following the production of the inputs. As in AH, ex post bargaining takes place un-
der all organizational forms and is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game
over potential revenue, which is given by:
Rj(i) = pj(i)xj(i) = X
µ−α
j xj(i)
α
In the Nash bargaining procedure, the outside option of the manufacturing sup-
plier is always zero since its input is completely variety-specific. The final good
producer’s outside option, however, depends positively on the share of the firm it
controls. Specifically, δ determines the fraction of the manufactured input that the
final good producer has residual rights over. In the ex post bargaining, the final good
producer can seize its share of the manufactured input, δ, once production has al-
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ready taken place, and sell an amount δx(i).11 This translates into a fraction δα of the
revenue if the final good producer carries out production on its own. Let β ∈ (0, 1)
denote the fraction of the ex post gains from entering a production relationship that
go to the final good producer. Given this definition of residual rights, the share of
the revenue that the final good producer captures is given by βV = δ
α+β(1−δα) as a
result of generalized Nash bargaining, which reflects the final good producer’s outside
option plus its share of ex post gains. The share of the revenue for the manufacturing
supplier is (1− β)(1− δα), or equivalently, 1− βV , where βV = δα + β(1− δα).
The final element of the model is an upfront payment in each period by the
manufacturing supplier to participate in the match. The upfront payment could
be either positive or negative and is included in the contract that is offered to the
potential supplier by the multinational. The contract offer follows the decision for the
level of integration. As in AH, I assume an infinitely elastic supply of manufacturing
suppliers so that their profits from the relationship inclusive of the upfront payment
are equal to their ex ante outside option, which is set to zero for simplicity.
The time line of the model is as follows:
1. Period 1 starts. The final good producer enters the industry and pays the fixed
cost of entry, wNfE.
2. At the same time, an unmatched supplier of manufactured inputs and the final
good producer form a pair and jointly draw a random match parameter θ from a
known distribution with cumulative distribution function Prob{θ ≤ s} = G(s).
The value of θ is unknown to both sides of the match at this point.
3. After the match is formed, the final good producer and the supplier receive a
signal y, which is a random draw from the uniform distribution over the range
11Note that restricting δ to be strictly less than one ensures that the supplier chooses to produce a positive
amount of the manufactured input in each period.
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(0, θ].12 13 Following the realization of the noisy signal, the final good producer
may choose to exit the match or offer a contract to the supplier. If the final good
producer leaves, it can seek out a new supplier, draw a new match parameter,
θ′, and receive a noisy signal on it, y′, the next period.
4. If the final good producer stays, it negotiates a multi-period contract with the
supplier. The contract sets forth the share of the firm that the multinational
will own this period, δ1, with the understanding that this can be updated when
the uncertainty is resolved. The contract also specifies an upfront payment, t,
that is to be paid by the supplier for each period that the match survives and
that can be updated. Note that t could be positive or negative and the supplier
has an outside option of zero in each period.
5. If the parties to the match cannot reach an agreement, the match breaks up.
The final good producer can then seek out a new supplier and draw a new match
parameter, θ′, in the next period. If the multi-period contract is accepted, the
match survives into the next period.
6. Upon acceptance of the contract, the final good producer acquires its negotiated
stake, δ1, as specified in the contract. The final good producer and the supplier
then independently choose their quantities, h and m respectively, to maximize
their own payoffs.
7. Output for the first period is sold and the resulting revenue is divided following
12I let the signal be a random draw from the uniform distribution for purposes of tractability. In particular,
this setup yields the Pareto distribution to be“conjugate”; that is, the posterior distribution of the parameter
of interest belongs to the same family as the prior distribution. The model could be easily extended to the
case where the signals are also distributed Pareto - in this case, the posterior distribution will belong to the
Gamma family of distributions when the shape parameter is unknown, and to the Pareto family when the
scale parameter is unknown.
13Notice that the lower boundary on the range of the signal is known, while the upper boundary is not.
One can also imagine a case where the lower boundary is unknown as well, e.g. some range [θ1, θ2]. This
could be handled similarly where the prior joint distribution of θ1 and θ2 are bilateral bivariate Pareto,
which gives rise to a posterior joint distribution in the same family of distributions.
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a generalized Nash bargaining procedure. Period 1 ends.
8. Period 2 starts. In the case of survival, the true value of θ is revealed to both
sides of the match as a result of continued joint production. The final good
producer has the option to terminate the contract at this point or update it. If
the multi-period contract is updated, the final good producer picks its optimal
stake this period, δ2, which will apply in all subsequent periods as well.
9. The final good producer and the supplier choose their quantities noncoopera-
tively to maximize their own payoffs.
10. Output for this period is sold and the resulting revenue is shared following a
generalized Nash bargaining procedure. Period 2 ends.
The current model can characterize what happens to the likelihood of divestment
over time (i.e. a break up of the match) endogenously. It is still of interest, however,
to study an exogenous impact that may dissolve a match, which ensures that there
exists a set of domestic suppliers that remain unmatched in each period. I assume
that a firm in production is subject to adverse liquidity shocks with the hazard of
separation occurring at the exogenous rate λ. Once joint production starts, the firm
could receive a liquidity shock in any of the future periods.
Before describing the equilibrium under uncertainty, I study the per-period prob-
lem that the final good producer and the manufacturing supplier face. In the case
that parties reach agreement, one can write the revenue in each period, using (1.2),
as:
(1.3) R(i) = Xµ−αθα
[
h(i)
η
]αη [
m(i)
1− η
]α(1−η)
,
where I have dropped the subscript, j, to focus attention on a single industry. In the
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case of disagreement, the outside option of the supplier remains zero but that of the
final good producer depends on its share of the firm, δ.
Following the final good producer’s choice of δ in each period, the parties to the
match independently choose the quantities of their inputs. Given the noncontractibil-
ity of the supply of inputs, each input supplier maximizes its own payoff. The final
good producer’s problem is to pick the amount of headquarter services to maximize
βVR(i)−wNh(i), and the manufacturing supplier’s problem is to pick the amount of
intermediate inputs to maximize (1−βV )R(i)−wSm(i). Substituting the expression
in (1.3) for R(i) and taking first order conditions, the Nash equilibrium quantities
are:
(1.4) h∗(i) = η
(
Xµ−αθαα
) 1
1−α
(
βV
wN
) 1−α(1−η)
1−α
(
1− βV
wS
)α(1−η)
1−α
(1.5) m∗(i) = (1− η) (Xµ−αθαα) 11−α ( βV
wN
) αη
1−α
(
1− βV
wS
) 1−αη
1−α
These quantities reflect the optimal decisions of the sides to the match after
uncertainty is resolved; that is, at stage 9 of the game. When the input suppliers are
making their input decisions prior to the resolution of the uncertainty, at stage 6,
they will be picking their quantities conditional on the information that they receive
about the true joint productivity. The optimal quantities under uncertainty are then
given by the first order conditions to each supplier’s program, which maximize own
per-period expected payoffs. Since both input suppliers are assumed to update their
beliefs about θ in a Bayesian fashion, the expected payoffs substitute E[θα|y] in place
of θ in (1.3).
The ratio of headquarter services to manufactured inputs is given by:
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(1.6)
h∗(i)
m∗(i)
=
η
1− η
δα(1− β) + β
1− δα(1− β)− β
wS
wN
,
since βV = δ
α(1 − β) + β. Notice that taking headquarter intensity and wages
as fixed, h∗(i)/m∗(i) depends only on δ. Hence, the model generates within-sector
heterogeneity in factor use due to the level of integration. The optimal intensity of
headquarter services is independent of θ due to the symmetry between the two input
suppliers’ (lack of) information about θ in each period. In the first period, they both
observe the same signal, y, which returns the same conditional expectation about
θ, while in the second period, the true value of θ is revealed to both sides. This
informational symmetry prevents the sides to the match from learning more about
θ through each other’s input choices. Given this, the final good producer’s optimal
level of integration will be changing as the firm endures to the extent that it is
affected by the resolution of the uncertainty. In particular, the production line will
be getting more intensive in the use of headquarter services if δ increases following
the removal of uncertainty in equilibrium. I show this result in the next section.
Using the first order conditions in (1.4) and (1.5) along with (1.3) gives the total
per-period value of the firm as measured by total operating profits:
(1.7) pi(δ, θ, X, η) = X
µ−α
1−α θ
α
1−αψ(δ, η)− wNδφ
where
(1.8) ψ(δ, η) = α
α
1−α
(
βV
wN
) αη
1−α
(
1− βV
wS
)α(1−η)
1−α
(1− αηβV − α(1− η)(1− βV ))
βV = δ
α(1− β) + β
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and wNδ
φ reflects the (per-period) fixed costs of integration. Recall that φ > α
is a parameter that describes the marginal fixed cost of acquiring an ownership
stake at the firm. I assume that this marginal fixed cost decreases with the level
of integration as the final good producer is required to commit a greater amount of
resources initially to take control of the firm. Accordingly, φ ∈ (0, 1). Profits are
strictly increasing in θ and strictly decreasing in wN and wS as expected.
Following AH, I consider an industry with high headquarter intensity η such
that operating profits excluding organizational costs are increasing in the final good
producer’s share of the revenue.14 This setup highlights the importance of the input
by the final good producer and lays the basis for the observation that most foreign
direct investment takes place in high technology intensive industries. Since I focus
specifically on vertical integration in the South, this is equivalent to the setup in AH
where ψ(βV , η) is increasing in βV regardless of where production takes place. The
intuition here is that in a high headquarter intensity sector, “the marginal product
of headquarter services is high, making underinvestment in h(i) especially costly and
integration especially attractive” (Antras and Helpman, 2004).
In solving any given period’s subgame, the upfront payment specified in the multi-
period contract, t, ensures that the final good producer effectively maximizes the total
value of the firm in every period.15 Given the structure of the profits in the stage
game, is there an optimal level of integration δ∗ that maximizes (1.7)? Moreover,
is δ∗ unique? This is the question that the final good producer needs to answer at
stage 8 of the game after both parties to the match learn the true value of θ (the
same question needs to be answered also in the first period at stage 6, when θ is
14Where deemed useful, I comment on how the model can accommodate low headquarter intensity sectors
(see, for example, the proof of Proposition 1) and provide intuition for comparison purposes.
15See Antras and Helpman (2004) for a proof of this assertion.
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still unknown). It is equivalent to asking whether the firm’s operating profits, (1.7),
are concave in δα; for if not, then the optimal level of integration happens either at
extremes (e.g. in the case of linearity) or at multiple points.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique optimal value for the level of integration, δ∗ ∈
(0, 1), that maximizes the total operating profits of the multinational firm at
the stage game.
Figure 1.4, panel (a), shows the relationship between the firm’s operating profits
and its degree of integration for various values of headquarter intensity. Firstly, the
optimal level of integration lies strictly away from the end points for a range of head-
quarter intensities. For different values of η, profits are maximized at an intermediate
level of integration. Secondly, notice that the optimal level of integration is increas-
ing in η. For industries that are relatively more intensive in the use of headquarter
services (i.e. η > 0.5), both the optimal integration level and the absolute level of
profits are rising in η.16 The reason for this lies at the heart of the hold-up problem,
whereby a larger share of the manufactured input’s ownership should be given to the
side whose investment has greater impact on the joint surplus, following the optimal
allocation of property rights. In high η industries, the marginal product of the input
from the headquarters is much greater than that of the input from the manufacturing
supplier. Therefore, the underinvestment in the manufactured input that is caused
by a higher degree of integration is more than offset by the rise in total revenues
driven by increased employment of headquarter services. Consequently, the share of
the revenue that the final good producer captures from the relationship is increasing
in the intensity of headquarter services. I refer to this dependence of the optimal
16Notice that the absolute level of profits for η = 0.35 is actually higher than that for η = 0.5. The upper
envelope of operating profits as a function of δ seems to be U-shaped, with the bottom of the U being
reached at an intermediate level of η. This is because the hold-up problem in physical investments is most
severe when both sides to the match make large contributions.
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degree of integration on η as the “Antras effect.”
A second important result from the stage game concerns how δ∗ changes with
match-specific productivity. As seen from (1.3), the revenues of the firm are strictly
increasing in θ. Given a higher level of productivity, a final good producer is in-
clined towards capturing a greater share of the revenue. However, this decreases
the share that is left to the manufacturing supplier, causing underinvestment in the
manufactured input. The downward pressure on the revenue level caused by the
supplier’s underinvestment can potentially outweigh the gains from a productivity
increase. Yet, in an industry with high headquarter intensity, the marginal product
of the manufacturing input is relatively low. This enables the final good producer to
choose a higher stake at the firm without distorting the incentives of its supplier by
too much.
Proposition 2 The optimal level of integration is increasing in the match-specific
productivity level; that is, ∂δ∗(θ)/∂θ > 0.
I refer to this dependence of the optimal degree of integration on θ as the “match
quality effect.” Figure 1.4, panel (b), relates operating profits to δ for a range of
joint productivities in the same industry. While the Antras effect highlights the role
that sector-specific headquarter intensity plays in determining δ∗, the match quality
effect emphasizes within-sector heterogeneity along joint productivities. Given a non-
degenerate distribution of θ, the stage games produce a non-degenerate distribution
of δ∗ among the MNEs. Producers show variation in their level of integration not
only along headquarter intensity, but also their joint productivities within similar
industries. Which one of these effects is more instrumental in determining δ∗ is
essentially an empirical question. Another important implication of Proposition 2
is that the optimal ratio of investments in headquarter services and manufacturing
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inputs, given by(1.6), is higher for those MNEs with a higher match quality in any
given industry. Within-sector heterogeneity in productivity translates into factor
intensity heterogeneity for the MNEs due to the variation in their optimal degree of
foreign ownership.
1.4 Equilibrium Under Uncertainty
In serving a host country market, the multinational seeks to maximize the ex-
pected present value of its profits. Given the structure of the multi-period contract,
this will be equivalent to maximizing the total profit stream of the whole relationship
(the integrated firm) associated with a match. The problem for the multinational is
to determine the optimal path of integration with a manufacturing supplier to achieve
this goal. This includes the option that the final good producer might withdraw from
the partnership in order to seek a new match at any period in the relationship. I
solve the problem by working backward, starting in period 2.17
From stage 8 on, the final good producer knows the true value of θ, which will
be its joint productivity with the supplier in this and all future periods. Let J(θ)
denote the expected present value of profits to a firm who has a known match quality
θ and is behaving optimally. Note that having realized its true productivity, the final
good producer could calculate its optimal level of investment, δ∗2, and stipulate this
level in the contract to be updated. Therefore, θ is a sufficient statistic for the firm’s
expected present value at any period in time, which allows me to write the value
function in terms of θ only.
Let r be the firm’s discount rate. If the contract is updated, then the value of
17The solution concept here is similar to the discussion in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), who work with
a simplified version of Jovanovic’s model in its original context of labor markets. I also work with a simple
discrete time version of Jovanovic’s model; however, the current model differs significantly from the original
in certain respects, such as its contracting structure and probability distributions.
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the firm is given by pi(θ) + 1
r+λ
J(θ), where18
(1.9) pi(θ) = X
µ−α
1−α θ
α
1−αψ(δ2, η)− wNδ2
is the per-period profit of the firm at the outcome of the stage game in period 2.
Recall that λ is the exogenously given separation rate due to adverse liquidity shocks.
If the contract is terminated, no production will take place this period as the
final good producer would have no provision of the manufactured inputs. The final
good producer could then start searching for a new manufacturing input supplier
next period and draw a new match parameter. Let Q be the present value of profits
of a final good producer who withdraws from a match and behaves optimally. Since
the search for a new supplier involves drawing a new value of θ independent of the
previous matches, Q will be a constant under the assumptions of an infinite horizon
and constant discount rate (Jovanovic, 1979).19
The Bellman equation that characterizes the value of the game to the final good
producer in period 2 is then given by: J(θ) = max{pi(θ)+ 1
r+λ
J(θ), 1
r
Q}. I depict this
equation in Figure 1.5. The value of continued joint production is rising in the match
parameter while the value of withdrawal is constant. As is clear from the figure, the
optimal policy is one that updates the contract for values of θ above a certain level
and terminates it below this threshold level. The solution to the Bellman equation
in period 2 is given by:
J(θ) =

pi(θ) + 1
r+λ
J(θ) for θ ≥ θ
1
r
Q for θ ≤ θ
(1.10)
where the threshold level θ satisfies:20
18I suppress the other arguments of the per-period profit function for notational simplicity.
19In the current model, the constancy of Q implies that if a final good producer withdraws from a match
with a supplier, it will never choose to carry out joint production with this particular supplier in the future.
20Notice that (1.10) implies J(θ) = r+λ
r+λ−1pi(θ) for θ ≥ θ.
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(1.11)
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ) =
1
r
Q
The final good producer’s optimal policy in period 2 implies that, in equilibrium,
only those matches that have high enough productivities will continue joint produc-
tion in future periods. If the true value of θ is revealed to be below θ, the firm will be
dissolved since continuing the relationship indefinitely at a low θ yields a lower ex-
pected present value of profits than the alternative matches. This aspect of the model
can explain the often mentioned case of “cherry-picking” in foreign direct investment,
whereby multinational firms invest only in the high productivity plants in the host
economy. Since the multinational can sample from a large pool of potential suppliers
and it locks itself in a relationship with the same supplier, its optimal policy is to
wait until it finds itself in a match with high enough productivity. In equilibrium,
only those multinationals that realize a certain threshold level of productivity persist
in the industry.
The multinational’s optimal policy in period 2 implies that matches break up only
between the first and second periods. If the multinational decides to remain in the
relationship in period 2, then it will continue joint production indefinitely. Hence,
divestment is negatively correlated with the age of the multinational and the model
reproduces the empirical observation that most plant closures by multinationals occur
in the early stages of the partnership.
Given the optimal policy of contract updating in period 2, I now turn to the
final good producer’s decision making in period 1 in the presence of uncertainty.
Having received a noisy signal on the match parameter, y, the final good producer
follows Bayesian updating to calculate the posterior probability distribution of θ.
The following lemma describes the properties of the posterior distribution.
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Lemma 1: Let y denote a random draw from a uniform distribution over the range
(0, θ]. The Pareto(b, γ) distribution has density:
f(θ) =

γbγ
θγ+1
if θ ≥ b
0 otherwise
where b > 0 and γ > 2. Let γ˜ = γ+1 and b˜ = max(y, b). The posterior density
of θ is defined by:
f(θ|y) ∝

1
θγ˜+1
if θ ≥ b˜
0 otherwise
which takes the same form as the prior. Hence θ|y is Pareto(γ˜, b˜) with E(θ|y) =
γ˜b˜
γ˜−1 and V ar(θ|y) =
[
γ˜
γ˜−2 −
(
γ˜
γ˜−1
)2]
b˜.
Proof: See Leonard and Hsu (1999).
Lemma 1 expresses the posterior expected value of θ in terms of the parameters of the
distribution and the signal. In order for the signal to be informative about θ, I assume
for the remaining analysis that the lower bound for the signal is b, so that b˜ = y.21
This setup leads the firm to infer that the true value of its θ is increasing in the value
of the signal that it receives, as the posterior mean is given by: θ˜ = E(θ|y) = γ˜
γ˜−1y.
Notice that since y is uniformly distributed, the posterior mean is also distributed
uniformly, characterized by the parameters bˆ and γˆ, where bˆ = γ˜
γ˜−1b and γˆ =
γ˜
γ˜−1θ.
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I denote the distribution of the posterior mean by G(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ).
Let V (θ˜) be the value to a final good producer who has received signal y and
21One can interpret this by assuming, for instance, that the firm receives a signal above a certain value in
expectation of the productivity gains from a takeover. Note that when y < b, the posterior mean becomes
γ˜b/(γ˜ − 1), which is independent of y, and therefore the signal becomes uninformative.
22The support of a uniform distribution is defined by its upper and lower bounds.
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is behaving optimally in period 1. If the final good producer chooses to remain in
the match, the outcome of the game in period 1 yields a per-period profit of pi(θ˜),
where23
(1.12) pi(θ˜) = X
µ−α
1−αE
[
θ
α
1−α |y
]
ψ(δ1, η)− wNδ1
In the case that the match breaks up, the final good producer receives a per-
period profit of zero and it can seek out a new supplier next period. If it survives,
the true value of θ is revealed. Then V (θ˜) satisfies:
(1.13) V (θ˜) = max
{
pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ
J(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜), 1
r
Q
}
In (1.13), P (θ′|γ˜, b˜) is the conditional distribution of joint productivities for the
next period when the true θ is revealed. As with the contract updating policy in
period 2, (1.13) implies an optimal policy for the final good producer that continues
the match above a certain level of θ˜, and withdraws from it below this threshold.24
The solution to the Bellman equation for the first period is given by:
(1.14) V (θ˜) =

pi(θ˜) + 1
r+λ
´
J(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜) for θ˜ ≥ θ˜
1
r
Q for θ˜ ≤ θ˜
where θ˜ satisfies:
(1.15) pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ
J(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜) = 1
r
Q
23The following equations are written with some abuse of notation. Notice that equation (1.12) is actually
defined in terms of E
[
θ
α
1−α |y
]
, which is not the same as θ˜ = E(θ|y). To be more precise, one can calculate
E
[
θ
α
1−α |y
]
as γ˜
γ˜−α/(1−α)y
α/(1−α) by using the density function f(θ) in Lemma 1. Notice that just like
E(θ|y), E
[
θ
α
1−α |y
]
is determined by γ˜ and y. Likewise, taking α as given, the distribution of the posterior
expectation is uniform and characterized by similar parameters.
24To see this, notice that both pi(θ˜) and 1
r+λ
´
J(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜) are increasing in θ˜ while 1
r
Q is constant.
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It is possible to show (see Appendix) that pi(θ) > pi(θ˜); that is, the final good
producer requires a higher level of profits in period 2 to stay in the match compared
to the level of profits it would accept in period 1 to continue joint production. The
reason for the increase in the “reservation profits” is the resolution of the uncertainty
over the joint productivity parameter. Since the final good producer knows that
the firm’s total profits will be determined by the true value of θ in period 2 and
thereafter, it becomes more selective in establishing a long-term relationship with
a supplier. An immediate implication of this result is that θ > θ˜, because the
per-period profit function pi(.) is strictly increasing in θ. Therefore, the final good
producer’s optimal policy implies divestment whenever the true productivity level
with the supplier turns out to be lower than the threshold value of the posterior
mean.
The increase in the reservation productivity level of the final good producer ex-
plains the argument that foreign direct investors tend to retain high-productivity
firms under their ownership and sell low-productivity firms to uninformed agents
since they gain crucial information about the productivity of the firms under their
control (Loungani and Razin, 2001). Note, however, that in order to gain this cru-
cial information, the final good producer should commit to at least one period of
joint production with its supplier. What happens following this learning stage is a
selection process which eliminates low quality matches. As a result, multinational
producers lie at the high end of the productivity distribution for a universe of plants
in host economies.25
I now study whether there exists a unique solution to the final good producer’s
25This mechanism implies a lemons problem in the market for corporate stocks when foreign owners are
divesting. It would not be surprising to see a decline in the value of a firm when corporate control is handed
from foreign owners back to the initial owners of the firm.
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dynamic problem. The final good producer’s optimal policy consists of a threshold
strategy in each of the two periods of the model. If the final good producer leaves
the match at either of these periods, it can match with a new supplier and receive
a noisy signal on its joint productivity with the new partner. The expected present
value from a new match is given by:
(1.16) Q =
ˆ
V (θ˜)dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)
The final good producer’s optimal policy is characterized by the equations (1.10),
(1.14), and (1.16), which give rise to a single Bellman equation in V :
V (θ˜) = max
{
pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ
max
{
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ),
1
r
ˆ
V (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
}
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜),
1
r
ˆ
V (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
}
(1.17)
The following result establishes the solution to the final good producer’s dynamic
problem and is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique, bounded, and continuous solution for V in (1.17).
What does the learning process imply about the optimal level of integration? Recall
that the final good producer designs a multi-period contract in period 1 (stage 4)
which specifies its share of the manufactured input in the first period and gives the
right to update this share when the uncertainty is resolved (stage 8). I am interested
in how this share evolves as the match endures. Within the property-rights framework
of the multinational firm, I expect the resolution of the uncertainty to lead to a more
efficient allocation of residual rights as joint production reveals the optimal mix of
headquarter services and manufactured inputs. The multi-period contract should be
updated to reflect this allocation of rights over the manufactured input.
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Consider a final good producer in period 1 that has received a signal such that
its posterior expected value of θ, say θ˜t, lies between θ and θ˜. In equilibrium, this
marginal producer will start production with its supplier in the first period but it
will divest and withdraw from its match if the true value of its θ eventually turns
out to be less than θ. For the producer to survive with its current match into future
periods, its true θ should turn out to be greater than θ > θ˜t. This implies that
the true joint productivity with the supplier should surpass the posterior expected
value, which is calculated from the signal, for surviving firms. Recalling the earlier
result that ∂δ∗(θ)/∂θ > 0, the marginal producer will increase its optimal level of
integration with the supplier in the case that the match survives. It is then intuitive
to see the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The optimal level of integration for an average firm in its second
period is higher than the optimal level of integration for an average firm in its
first period. In other words, the optimal degree of foreign ownership is rising
over time for an average multinational.
Proposition 3 explains the empirical regularity demonstrated in Section 2 that foreign
equity participation rises with the age of the MNE. The intuition is fairly straightfor-
ward and depends on the selection of high productivity matches into future periods.
Low productivity matches dissolve if the true value of their θ is not higher than
their posterior mean. High productivity matches survive into the second period and
the multi-period contract is updated to reflect the revelation of the true value of
productivity. This selection mechanism leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The optimal ratio of investments in headquarter services and man-
ufactured inputs, h∗/m∗, rises with the age of the integrated firm.
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Proposition 4 is relatively easy to see from equation (1.6). Notice that (1.6) depends
only on δ, and positively. Since the optimal level of integration is increasing over
time for an average multinational, we immediately have that h∗/m∗ is higher in the
second period than in the first period. Hence, the model predicts that production
gets more intensive in the use of headquarter services as the integrated firm continues
production in future periods. In the second period, there is a greater transfer of
headquarter services that are produced in the North to the production plant in the
South. Therefore, the model generates transfer of technology that is driven by the
degree of foreign ownership and explains the empirical finding that multinational
plants get more headquarter-intensive over time.26
The inner workings of the dynamic model essentially depend on a selection mecha-
nism whereby low productivity matches dissolve as the uncertainty over match quality
is resolved. This selection mechanism determines the rise in the threshold levels of
joint productivity from period 1 to period 2 and leads to the optimal reallocation of
property rights within the firm. According to the model, the probability of a match
being dissolved in period 2 is given by Prob{θ′ < θ|θ˜} = P (θ|γ˜, b˜), which is obviously
negatively correlated with θ˜, the posterior expected value for joint productivity. I
summarize this selection mechanism in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The probability of a match being dissolved subsequently is nega-
tively correlated with the current level of joint productivity.
The dynamic model can thus explain the major empirical regularities identified in
Section 2 in addition to a set of well-known facts in the literature. It also presents
some strong implications about the evolution of the degree of foreign ownership and
26See, for instance, the discussion in Arnold and Javorcik (2009) for how factor intensity and use of
imported inputs evolves at multinationals over time.
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productivity and how they interact. I turn next to a rigorous empirical analysis of
this interaction.
1.5 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical model described above delivers some testable implications about
the relationship between the level of foreign ownership and the joint productivity
(“match quality”) of the multinational parent and the manufacturing supplier. In
order to test the implications of the model, I measure joint productivity at the
MNE by total factor productivity (TFP). This section first discusses the construction
of the joint productivity measure and then lays out the econometric strategy to
test the model alongside presenting my findings using plant-level data from Turkish
manufacturing industry.
1.5.1 Estimating Joint Productivity
In the model, output is produced according to the Cobb-Douglas production
function:
xj(i) = θ
[
hj(i)
ηj
]ηj [mj(i)
1− ηj
]1−ηj
, 0 < ηj < 1,
where θ indicates joint productivity, hj(i) is the headquarter services input that is
imported from the North, and mj(i) is the manufactured component at the plant
in the South. Both the headquarter firm and the manufacturing supplier employ
physical capital, labor, and some intermediate inputs to provide h and m. While
I do not observe the quantities of inputs that are used in the production of h, I
do observe the inputs used by the supplier firm to produce m. More specifically, I
assume that m is produced following a Cobb-Douglas function of the form:
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(1.18) mj(i) = k
a
i, jl
b
i, jn
c
i, je
d
i, j
where k represents physical capital, l represents labor, n represents raw material
inputs, and e represents energy consumption. Substituting (1.18) into the final pro-
duction function gives:
xj(i) = θ
[
hj(i)
ηj
]ηj [kai, jlbi, jnci, jedi, j
1− ηj
]1−ηj
which suggests the following specification of the Cobb-Douglas production function
in logs:
logxj(i) = β0+β1loghj(i)+β2logkj(i)+β3loglj(i)+β4lognj(i)+β5logej(i)+logθ+εj(i)
where logθ is the productivity shock that is observed by the producer but not by
the econometrician, and ε are unobservable shocks to efficiency. Productivity shocks
logθ are assumed to follow a first-order Markov process. Since I cannot differentiate
between h and n in my data set, I choose to follow a value-added estimation approach.
Letting vj(i) represent value added, i.e. gross output net of both imported and
domestic intermediate inputs, I can write the production function as:
(1.19) logvj(i) = β0 + βklogkj(i) + βlloglj(i) + logθ + ε
The parameters of the value-added equation (1.19) are consistently estimated
using the two-step procedure suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and predicted
levels of productivity are recovered from:
θˆ = exp(logv − βˆklogk − βˆllogl)
The Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure relies on firms’ intermediate inputs to
proxy for productivity shocks that are correlated with firms’ inputs of production. In
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my estimations, I use raw materials to proxy productivity shocks in order to satisfy
the monotonicity condition.27 I estimate the parameters of (1.19) at the ISIC Rev.
2 three digit industry level; coefficient estimates are reported in Table 1.9.28
Table 1.2 reports the mean values of some key variables used in the empirical
analysis by type of ownership and year. The average TFP value for the multinationals
is more than twice that for domestic plants in most of the years in the sample.
The average TFP at multinationals throughout the sample period is around 5.3
compared to 1.3 at domestic plants, a difference that is statistically significant. This
finding confirms the model’s prediction that, in equilibrium, only the most productive
plants are controlled by multinational investors. Accordingly, multinational plants
in Turkey are much larger compared to domestic plants, both in terms of the number
of workers they employ and the value of output they produce. They are also more
capital intensive on average and have much higher value added. Hence, there is a
sizable premium to being multinational, which is well documented in the literature.
What remains to be understood, however, are the determinants of the extent of
ownership at multinationals, to which I turn next.
1.5.2 Match Quality and the Level of Foreign Ownership
This subsection answers two questions that are central to my model: i) What
determines the level of foreign ownership at subsidiaries of multinational firms; and
ii) how does joint productivity affect the level of ownership? Theory suggests that
there are two primary factors that determine the answer to my first question. The
27An alternative methodology for TFP calculation is Olley and Pakes (1996), who suggest using invest-
ment decisions to proxy productivity shocks. However, there is a large number of zero observations for
the investment series in the Turkish data, as can be seen from Table 1.8, which reports the percentage of
non-zero observations of potential proxy variables for the ten largest manufacturing sectors.
28I estimate industry categories 313 (beverages) and 314 (tobacco) together, as well as 361 (pottery,
china, earthenware) and 362 (glass products), to increase the sample size for the estimation at the industry
level. For the same concern, the production function is not estimated for the industries of 353 (petroleum
refineries) and 354 (other petroleum), which have a total of 367 plant-year observations.
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first is the industry-level intensity of the production line in headquarter services,
η, which I refer to as the “Antras effect.” The second is the match-specific joint
productivity, θ, which I call the “match quality effect.” Antras (2003) and Antras
and Helpman (2004) proxy η by industry-level data on capital- and skill-intensity,
respectively, and I compute these values for the Turkish manufacturing data for its
85 industries defined at the ISIC four digit level.29 I compute θ as described in the
previous section and estimate variants of the following Tobit type-one model:
y∗it = α + βθln(θ)it + βK/Lln(K/L)gt + βS/Lln(S/L)gt + µt + εit(1.20)
yit =

y∗it if 0 < y
∗
it ≤ 100
0 if y∗it ≤ 0
(1.21)
where i indexes plants, g indexes industries, and t indexes time. In (1.20), y∗it is a
latent variable indicating the optimal level of foreign equity participation, but in the
data I simply observe yit. I assume ε ∼ N(0, σ2) with variance σ2 constant across
observations, and µt are year dummies.
Table 1.4 reports the estimates of the model in (1.20). In all columns, I report
standardized “beta” coefficients, which makes it easy to analyze and compare the
size of the coefficients. To judge the goodness of fit for the different models, I
follow Wooldridge (2002) and calculate R2 as the square of the correlation coefficient
between yi and yˆi, where yˆi is the Tobit estimate of E(y|x = xi) with x being
the vector of explanatory variables. The results indicate that match quality is a
highly significant determinant of the degree of foreign ownership. Joint productivity
29I conducted the following analysis at the ISIC three-digit level as well, and my results are unchanged.
My analysis with 85 industries is an improvement over Antras (2003), who worked at the 2-digit SIC level
with 28 industries, and Yeaple (2006), who worked with 51 industries from BEA data, but falls short of a
similar exercise conducted by Nunn and Trefler (2008), who work with 370 industries from the US Census
data. Unlike these studies, however, I am interested in determining firm-level outcomes as opposed to the
industry-level.
35
alone can explain more of the variation in foreign equity participation as compared to
sectoral capital and skill intensity (see columns (1) and (2)). I find that while sectoral
skill intensity is a significant determinant of foreign equity participation, sectoral
capital intensity is not. Comparing the sizes of the coefficients in column (3) indicates
that joint productivity has a larger effect than industry-level factor intensities. Hence,
the “match quality effect” outweighs the “Antras effect” in determining the degree of
integration at multinational subsidiaries.
These findings are consistent with a high degree of within-industry heterogeneity
in factor use. In their study of intrafirm trade using French data, Corcos et al. (2010)
find factor intensity to be an important determinant of firms’ sourcing decisions
when measured at the firm level, but not at the industry level, which they attribute
to substantial within-industry heterogeneity. In order to determine whether match
quality still matters when this heterogeneity is taken into account, I estimate (1.20)
with firm-level capital and skill intensity. Indeed, columns (4) and (5) show that both
variables are highly significant determinants of foreign equity participation. I find
that match quality retains its significance with an economically large effect even after
controlling for firm-level heterogeneity in factor intensities: a one standard deviation
increase in joint productivity leads to a 0.223 standard deviation increase in foreign
equity participation.
One of the major propositions that comes out of my model is that, conditional
on acquisition taking place, the level of foreign ownership is increasing in the joint
productivity of the final good producer and the manufactured input supplier; i.e.
∂δ/∂θ > 0. In order to quantify the impact of joint productivity on the level of
foreign ownership, I estimate the pooled Tobit model:
y∗it = α + βθln(θ)it + βK/Lln(K/L)it + βS/Lln(S/L)it + γ
′Xit + εit,(1.22)
36
where y∗it is defined by (1.21) and Xit is a vector of firm-level controls.
30 The pooled
Tobit model has two distinct advantages. First, it does not maintain strict exo-
geneity of the explanatory variables; while εit are assumed to be independent of the
covariates, the relationship between the current error term and the covariates in the
other time periods is unspecified. This means that we can safely estimate explana-
tory variables that are affected by feedback from previous periods. Second, εit are
allowed to be serially dependent, so that y∗it can be dependent after conditioning on
the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002).
Table 1.5 reports the estimates from the model in (1.22), which also control for
year and sector effects.31 I report marginal effects conditional on foreign acquisition;
i.e. E(∂y/∂x|0 < y ≤ 100). Column (1) indicates that a 10 percent increase in
joint productivity is associated with around a 17 percent increase in foreign equity
participation when I do not control for additional covariates. This is an economi-
cally significant effect and it points to substantial variation in the degree of foreign
ownership simply due to “match quality.” When additional covariates are included in
columns (2) and (3), the estimated effect is 18 percent and 14 percent, respectively.
These figures show that multinationals acquire sizable shares of equity at those of
their subsidiaries that they perceive as highly productive partnerships. Controlling
for unobserved plant effects in column (4) does not change the major finding of
a positive relationship between joint productivity and foreign equity participation,
30My choice of controls is informed by existing studies which predict the type of foreign ownership at
the plant level (see, for instance, Barbosa and Louri (2002)). It is important to note that there is a
subtle difference between the determinants of the level of foreign ownership and the determinants of foreign
acquisition per se. Most of the existing literature has focused on the latter, predicting what factors increase
the likelihood of a domestic plant being taken over. The focus of the current study, however, is on the
former, which will not necessarily share the factors that predict acquisition.
31If foreign investors own larger equity fractions in sectors that are more productive than the others, then
failing to control for sector effects might drive the relationship reported in Table 1.5. Controlling for sector
effects ensures that this relationship is driven by within-industry variation.
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although it returns much lower coefficients across the board.32
It is possible to have a nonzero correlation between ln(θ)it and εit in (1.22) if the
specification does not include relevant time-varying factors correlated with TFP, or if
TFP is mismeasured.33 An additional concern is reverse causality, whereby the degree
of foreign ownership might impact productivity through intrafirm activities. An oft
mentioned argument is that equity investment decisions precede physical investment
decisions, for instance if majority foreign ownership is required to transfer technology
to the affiliate (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2006). If such physical investment affects TFP
concurrently, then ln(θ) is potentially endogenous in (1.22).34 I therefore turn to
an instrumental variables (IV) Tobit model to establish the causal link from joint
productivity to the degree of foreign ownership.
I implement the IV Tobit model in a two-step procedure following Smith and
Blundell (1986) and Wooldridge (2002), in which residuals from first stage estimation
are included in (1.22) and a standard Tobit is estimated at the second step. I estimate
the first stage by ordinary least squares including the (log of) price cost-margin
32Column (4) reports estimates from a random effects Tobit model to control for unobserved individual
effects since unconditional fixed effects estimates are biased as is well known. Controlling for individual
effects comes at a cost, though, because the random effects Tobit estimator requires strict exogeneity
conditional on the unobserved effects. This assumption is unlikely to be satisfied in the present context as
theory emphasizes the link between firm-specific characteristics and firm-level outcomes.
33I experimented with three additional methods to check the robustness of my results against the con-
struction of the TFP measure. First, I used electricity use as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks
instead of raw materials in the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. Second, I estimated equation (1.19) assuming
there are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, instead of one. Data on the number of non-production
and production workers are used to represent skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. I estimated the
production function with two types of labor first using electricity usage as a proxy, and then using raw
materials. My results are robust to these alternative methods and they are available upon request.
34While the differences in the level of productivity between MNEs and domestic firms are well documented,
the evidence from the few studies on whether there is a causal effect of foreign ownership on productivity
is inconclusive. Using data from the British and Italian manufacturing industries, respectively, Harris and
Robinson (2002) and Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) find that foreigners acquire the most productive
plants (cherry-picking) and that foreign ownership has no effect on productivity. In contrast, Arnold
and Javorcik (2009) find that foreign acquisitions do lead to productivity improvements in Indonesian
manufacturing, and Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that foreign equity participation is positively correlated
with plant productivity, as measured by (log) output, in Venezuela. In a review of the literature, Navaretti
and Venables (2004) argue: “... the evidence reported up to now supports a statistical association between
foreign ownership and productivity, but not a causal link.”
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(PCM) at the plant level, which serves as the identifying exclusion restriction. The
PCM is calculated as {(value added - total wages)/gross value of production} for each
plant-year observation. The PCM captures the multinational’s marginal costs and
price-setting behavior and thus directly reflects its market power and profitability,
which cannot be accounted for by physical inputs to production. These in turn are
positively associated with firm-level productivity, which renders PCM a good proxy
for ln(θ). In the data, the simple correlation between (log) PCM and (log) TFP is
0.39. Barbosa and Louri (2002) find, using plant level data from Portugal, that PCM
does not affect multinationals’ ownership preferences, which provides support for the
exogeneity condition of the instrument.
Estimates from the IV Tobit model are reported in columns (5)-(7) of Table
1.5.35 First stage results indicate that PCM is a highly significant predictor of joint
productivity; a 10 percent increase in PCM is associated with around a 5 percent
increase in TFP. Accounting for endogeneity does not affect my major findings and
estimates at the second stage. Column (5) shows that a 10 percent increase in joint
productivity leads to an 18 percent increase in foreign equity participation. Including
further controls in columns (6) and (7), this estimate becomes 14 percent and 12
percent, respectively. Table 1.5 additionally reports the results of the Wald test of
exogeneity for the two-step procedure, which indicate that endogeneity is a valid
concern except for column (5). As a result, these estimates point to a robust and
economically large effect of joint productivity on the degree of foreign ownership.
Comparing the size of the estimates for all covariates, joint productivity is only
second to plant size in determining foreign equity participation. As expected, capital
and skill intensity as well as plant size unambiguously impact the degree of foreign
35As a robustness check, I estimated the IV Tobit model using maximum likelihood as well. My results
are unchanged using this alternative method.
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ownership positively.
1.5.3 Match Quality and Selection
Why does the average degree of foreign ownership rise over time? In the model,
multinationals enter a relationship with input suppliers if they receive a high enough
productivity draw and they determine their level of equity participation depending
on the noisy signal on this draw. Because they lock themselves in a long-lasting
relationship upon the resolution of the uncertainty over joint productivity, multi-
nationals choose higher shares of equity in a high productivity partnership. They
are also predicted to increase their equity share if true productivity turns out to be
better than what is implied by the noisy signal. If, on the other hand, they find
themselves to be in a low productivity partnership after uncertainty is resolved, then
they dissolve the match and engage in divestment. As low productivity matches
dissolve with learning, divestment occurs at those partnerships with lower levels of
foreign equity participation, thus producing the trend in Figure 1.3. This subsection
tests whether the described selection mechanism is also at work empirically by using
nonparametric and semi-parametric survival analysis.
I define divestment as constituting any reduction in foreign equity participation
that exceeds 1 percentage point, including cases of plant closure by the multinational
parent.36 A reduction in foreign equity participation means the sale of equity shares
back to the domestic supplier or a third party, which indicates that the multinational
parent is unwilling to commit resources in line with its original stake as it perceives
itself to be in a low productivity match. In the data, the median age (defined as
the number of years that the newly established MNE has operated) of divestment is
36The reason for choosing 1 percent for the definition is to sidestep any coding errors in the data and to
capture the fact that any change in excess of 1 percent can have significant implications for the subsidiary,
if for instance, the multinational parent decreases its stake from 51 percent to 49 percent.
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3 years. I start by modeling the “hazard” of divestment by a strictly empirical and
nonparametric approach that leaves out covariates that could affect the hazard rate,
which is the well-known Kaplan-Meier estimator. Let T be the time until divestment
occurs and am be the age of the MNE in year m = 1, ..., M ; e.g. a1 is the first year
of production for the MNE. Then the survivor (no divestment) function at age am is
given by:
(1.23) S(am) = P (T > am) = Π
m
r=1P (T > ar|T > ar−1)
Now for each r = 1, ..., M , define Nr to be the number of MNEs in the “risk set”
for interval r. That is, Nr is the number of MNEs that did not engage in divestment
in the time interval [ar−1, ar), so they are subject to the hazard of divestment during
this period (age). Similarly, define Dr to be the number of MNEs that engaged in
divestment in interval r. A consistent estimator of (1.23) at age am is then given by
(Wooldridge, 2002):
Sˆ(am) = Π
m
r=1 [(Nr −Dr)/Nr]
The Kaplan-Meier estimator imposes minimal restrictions and assumes that the
probability of divestment depends only on time. In the present context, it highlights
the role that learning over time plays in determining survival/divestment. Figure 1.6
depicts the evolution of the Kaplan-Meier estimates of divestment. I divide MNEs
into four groups of 25 percentile units according to their average productivity.37 The
figure displays the cumulative probability of divestment by age for the MNEs ranked
by their percentile of productivity. The cumulative divestment functions for the
four groups diverge over time, with the MNEs in the bottom 25th and second 25th
37As a robustness check, I conducted the following nonparametric and semi-parametric analyses using the
initial values of productivity at the MNEs as well. My results are unchanged with this alternative variable.
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percentiles subject to higher divestment hazard throughout. MNEs in these two
groups have around a one-third probability of divestment beyond age seven. A log-
rank test for the equality of the divestment functions for these four groups returns
a χ2 value of 13.22 with an associated p-value of 0.004. When I control for time-
invariant sector and/or year effects, the log-rank test essentially returns a p-value of
0. Coupled with Figure 1.6, these test statistics provide strong evidence that low
productivity matches dissolve earlier than high productivity matches.
An important assumption of the Kaplan-Meier estimator is that all MNEs in the
sample behave the same regardless of whether they have engaged in divestment or
not. If those MNEs that experienced no divestment during the sample period behave
differently from those that did, then the Kaplan-Meier estimator may return biased
results. Additionally, there could be other factors that influence the probability of
divestment, such as plant size, which are not controlled for in the non-parametric
approach. In order to address these issues, I turn to a Cox proportional hazard model.
Cox (1972) suggests a semi-parametric method of analyzing the impact of covariates
on the hazard rate while handling censored cases (MNEs for which no divestment
took place) and individual heterogeneity. Let the hazard function be given by:
(1.24) λ(Ti) = exp(−x′iβ)λ0(Ti)
where λ0 is the “baseline” hazard, which reflects individual heterogeneity, and x is a
vector of covariates. Cox’s partial likelihood estimator provides consistent estimates
of β without specifying the form and the estimation of λ0 individually. Since inter-
est is on how match quality impacts the probability of divestment, the Cox model
provides the best tradeoff between the purely non-parametric model and the more
restrictive parametric models.
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Table 1.6 presents the estimates of the model in (1.24) with different sets of
controls. I report hazard ratios; a ratio above 1.0 means higher odds of divestment
and hazard ratios below 1.0 are associated with decreased hazard of divestment. All
estimations are stratified by sector and year, which allow for equal coefficients of
the covariates across these pairings, but generate baseline hazards unique to each
stratum. Hence, I guard against sectoral and economy-wide shocks in a given year
that may render the baseline hazards for these pairs non-proportional.38
I find strong evidence that lower levels of productivity increase the probability of
a match being dissolved between the multinational parent and its supplier. Columns
(1) and (2) report the estimated effect of an MNE’s time-invariant average produc-
tivity on the probability of divestment.39 One unit decrease in average productivity
in log terms is associated with between 35 percent and 27 percent higher hazard
of divestment. Considering that one standard deviation of average productivity is
about 1.42 in log terms, these estimates imply economically large and significant
differences between the survival prospects of MNEs that lie at the opposite ends of
the productivity distribution. For instance, using the more conservative estimate
from column (2), an MNE at the 25th percentile (ln TFP i = −0.59) is predicted to
have about 44 percent higher hazard of divestment compared to an MNE at the 75th
percentile (ln TFP i = 1.05).
In columns (3)-(6), I check whether using a time-variant measure of joint produc-
tivity affects my results. Since the model implies that current levels of productivity
affect subsequent divestment, year-to-year shocks to TFP can potentially influence
38This could be a concern in the Turkish data as Turkey experienced two drastic financial crises in 1994
and 2001, which were accompanied by devaluation of the Turkish Lira and the contraction of nominal GDP
by almost a quarter in both years.
39Using the time-invariant value of average productivity helps attenuate the yearly idiosyncratic shocks
to TFP and can represent a more accurate estimate of the match-specific joint productivity that the multi-
national learns over time.
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the estimated hazard. While joint productivity is still highly significant, a one unit
decrease is now associated with between 20 percent and 14 percent higher hazard
of divestment (columns (3) and (4), respectively). Controlling for firm-level random
effects in column (5) decreases this estimate to 12 percent. The random effects Cox
model has the advantage of accounting for within-firm correlation in the divestment
hazard. Column (6) indicates that with the addition of further controls, firm-level
TFP no longer affects the hazard of divestment significantly. These results suggest
that divestment at MNEs occurs primarily at the cross-section through a process of
learning about fixed match quality rather than at a longitudinal level through MNEs
reacting to changes in year-to-year productivity. This is supported by the likelihood
ratio tests of shared frailty in columns (5) and (6), which find a significant firm-level
frailty effect. Table 1.6 also shows that a smaller plant size and lower skill intensity
at the plant level increase the probability of divestment. Perhaps surprisingly, capital
intensity has no effect on the prospects of survival, except in column (6). Lastly, the
proportional hazard tests provide strong support for the model specification in all
columns, except for column (6).
1.6 Conclusion
Using an almost exhaustive database of Turkish manufacturing plants, I con-
ducted a detailed examination of the degree of vertical integration among multi-
nationals operating in Turkey and uncovered some empirical regularities that are
unknown in the literature. Motivated by these and earlier findings, I developed a
multi-period model of foreign direct investment under uncertainty. I showed that
there exists a nondegenerate distribution of foreign ownership in integrated firms
regardless of industry and that the degree of foreign ownership rises over time. The
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multi-period model developed in this paper is also able to explain several empirical
findings in the literature and can generate “cream-skimming.” An important point
that emerges from the model is that the relative use of factors in production, and
thus the amount of intrafirm trade, are directly linked to the level of integration
with the parent foreign company. This implies that technology transfer within inte-
grated firms is determined by the degree of foreign ownership and it takes place only
gradually via intrafirm trade conditional on survival.
My empirical analysis on the relationship between productivity and the degree
of foreign ownership has revealed the importance of within-sector heterogeneity in
explaining the distribution of foreign equity participation across plants. I find that
a 10 percent increase in plant-level TFP is associated with between 12 and 18 per-
cent increase in foreign equity participation. While factor shares in the production
technology are also important in predicting the degree of foreign ownership, the het-
erogeneity in plant-level productivities can better explain the investment decisions
of multinationals. I also find that MNEs with lower levels of productivity are more
likely to engage in divestment. As a result, my empirical analysis lends support to
the selection mechanism described in the theoretical model. Further empirical anal-
ysis of how the degree of foreign ownership impacts intrafirm trade would be most
welcome.
1.7 Appendix A
The Appendix contains some intermediate results and proofs of the propositions
and theories that are mentioned in the body of the text.
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1.7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part of the proof, I show that there
exists a solution δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) to the final good producer’s problem. In the second
part, I show that this optimal level of integration is unique. In order to simplify the
analysis, I show these results for the optimal fraction of revenues that accrue to the
final good producer, β∗V . Recall that βV = δ
α(1−β)+β. Since the choice of the level
of integration, δ, uniquely determines the division rule of the surplus, βV , it will be
sufficient to pin down an optimal βV ∈ (0, 1). One can then back out δ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
from δ = [(β∗V − β)/(1− β)]1/α.40
Existence:
I rewrite the final good producer’s problem of maximizing per-period profits in
terms of βV (I suppress the other arguments for notational simplicity):
(1.25) max
βV
pi(βV ) = X
µ−α
1−α θ
α
1−αψ(βV )− wN
(
βV − β
1− β
) φ
α
where
ψ(βV ) = α
α
1−α
(
βV
wN
) αη
1−α
(
1− βV
wS
)α(1−η)
1−α
(1− αηβV − α(1− η)(1− βV )) .
The first order condition to this program yields:
∂pi(βV )
∂βV
=
[
ααXµ−αθα
wαηN w
α(1−η)
S
] 1
1−α
[
αβ
αη
1−α−1
V (1− βV )
α(1−η)
1−α −1
(1− α)
]
(1.26)
× [β2V (2η − 1) + βV (2η(α− αη − 1)) + η(1− α + αη)]
− φwN
α(1− β)
(
βV − β
1− β
)φ−α
α
= 0
40Notice also that the first order condition that defines the optimal level of integration, ∂pi(δ)/∂δ = 0,
can be written as (∂pi(βV )/∂βV )(∂βV /∂δ) = 0. The partial derivative of βV with respect to δ is always
non-zero, so that δ∗ is defined by ∂pi(βV )/∂βV = 0.
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For operating profits to have at least one local maximum βV ∈ (0, 1), we require
∂pi(βV )/∂βV > 0 as βV → β (this is the case when δ → 0) and ∂pi(βV )/∂βV < 0 as
βV → 1 (this is the case when δ → 1). First consider the case when βV → 1. The
second term in (1.26) is clearly negative and the first term converges to zero when
α(1−η)
1−α − 1 > 0. If α(1−η)1−α − 1 < 0, then the sign of the quadratic equation in βV in
the square brackets becomes important as the first term in the expression tends to
infinity. However, notice that the quadratic equation goes to −1 + η(1 + α− αη) as
βV → 1. Let g(η) = −1 + η(1 + α − αη). It is easy to check that g(η) is increasing
in η and g(0) = −1 and g(1) = 0. Since η takes on values in the open interval (0, 1),
g(η) is always negative.
Next consider βV → β. The second term in the first order condition vanishes
since φ > α. The sign of the first order condition is then determined by the quadratic
expression β2(2η − 1) + β(2η(α− αη − 1)) + η(1− α + αη), which is required to be
positive to show existence. For high enough values of η, this expression is positive
for almost all β ∈ (0, 1). Since I focus on high headquarter intensity industries
in this paper, the existence of δ∗ follows without much restriction on β.41 For low
headquarter intensity industries, however, the model requires the bargaining power
parameter β to be low enough for vertical integration to arise. In particular, assume
η is less than 1
2
for low headquarter intensity industries; one can check that for
η < 1
2
, β should also be less than 1
2
for integration to arise in equilibrium. Figure 1.7
demonstrates the permissible set of β’s for two industries, one with relatively high
headquarter intensity and the other with relatively low headquarter intensity.
The intuition here comes from the tradeoff faced by the final good producer be-
tween maximizing the level of profits versus maximizing its share of the revenue when
41Only very high values for β may reverse the sign of the quadratic expression in β.
47
it decides on the level of integration. By picking a higher degree of ownership, the
final good producer grabs a bigger fraction of the revenue, but causes its manufac-
turing supplier to underinvest, which leads to a lower overall level of profits. As the
headquarter intensity of the production line increases, the relative importance of the
manufacturing supplier’s input goes down. This means that the supplier’s underin-
vestment has minimal effect on the overall level of profits when η is high, thereby
tilting the final good producer’s tradeoff in favor of a higher share of the revenue.
Notice that the final good producer always receives at least a fraction β of the
revenue. In low η industries, its input is of relatively low importance, so a high bar-
gaining power β already compensates it for its investment. Any additional increase
in the final good producer’s share of the revenue will lower overall profits. In such
industries, one needs the manufacturing supplier to have the upper hand in the ex
post bargaining stage, i.e. 1− β to be high, for vertical integration to occur. In high
η industries, however, the relatively high importance of its input leads the final good
producer to claim a larger fraction of the revenue even if it has a high bargaining
power to start with. Hence, the permissible set of β’s enlarges with headquarter
intensity.
Uniqueness:
I now prove that the optimal level of integration is unique. A sufficient condition
for this result is that operating profits are strictly quasi-concave in δ. To get this
result, I again work with βV and I show the strict concavity of the profit function in
δ. Note that βV is a strictly concave function of δ, since βV = δ
α(1 − β) + β and
α ∈ (0, 1), and profits are strictly increasing in βV by the model assumptions. Hence,
one needs only to show that profits are concave in βV to establish strict concavity in
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δ.42
Since φ > α, the costs of organizational form in (1.25) are convex. Subtracting a
convex function from a concave function returns another concave function; I therefore
check whether X
µ−α
1−α θ
α
1−αψ(βV ) in (1.25) is concave in βV . The second order condition
to the final good producer’s problem is given by:
∂2pi(βV )
∂β2V
=
α
(1− α)2
[
Xµ−αθααα
wαηN w
α(1−η)
S
] 1
1−α [
β
αη
1−α−2
V (1− βV )
α(1−η)
1−α −2
]
(1.27)
×[β3V (1− 2η)α + β2V (1 + αη − α)(4αη − 1)
+βV (1 + αη − α)(2− 3α− 2αη)η + (1 + αη − α)(α + αη − 1)η]
−φwN(φ− α)
α2(1− β)2
(
βV − β
1− β
)φ−α
α
−1
where the first term is the second derivative of X
µ−α
1−α θ
α
1−αψ(βV ) with respect to βV .
In order for operating profits to be concave in βV , it is sufficient for the value of the
cubic equation in βV that is expressed in the square brackets to be negative.
43 The
sign of this expression is determined by the values of the parameters in the model.
In Figure 1.8, I plot out the cubic equation for various values of α and η. As can be
seen from the figure, the cubic equation is everywhere less than zero whenever α < 1
2
,
regardless of what value η takes. When α > 1
2
, the curvature of the cubic equation
is reversed; as a result, the value of the equation becomes only slightly positive when
42This is relatively easy to see. Let D be a convex set and f : D → R be strictly concave. Let B
contain f(D) and g : B → R be concave and strictly increasing. Consider any a, b ∈ D and t ∈ [0, 1]. Let
d = ta+ (1− t)b. The strict concavity of f means that:
f(d) = f (ta+ (1− t)b) > tf(a) + (1− t)f(b)
Then g(f(d)) is strictly concave since:
g (f(d)) > g (tf(a) + (1− t)f(b)) ≥ tg (f(a)) + (1− t)g (f(b))
where the first inequality follows from g being strictly increasing and the second (weak) inequality from
its concavity.
43Note that this is more restrictive than necessary. The second term in (1.27) is unambiguously negative
since φ > α. Negativity of the first term ensures that ∂2pi(βV )/∂β
2
V < 0. However, the second order
condition could still be negative when the first term is positive, depending on the relative sizes of the two
terms.
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evaluated at the extreme end values of βV . This may occur, for instance, when both
α and η are sufficiently high. However, recall that βV is the share of revenue that
accrues to the final good producer, which has a lower bound of β, and 1− βV is the
share of revenue that accrues to the manufacturing input supplier. As a result, one
can comfortably conjecture that the value of βV in equilibrium will be away from the
end points of 0 and 1. This establishes the concavity of the profit function in βV .
(Recall that α governs the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties within
a sector through the CES function for aggregate consumption.)
1.7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In order to show the result, I again work with βV instead of working with δ directly.
Since ∂δ
∗
∂θ
=
(
∂δ∗
∂βV (δ)
)(
∂βV (δ)
∂θ
)
and βV rises monotonically in δ
∗, it is sufficient to sign
the partial derivative ∂βV (δ)/∂θ.
The final good producer’s optimal share of revenues is implicitly defined by the
first order condition in (1.26). Define the function g(βV , θ) =
∂pi(βV )
∂βV
. Using the
implicit function theorem:
∂βV
∂θ
= − ∂g(βV , θ)/∂θ
∂g(βV , θ)/∂βV
Notice that ∂g(βV , θ)/∂βV is simply the second order condition given by (1.27). I
show in the proof of Proposition 1 that (1.27) is negative. Now consider ∂g(βV , θ)/∂θ.
This is given by:
∂g(βV , θ)
∂θ
=
α
1− α
[
1
θ
ααXµ−α
wαηN w
α(1−η)
S
] 1
1−α
[
αβ
αη
1−α−1
V (1− βV )
α(1−η)
1−α −1
(1− α)
]
× [β2V (2η − 1) + βV (2η(α− αη − 1)) + η(1− α + αη)]
Since ψ(βV , η) is assumed to be increasing in βV in high headquarter intensity
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industries, we have44:
∂ψ(βV , η)
∂βV
=
[
αα
wαηN w
α(1−η)
S
] 1
1−α
[
αβ
αη
1−α−1
V (1− βV )
α(1−η)
1−α −1
(1− α)
]
× [β2V (2η − 1) + βV (2η(α− αη − 1)) + η(1− α + αη)] > 0
It is then straightforward to see that ∂g(βV , θ)
∂θ
> 0. Hence, the partial derivative
∂βV /∂θ is positive as a result of the implicit function theorem, which establishes that
δ∗ is strictly increasing in θ.
1.7.3 Proof of Intermediate Result
In the body of the paper, I made the assertion that the level of profits required
by the final good producer to stay in the match rises from the first period to the
second; i.e. pi(θ) > pi(θ˜). I now show formally why this holds.
Using (1.10) and (1.11) in equation (1.15), and adding and subtracting like terms
where necessary, we get:
44To see this result, note that the quadratic term in βV in square brackets goes to (βV − 1)2 as η → 1;
i.e. for high enough values of headquarter intensity, the quadratic expression is positive.
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r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ) = pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ ∞
−∞
J(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ) = pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ θ
−∞
1
r
QdP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
+
1
r + λ
ˆ ∞
θ
r + λ
r + λ+ 1
pi(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ) = pi(θ˜) +
pi(θ)
r + λ− 1
ˆ θ
−∞
dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
+
1
r + λ− 1
ˆ ∞
θ
pi(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
(r + λ)pi(θ) = (r + λ− 1)pi(θ˜) + pi(θ)
ˆ θ
−∞
dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
+
ˆ ∞
θ
pi(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
(r + λ− 1)
[
pi(θ)− pi(θ˜)
]
= pi(θ)
ˆ θ
−∞
dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜) +
ˆ ∞
θ
pi(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)− pi(θ)
(r + λ− 1)
[
pi(θ)− pi(θ˜)
]
= pi(θ)
ˆ θ
−∞
dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜) +
ˆ ∞
θ
pi(θ′)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
−
ˆ θ
−∞
pi(θ)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)−
ˆ ∞
θ
pi(θ)dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
pi(θ)− pi(θ˜) = 1
r + λ− 1
ˆ ∞
θ
[pi(θ′)− pi(θ)] dP (θ′|γ˜, b˜)
pi(θ)− pi(θ˜) > 0
The last line can be easily seen as the right hand side of the equation is certainly
positive due to the fact that pi(.) is an increasing function of θ.
1.7.4 Proof of Theorem 1
I check Blackwell’s sufficient conditions to establish the existence of an appropriate
operator and show its properties. Let T denote the operator which defines V as the
fixed point of the equation (1.17), so that V = TV .
First, T transforms bounded and continuous functions into other bounded and
continuous functions. Boundedness follows since the profit function in terms of the
52
posterior expected value of productivity, pi(θ˜), is bounded. To see this, note that
from equation (1.7), the profit function is bounded from below trivially by the fixed
cost (when θ = 0). The support of θ is (0, ∞), but as θ rises, Proposition 2 implies
that the optimal level of integration, and thus the final good producer’s share of
revenue,βV , should also rise. From (1.8), one can see that this negates the initial
effect on profits from the rise in θ. As βV tends to 1, operating profits collapse to
zero. Continuity follows in a more straightforward manner as the profit function is
continuous in θ˜.
Second, consider V (θ˜) ≥ W (θ˜) from the set of bounded and continuous real-
valued functions on θ. Then:
TV = max
{
pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ
max
[
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ),
1
r
ˆ
V (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
]
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜),
1
r
ˆ
V (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
}
≥ max
{
pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ
max
[
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ),
1
r
ˆ
W (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
]
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜),
1
r
ˆ
W (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
}
= TW
This establishes the monotonicity of T . For Blackwell’s other sufficient condition,
we have:
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T (V + c) = max{
pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ
max
[
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ),
1
r
ˆ {
V (θ˜′) + c
}
dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
]
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜),
1
r
ˆ {
V (θ˜′) + c
}
dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
}
= max{
pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ
max
[
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ),
1
r
ˆ
V (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ) + c
r
]
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜),
1
r
ˆ
V (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ) + c
r
}
= max{
pi(θ˜) +
1
r + λ
ˆ
max
[
r + λ
r + λ− 1pi(θ),
1
r
ˆ
V (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
]
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜),
1
r
ˆ
V (θ˜′)dG(θ˜′|γˆ, bˆ)
}
+
c
r
= TV +
c
r
Hence, T is a contraction operator with modulus 1/r which gives us that the
functional equation in (1.17) has a unique fixed point in the space of bounded and
continuous functions.
1.7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Since the optimal level of integration is strictly increasing in the level of produc-
tivity due to Proposition 2, we need only to show that the average productivity in
the second period is greater than in the first period. The rest of the proof closely
follows Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
The mean values of productivity in period 1 and in period 2 are calculated using
Bayes rule. The probability that a previously unmatched multinational offers a
contract to its supplier in the first period is given by
´∞
θ˜
dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ). The probability
that a previously unmatched multinational offers a contract in the first period and
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updates it in the second period is given by:
´∞
θ˜
´∞
θ
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜)dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ). Following
Bayes rule, average productivity in period 1 and period 2 is respectively given by:
θ˜1 =
´∞
θ˜
θ˜dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)´∞
θ˜
G(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)
θ2 =
´∞
θ˜
´∞
θ
θdP (θ|γ˜, b˜)dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)´∞
θ˜
´∞
θ
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜)G(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)
Using the fact that θ˜ =
´∞
b
θdP (θ|γ˜, b˜), one gets:
θ˜1 =
´∞
θ˜
´∞
b
θdP (θ|γ˜, b˜)dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)´∞
θ˜
G(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)
=
´∞
θ˜
´ θ
b
θdP (θ|γ˜, b˜)dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ) + θ2
´∞
θ˜
´∞
θ
dP (θ|γ˜, b˜)dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)´∞
θ˜
G(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)
<
´∞
θ˜
{
θP (θ|γ˜, b˜) + θ2
[
1− P (θ|γ˜, b˜
]}
dG(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)´∞
θ˜
G(θ˜|γˆ, bˆ)
< θ2
Thus, average productivity rises over time which leads to a greater degree of
foreign ownership at the average integrated firm.
1.7.6 Proof of Proposition 4
In the text.
1.7.7 Proof of Proposition 5
In the text.
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Table 1.1: Presence of Multinationals in Turkish Manufacturing
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No. of MNEs 251 264 277 282 308 338 353 343 341
Total No. of Plants 5,682 5,982 6,466 6,888 7,322 7,855 7,557 7,385 6,950
MNE Presence (%) 4.42 4.41 4.28 4.09 4.21 4.30 4.67 4.64 4.91
(a) Multinational Presence by Year
Plant-Year Obs: MNE Presence:
ISIC Code Sector MNE Total (%)
311 Food 235 6,764 3.47
312 Other Food 116 1,978 5.86
313 Beverage 43 657 6.54
314 Tobacco 53 217 24.42
321 Textiles 175 10,605 1.65
322 Wearing Apparel 199 7,040 2.83
323 Leather 1 787 0.13
324 Footwear 3 693 0.43
331 Wood Products 10 1,128 0.89
332 Furniture 7 935 0.75
341 Paper Products 36 1,009 3.57
342 Printing and Publishing 11 1,166 0.94
351 Industrial Chemicals 74 602 12.29
352 Other Chemicals 294 1,831 16.06
353 Petroleum Refineries 8 63 12.70
354 Other Petroleum 67 229 29.26
355 Rubber Products 54 812 6.65
356 Other Plastic Products 103 2,564 4.02
361 Pottery, China, Earthenware 11 278 3.96
362 Glass Products 43 524 8.21
369 Non-metallic Mineral Products 156 3,649 4.28
371 Iron and Steel 46 1,697 2.71
372 Non-ferrous Metal 23 728 3.16
381 Fabricated Metal Products 147 5,032 2.92
382 Non-electrical Machinery 175 4,158 4.21
383 Electrical Machinery 285 2,809 10.15
384 Transport Equipment 293 2,821 10.39
385 Scientific and Optical Equipment 48 628 7.64
390 Other Manufacturing 41 683 6.00
(b) Multinational Presence by Sector
Notes: An MNE is defined as a plant with any level of foreign ownership share. MNE presence
is the ratio of the number of MNE observations to the total number of observations. Industry
classification follows the International Standard Industry Classification System (ISIC) Rev.2 at the
3-digit level.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics on Firm-Level Variables
Obs Mean Std Dev
Intra-sector
Std Dev (%)
TFP 58,845 -0.631 1.247 0.828
Capital Intensity 59,137 -1.082 1.676 0.973
Skill Intensity 54,248 -1.557 0.954 0.909
Employment 59,127 4.010 1.119 0.971
Electric Use 59,077 -4.471 1.326 0.885
(a) Intra-Sector Heterogeneity
TFP
Capital
Intensity
Skill
Intensity
Employment
Electric
Use
TFP 1.000
Capital Intensity -0.075 1.000
Skill Intensity 0.115 0.165 1.000
Employment 0.272 0.114 0.049 1.000
Electric Use 0.053 0.340 0.101 0.209 1.000
(b) Correlations Across Firm-Level Variables
Notes: All variables are in logs. Intra-sector Std Dev (%) refers, for each variable, to the ratio
between the mean standard deviation within ISIC 3-digit sectors and the overall standard deviation.
The calculation of TFP estimates are described in the text. Capital Intensity is the ratio of the
stock of capital to employment in any given year. Skill Intensity is the ratio of non-production
workers to production workers. Employment is the average number of workers at a plant over a
given year. Electric Use is the yearly consumption of electricity per worker. Capital Intensity and
Electric Use are in billions of Turkish Liras and deflated by 1990 prices.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics (Means) by Year and Ownership
Year TFP Employment Output
Value
Added
Capital
Intensity
Multinational Plants
1993 4.7 419.0 2167.4 1018.1 2.4
1994 5.0 380.2 1698.8 792.0 2.6
1995 4.6 368.3 2007.2 896.1 2.5
1996 5.4 397.8 2051.3 933.8 2.7
1997 4.1 392.6 2175.8 1013.3 2.9
1998 6.0 369.4 1944.0 840.9 2.8
1999 6.2 352.3 1907.0 856.3 2.8
2000 5.7 371.5 2269.9 927.4 2.9
2001 5.9 378.8 2207.1 948.1 3.1
Domestic Plants
1993 1.4 126.2 299.2 127.3 1.7
1994 1.3 117.2 272.0 112.3 1.7
1995 1.2 114.8 283.7 110.1 1.6
1996 1.2 116.3 270.9 101.4 1.7
1997 1.2 118.0 294.2 113.6 1.5
1998 1.2 115.4 282.0 110.0 1.6
1999 1.4 112.4 282.2 109.4 1.8
2000 1.4 114.7 298.4 106.0 1.5
2001 1.4 113.7 301.3 109.4 1.5
Notes: An MNE is defined as a plant with any level of foreign ownership share. Employment is the
average number of workers at a plant over a given year. Output and Value Added are defined as in
the text and in Data Appendix. Capital Intensity is the ratio of the stock of capital to employment
in any given year. Output, Value Added, and Capital Intensity are in billions of Turkish Liras and
deflated by 1990 prices. The calculation of TFP estimates are described in the text.
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Table 1.4: The Determinants of the Level of Foreign Ownership, Sector- and Firm-Level
Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Foreign Equity Participation, yi, t (%)
Joint Productivity,
ln TFPi, t
0.266***
(0.113)
0.248***
(0.110)
0.223***
(0.109)
Sector-Level Capital Intensity,
ln (K/L)g, t
0.009
(0.257)
0.013
(0.149)
Sector-Level Skill Intensity,
ln (S/L)g, t
0.224***
(0.357)
0.187***
(0.202)
Firm-Level Capital Intensity,
ln (K/L)i, t
0.249***
(0.080)
0.257***
(0.083)
Firm-Level Skill Intensity,
ln (S/L)i, t
0.270***
(0.124)
0.232***
(0.128)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
−lnL 20,178 20,660 19,895 19,702 19,016
σˆ 157.316 159.725 153.120 148.876 143.284
R2 0.031 0.019 0.033 0.053 0.079
Observations 58,845 59,137 58,845 54,248 53,966
Notes: This table reports estimates of (1.20). Standardized “beta” coefficients are reported; robust
standard errors for the marginal effects after Tobit are given in parentheses and clustered at the
sector level in column (2) and at the firm level in the remaining columns; *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Sector- and Firm-Level Capital and Skill
Intensity measures are defined at the ISIC 4-digit level. Variable definitions and the calculation
of R2 are described in the text. −lnL is the negative of the log pseudolikelihood and σˆ is the
estimated standard error of the fitted model.
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Table 1.5: Tobit Results for the Effect of Joint Productivity on the Level of Foreign Ownership
Tobit RE Tobit IV Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: Foreign Equity Participation, yi, t (%)
ln Joint Productivity
1.669***
(0.123)
1.809***
(0.135)
1.370***
(0.129)
0.158***
(0.044)
1.809***
(0.219)
1.384***
(0.218)
1.180***
(0.235)
ln Capital Intensity
1.023***
(0.092)
0.937***
(0.097)
0.511***
(0.046)
1.038***
(0.099)
0.922***
(0.107)
ln Skill Intensity
1.085***
(0.130)
1.146***
(0.132)
0.457***
(0.058)
1.144***
(0.141)
1.165***
(0.144)
ln Plant Size
1.469***
(0.119)
0.973***
(0.060)
1.601***
(0.142)
ln Electric Use
-0.126
(0.113)
0.027
(0.043)
-0.085
(0.119)
Model Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
−lnL 19,364 18,438 17,994 13,060 14,925 14,199 13,874
σˆ 146.159 135.031 129.700 144.419 132.426 127.473
Wald Test (p-value) 0.652 0.001 0.045
First Stage
Dependent Variable: ln Joint Productivity
ln Price-Cost Margin
0.518***
(0.004)
0.532***
(0.004)
0.519***
(0.004)
R2 0.538 0.590 0.666
Observations 58,845 53,966 53,917 53,917 44,826 41,001 40,972
Notes: This table reports estimates of (1.22). Marginal effects conditional on foreign acquisition are reported, except for the first stage in IV
Tobit. Model effects include year and sector effects in all columns, and additionally unobserved effects in column (4). −lnL is the negative of the
log likelihood of the fitted model and σˆ is the estimated standard error of the fitted model. Wald Test is the test of exogeneity for two-step IV
Tobit, p-value reported (see Wooldridge (2002)). Variable definitions and sources are described in the text. All standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity, clustered at the firm level. Coefficients are given in the first line; standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Cox Regression Results for the Hazard of Divestment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Hazard Rate of Divestment
Average Joint Productivity, ln TFP i
0.652***
(0.048)
0.733***
(0.059)
Joint Productivity, ln TFP i, t
0.793***
(0.045)
0.855***
(0.053)
0.878***
(0.053)
0.931
(0.056)
Capital Intensity, ln (K/L)i, t
0.952
(0.040)
0.951
(0.040)
0.812***
(0.050)
Skill Intensity, ln (S/L)i, t
0.877*
(0.063)
0.801***
(0.056)
0.745***
(0.064)
Plant Size, ln (L)i, t
0.811***
(0.041)
0.781***
(0.038)
0.641***
(0.050)
Model Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shared Frailty Yes Yes
−lnL 865.087 832.313 832.153 796.620 2,398.292 2,322.029
Proportional Hazards Test, χ2
(p-value)
0.20
(0.657)
2.96
(0.565)
0.19
(0.667)
2.64
(0.620)
0.53
(0.465)
27.01
(0.000)
LR Test of Shared Frailty, χ2
(p-value)
123.35
(0.000)
97.09
(0.000)
Observations 2,674 2,649 2,593 2,572 2,593 2,572
Notes: This table reports estimates of (1.24). Model effects control for sector and year effects in all columns. Shared frailty controls for firm-level
effects. Hazard ratios are given in the first line; robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Variable definitions are in the text. −lnL is the negative of the log likelihood, and LR test of Shared Frailty tests for the existence of a
significant firm-level frailty effect.
61
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Foreign Ownership in the Pooled Sample
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Foreign Ownership by Age
Age 1:
Age 3:
Age 5:
Age 7:
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Figure 1.3: Average Degree of Foreign Ownership by Age
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Figure 1.4: Operating Profits and the Level of Integration
(a) Different Headquarter Intensities
Notes: This figure simulates the behavior of the operating profits function in (1.7) for different
values of headquarter intensity, η. The parameter values used in the simulation are: β = 0.1,
α = 0.75, µ = 0.4, θ = 30, X = 10, φ = 0.8, wN = 1.1, and wS = 1.
(b) Different Match Qualities
Notes: This figure simulates the behavior of the operating profits function in (1.7) for different
values of the match quality, θ. The parameter values used in the simulation are: β = 0.1, α = 0.7,
µ = 0.4, η = 0.7, X = 10, φ = 0.8, wN = 1.1, and wS = 1.
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Figure 1.5: Optimal Policy in Period 2
Figure 1.6: Kaplan-Meier Divestment Plot of MNEs by Level of Joint Productivity
Notes: This figure plots the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the divestment probabilities for multina-
tionals in the Turkish manufacturing industry, 1993-2001, stratified by percentile rank of their
mean total factor productivity (TFP) while under foreign ownership. Divestment is defined as
any decrease in foreign equity participation exceeding one percent or complete shutdown of the
multinational plant. The calculation of TFP estimates are described in the text.
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Figure 1.7: The Permissible Set of β’s for Various Headquarter Intensities
Figure 1.8: The Sign of the Cubic Equation in βV for Different Parameter Values
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1.8 Appendix B
In this section, I detail the construction of the variables used in the paper and
the procedure followed to clean the data. Note that all variables in the data set are
measured in 1990 prices (Turkish Liras). All data come from the Turkish Statistical
Institute’s Industrial Analysis Database unless stated otherwise.
Output is measured as the sum of the revenues from annual sales of the plant’s
final goods, revenues from contract manufacturing, and the change in inventories of
final goods from year start to year end. I deflate output by the relevant three-digit
output price deflator. Material inputs are measured as the sum of all intermediate
inputs, except for fuel and electricity, and the change in inventories of material inputs
from year start to year end. I deflate material inputs by the relevant three-digit
input price deflator. Electricity is calculated as the sum of the value of electricity
purchased and produced in-house minus the value electricity sold. Both electricity
and fuel are deflated by their own price deflators. Labor is measured as the number
of paid workers of the plant in a given year. This is reported for production and
non-production workers four times during a given year (in February, May, August,
and November) and the average of these four observations constitutes the average
number of workers at the plant in a given year (i.e. the plant size).
Capital stock information is not reported in the database, so I calculate it using
the reported investment data. The database includes information on investment in
machinery and equipment, building and structures, transportation equipment, and
computer and programming. All series are available since 1990, except for computer
and programming, which is available since 1995. Since the disaggregated investment
deflator is not available, I use the aggregate investment deflator to deflate all series. I
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use the perpetual inventory method in constructing the yearly capital stock for each
of these series at the plant level.
Since initial capital stock is not reported, I impute it by assuming that plants
are on their balanced growth path. I assume that capital stock is predetermined and
evolves according to:
(1.28) Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
as current investment, reacting to realized productivity shocks, takes one period
before it becomes productive. If plants are on their balanced growth path, then
K1/K0 = Y1/Y0 = 1 + g0, 1, where g0, 1 is the initial output growth of the plant. It
is then easy to show that initial capital stock is given by: K0 = I0/(g0, 1 + δ). After
calculating K0, I apply the perpetual inventory method to construct the capital
stock series implied by (1.28). I use depreciation rates of 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30%
for building and structures, machinery and equipment, transportation equipment,
and computer and programming, respectively. I observe zero initial investment for
a small number of plants, for which I calculate initial capital stock at the year that
they first report positive investment and then iterate back by dividing capital stock
by (1− δ) each year.
After calculating the capital stock series separately for machinery and equipment,
building and structures, transportation equipment, and computer and programming,
I aggregate the series to form the total capital stock series of the plant. The database
provides information on imported machinery capital, and I follow the same approach
outlined here to calculate these series.
Table 1.7 reports the number of MNEs and the total number of plants in the
database before the cleaning procedure. I follow three rules to clean the data. First,
69
plants that have “gaps” in the sample period are excluded from the analysis. Second,
those observations which have a non-positive value for capital stock are excluded as
well. Lastly, I exclude the outlier observations which could distort inference following
the construction of the TFP measure by dropping the top 1 percent of the sample
for which productivity is computed.
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Table 1.7: Turkish Manufacturing Industry, 1993-2001
Year
No. of
MNEs
Total No.
of Plants
Foreign
Presence (%)
1993 301 10,567 2.85
1994 312 10,127 3.08
1995 325 10,229 3.18
1996 326 10,590 3.08
1997 362 11,365 3.19
1998 416 12,321 3.38
1999 406 11,262 3.61
2000 414 11,114 3.73
2001 439 11,311 3.88
Table 1.8: Percent of Non-Zero Observations
ISIC Sector Investment Fuels Materials Electricity
311 Food 56.8 84.4 100 99.9
312 Other Food 49.3 85.3 100 99.9
321 Textiles 63.9 71.9 99.8 99.9
322 Wearing Apparel 60.8 64.6 99.6 99.9
356 Other Plastic Products 69.9 62.3 100 100
369 Non-metallic Mineral Products 56.9 88.0 99.9 99.8
381 Fabricated Metal Products 63.0 72.9 99.9 99.9
382 Non-electrical Machinery 63.5 70.9 100 99.9
383 Electrical Machinery 69.5 77.2 99.9 99.7
384 Transport Equipment 67.4 74.8 100 99.9
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Table 1.9: Levinsohn-Petrin Estimates of the Production Function, 1993-2001
ISIC Sector Labor Capital N
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
311 Food .893 .029 .359 .075 6448
312 Other Food .845 .047 .190 .113 1853
313, 314 Beverage and Tobacco .894 .090 .098 .177 830
321 Textiles .809 .023 .193 .042 10293
322 Wearing Apparel .754 .036 .075 .102 6762
323 Leather .884 .098 .191 .081 708
324 Footwear 1.022 .083 .226 .096 683
331 Wood Products .851 .079 .011 .101 1074
332 Furniture .964 .064 .292 .110 905
341 Paper Products .826 .085 .265 .201 975
342 Printing and Publishing .613 .103 .328 .156 1117
351 Industrial Chemicals .698 .153 .419 .128 563
352 Other Chemicals .950 .063 .262 .118 1767
355 Rubber Products .952 .103 .545 .185 789
356 Other Plastic Products .944 .071 .367 .081 2432
361, 362 Pottery, China, and Glass Prod. .810 .098 .339 .176 778
369 Non-metallic Mineral Prod. .932 .048 .937 .091 3558
371 Iron and Steel .873 .070 .159 .107 1556
372 Non-ferrous Metal .878 .104 .402 .195 683
381 Fabricated Metal Products .910 .034 .337 .054 4870
382 Non-electrical Machinery .948 .045 .204 .047 3990
383 Electrical Machinery .898 .051 .148 .102 2734
384 Transport Equipment .826 .050 .164 .093 2741
385 Scientific and Optical Equipment .728 .108 .413 .220 613
390 Other Manufacturing 1.008 .109 .441 .180 665
CHAPTER II
Foreign Direct Investment and Wages: Does the Level of
Ownership Matter?
2.1 Introduction
A large body of trade research is devoted to understanding the host-country ef-
fects of foreign direct investment (FDI), which has increased dramatically in recent
decades. One of the key effects studied extensively in this regard is the impact that
multinational activity has on average wages at plants subject to foreign acquisition.
It is now well known that affiliates of multinational companies pay higher wages com-
pared to their domestic counterparts even after controlling for sectoral, regional, and
plant-level characteristics.1 However, existing studies provide a range of estimates for
the average wage effect of multinational status from 1 percent to 70 percent. Despite
the similarity in the methodology and data sets employed in these studies, it remains
to be understood why we observe such a large range of estimates at seemingly sim-
ilar multinational plants and what the precise wage effects of multinational activity
are. As Girma and Gorg (2007) note, even when controlling for observable and time
invariant unobservable characteristics, there remains a fundamental problem in iden-
1See, for example, Aitken et al. (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Doms and Jensen (1998), Figini
and Gorg (1999), Taylor and Driffield (2005), Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006), Almeida (2007), Heyman et al.
(2007), Girma and Gorg (2007), and Arnold and Javorcik (2009). See Table A1 in Almeida (2007) for
a summary of the literature on the multinational wage premium using firm level data and the premium
estimates.
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tifying the performance differences that are attributable to multinationality per se.
The current study identifies the causes of such divergent estimates and documents
the causal impact of foreign ownership on wages using methodology that sidesteps
earlier limitations.
Existing studies often estimate a firm-level wage model with a binary variable that
indicates multinational status. Using binary variables in the estimation embodies the
assumption that all multinational affiliates are identical with respect to the wages
they pay. Since an indicator variable for ownership status censors the information
on what share of the affiliate equity is controlled by the multinational parent, it
is unable to capture any variation in the wages due to different levels of foreign
equity participation. If the level of control that multinationals exercise at their
affiliates affects the wages they pay, then estimation with a binary variable will fail
to capture the heterogeneity in the wage premium across multinational affiliates.
Moreover, an econometric issue arises if the wage premium varies with foreign equity
participation. Rigobon and Stoker (2009) show that the least squares estimator is
prone to severe bias when there are several regressors and a binary variable is used
in place of a continuous regressor. Estimates also become sensitive to the level of
thresholds in defining the multinational status of an affiliate. Thus, using a censored
foreign ownership variable, as is the common practice in the literature, would lead
to inconsistent estimates of the wage premium when wages vary with the level of
foreign equity participation.
This study identifies the heterogeneity in the multinational wage premium that
arises due to the level of foreign equity participation using a unique data set from
Turkey. The distinguishing feature of these data is the observation of continuous
levels of foreign ownership at the plant level with a considerable degree of ownership
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distribution across the plants. I build on the results by Rigobon and Stoker (2009)
to show that using censored regressors may lead to severe bias not only in ordinary
least squares estimation, but also in fixed effects estimation. More specifically, when
the true relationship between foreign equity participation and average wages is lin-
ear, using a binary variable instead of a continuous regressor leads to inconsistent
estimates of the wage premium even if plant level individual effects are accounted
for. By artificially creating different thresholds for the foreign ownership variable, I
illustrate the “variability” of wage premia across different definitions and the biases
that ensue. Up to 14 percent of the wage premium attributed to a foreign owner
may come from different levels of foreign equity participation even after controlling
for plant level effects.
Two main results come out of the empirical analysis, which uses the census of
Turkish manufacturing plants over the period 1993-2001.2 First, using nonparametric
and semiparametric regressions, I demonstrate that there is essentially a linear and
increasing relationship between the level of foreign ownership and average wages.
This monotonic relationship holds more strongly for non-production workers than
production workers. Second, I find that a significant wage premium exists only for
non-production workers when I produce estimates of the premium that control for
plant level effects and the endogeneity of foreign ownership. I address the endogeneity
of multinational activity by generating instruments from the panel data at hand in
a generalized method of moments framework, which allows me to accommodate a
large set of assumptions on the estimated wage model. My results indicate that a
10 percentage point increase in foreign equity participation is associated with a 4
2Three earlier studies report estimates from matched employer-employee data in addition to firm-level
estimates (see Heyman et al. (2007) for Sweden, and Martins (2004) and Almeida (2007) for Portugal).
These estimates focus on whether foreign firms pay higher wages to identical workers. While it is desirable
to have such data to control for worker heterogeneity, such employer-employee data do not exist for Turkey.
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percent increase in the average wage of non-production workers, and that the level of
foreign ownership does not affect the wages of production workers. Therefore, there
is a significant degree of heterogeneity in the wage premia at multinational affiliates
that comes from different levels of foreign equity participation. Moreover, the finding
that there is no significant premium for production workers is novel in the literature.
Existing literature has identified how the level of foreign ownership is related to
certain aspects of the firm, which may have an impact on average wages. Takii
and Ramstetter (2005) find that higher foreign equity participation is associated
with higher levels of productivity in Indonesian manufacturing. A similar finding
is documented in the case of Venezuela by Aitken and Harrison (1999). This could
arise because a majority foreign ownership share might be required for bringing in
technologies from the parent firm, which in turn may lead to a high wage premium
(Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2006). In a similar vein, Barbosa and Louri (2002) argue that a
foreign partner will demand higher ownership in case of profitable affiliates and large
intangible assets to be transferred. Indeed, Budd et al. (2005) find that the degree of
multinational ownership appears to condition the degree of intrafirm profit sharing,
and that affiliate wages are positively correlated with both parent and affiliate profits.
Although some existing studies consider the impact of the level of foreign own-
ership on the wage premium, there is no consensus in the literature on the subject.
On the one hand, Martins (2004) finds no higher wage premia for firms that exhibit
a stronger degree of foreign control in Portugal. On the other hand, Lipsey and
Sjoholm (2006) and Aitken et al. (1996) find that majority-owned foreign plants pay
higher wages for skilled workers in Indonesia and Venezuela, respectively. However,
these studies do not address the endogeneity of foreign ownership explicitly. Few
studies, notably Heyman et al. (2007), Girma and Gorg (2007), and Arnold and
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Javorcik (2009), present estimates of the wage premium that tackle the issue of en-
dogeneity by using matching techniques. Hence, the current study is the first in the
literature to identify systematic heterogeneity in the wage premium due to different
levels of foreign ownership while accounting for endogeneity explicitly. I find that
foreign equity participation impacts average wages at every level and my results are
not driven by those multinationals achieving majority control at their affiliates.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
empirical strategy of earlier studies and builds on the results from Rigobon and
Stoker (2009) to demonstrate the problems with the use of binary regressors in the
panel data context. Section 3 introduces the data to be used in the analysis. Section
4 presents my empirical strategy to test the implications of Section 2 and to identify
the relationship between the level of foreign ownership and average wages. Section
5 includes my empirical results and presents a set of robustness checks. Concluding
remarks appear in Section 6.
2.2 Censoring the Level of Foreign Ownership
The equity share that a multinational controls at an affiliate is often unobserved
in plant-level data. When it is observed, the common practice is to designate a
certain threshold and define a plant as “foreign-owned” if the multinational’s equity
participation exceeds that threshold.3 In this section, I discuss three issues. First,
I describe how the common practice of using different thresholds to define foreign
ownership can hide the heterogeneity in the wage premium. Second, building on
3In national and international accounting standards, FDI is typically defined as involving an equity stake
of 10 percent or more at the plant level (Razin and Sadka, 2007), although different countries follow different
recording practices. For instance, Sweden uses the 50% cut-off in defining foreign ownership (Heyman et
al., 2007). While researchers typically use this cut-off to define majority control, it has been noted by the
finance literature that shareholders can achieve effective control in many cases by holding a block that is
much smaller than 50% of the firm (Razin and Sadka, 2007).
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Rigobon and Stoker (2009), I derive the bias in the fixed effects estimate of the
wage premium that arises from censoring a continuous regressor in a single variable
regression. Lastly, I extend this result to the multivariate case and discuss how
censoring the level of foreign ownership distorts the estimation of the wage premium.
Assume that the true empirical model that links wages to foreign ownership at
the plant level is given by:
(2.1) wi, t = αi +m(xi, t) + γ
′yi, t + εi, t, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T
where wi, t represents the potential wage, xi, t ∈ [0, 100] denotes foreign equity par-
ticipation in percentages at plant i at time t, m(.) is a function that relates xi, t to
wages, αi is a time-invariant plant effect, yi, t is a vector of plant-level controls, and
εi, t is white noise. If the level of foreign ownership affects wages linearly, then the
true model becomes:
(2.2) wi, t = αi + βxi, t + γ
′yi, t + εi, t, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T
I confirm in the later sections that the estimated relationship between foreign
equity participation and wages is indeed linear for the present study. I am interested
in the wage premium due to the level of multinational activity, which is captured by
β in (2.2). The inclusion of αi in (2.2) enables the identification of β from within-
plant variation in foreign control, thus sidestepping problems that might arise from
selection of high-wage plants by multinationals.
Earlier studies estimate a wage premium by using a censored version of the foreign
ownership variable mostly because their data prevented them from observing xi, t in
its continuous nature. Specifically, they estimate:
(2.3) wi, t = ai + bFi, t + c
′yi, t + i, t, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T
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where Fi, t is a binary variable indicating foreign ownership, defined on a threshold,
φ:
(2.4) Fi, t = 1[xi, t > φ]
Implicit in this practice is the assumption that all foreign plants are identical.
When this is not the case, Figure 2.1 depicts how censoring the level of foreign own-
ership hides the heterogeneity in the wage premium and leads to different estimates
depending on the threshold.4 In the figure, all domestic firms are assumed to pay
the same wage, w1, while wages are increasing in the level of foreign ownership for
multinationals, as depicted by the function m(x). Assume that we estimate this
relationship with an equation such as (2.3), and we set φ = 0%. The variable of
interest, bˆ, will capture an effect illustrated by l1 in the figure, with every multina-
tional predicted to pay w2. As l1 simply captures an average effect, it overstates
the wage premium for multinationals with less than 50 percent ownership and un-
derstates it for those above this level. If we instead set φ = 50%, then bˆ captures
an effect illustrated by l2, at which all multinationals are predicted to pay w3. In
this case, l2 overestimates the wage premium for most multinationals and provides
a higher estimate than l1. Hence, censoring not only hides the heterogeneity in the
wage premium due to the level of foreign ownership, but it also results in confounded
estimates due to lack of knowledge on m(x).5
Rigobon and Stoker (2009) derive the bias from using censored regressors for the
OLS (ordinary least squares) estimator, and I build on their results for the case of
0-1 censoring as in (2.4). I show here that their results can be readily extended to
4Figure 2.1 is hypothetical and intended for demonstrative purposes only.
5Note that if there were no heterogeneity in the wage premium, then bˆ would return the same estimate
independent of the value of φ and accurately capture the return to being a multinational.
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the FE (fixed effects, or within-group) estimator. In order to motivate the result,
I start the analysis with a single regressor. Let the true model be given by (2.2),
excluding the vector of controls yi, t. The fixed effects transformation eliminates αi
from (2.2) and yields a single variable model in deviations from individual means:
(2.5) wi, t − w¯i = (xi, t − x¯i)β + (εi, t − ε¯i)
where w¯i = T
−1∑T
t=1wi, t, and x¯i and ε¯i are defined similarly. The FE estimator,
which is unbiased in finite samples, is given by:
βˆFE =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1(xi, t − x¯i)(wi, t − w¯i)∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1(xi, t − x¯i)2
I am interested in the asymptotic bias that arises when one estimates the following
model instead:
(2.6) wi, t = ai + bFi, t + i, t, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T
where the Fi, t is defined as above. The coefficient of interest is estimated by:
bˆFE =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1(Fi, t − F¯i)(wi, t − w¯i)∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1(Fi, t − F¯i)2
The bias that I am going to characterize is given by plim bˆFE−β, which will clearly
be affected by the threshold φ. To see this formally, recall that bˆFE is identical to
the estimator obtained by an OLS estimation of the dummy variable model:
(2.7) wi, t =
N∑
j=1
ajdi, j + bFi, t + i, t
where di, j = 1 if i = j and 0 elsewhere. Following Rigobon and Stoker (2009), the
probability limits of the OLS estimators of (2.7) are given by:6
6The difference here from Rigobon and Stoker (2009) is the conditional expectations, since the true data
generating process (DGP) is now given by the single variable version of (2.2) with time-invariant individual
effects instead of a cross-sectional DGP. Remember that the interpretation of β comes from the conditional
expectation on the structural equation (2.2) even though one uses the censored version of (2.5) or (2.7) in
practice to estimate the parameters of the model.
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plim aˆi, FE = E[wi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi] = αi + βE[xi, t|Fi,t = 0, αi]
plim bˆFE = E[wi, t|Fi, t = 1, αi]− E[ai|Fi, t = 1, αi]
= E[wi, t|Fi, t = 1, αi]− E[wi|Fi, t = 0, αi]
= αi + βE[xi, t|Fi,t = 1, αi]− αi − βE[xi, t|Fi,t = 0, αi]
= β {E[xi, t|Fi,t = 1, αi]− E[xi, t|Fi,t = 0, αi]}
The FE estimator bˆFE measures β up to a positive scalar as in the OLS case, but
differently, this scalar is now determined by the expectations conditional on αi. The
bias is:
plim bˆFE − β = β {E[xi, t|Fi,t = 1, αi]− E[xi, t|Fi,t = 0, αi]− 1}
What does this result tell us? If one is merely interested in whether foreign own-
ership causes a positive or negative wage premium, then using a censored regressor
will provide a consistent answer as to the direction of this association. However,
if the interest is in the size of the premium, then bˆFE provides an estimate that is
confounded by the difference E[xi, t|Fi,t = 1, αi] − E[xi, t|Fi,t = 0, αi]. This within
difference depends not only on φ, but also on the conditional distribution of the
uncensored variable xi, t. For instance, if foreign owners acquire higher equity stakes
at plants that are larger in size or that operate in certain industries, then we would
expect the within difference to be larger in such plants and industries. Thus, the
extent of the heterogeneity in foreign ownership directly impacts the wage premium
estimate and 0-1 censoring might lead to misestimates by hiding this information.
In practice, one is typically interested in the parameters of a multivariate model,
which calls into question the transmission of bias among the regressors. Assume that
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the true model is given by (2.2) in which the vector yi, t consists of a single control
yi, t. The censored model is:
(2.8) wi, t = ai + bFi, t + cyi, t + i, t, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T
The FE estimator of b is again identical to the estimator obtained by OLS esti-
mation of the dummy variable model:
(2.9) wi, t =
N∑
j=1
ajdi, j + bFi, t + cyi, t + i, t
Following Rigobon and Stoker (2009), denote the residual of wi, t regressed on Fi, t
as: ∆wi, t = wi, t−(1−Fi, t)w¯0, t−Fi, tw¯1, t; where w¯1, t =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 Fi, twi, t/
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 Fi, t
is the average of wi, t for Fi, t = 1, and w¯0, t =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1(1−Fi, t)wi, t/
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1(1−
Fi, t). Applying the same transformation to both sides of (2.2), one gets:
(2.10) ∆wi, t = β∆xi, t + γ∆yi, t + ∆εi, t
If one applies this transformation to the model in (2.9), both the censored vari-
able Fi, t and the individual dummies di, j are removed, which yields the estimation
equation:
(2.11) ∆wi, t = c∆yi, t + vi, t
Rigobon and Stoker (2009) note that the bias in cˆ of (2.8) is the same as that of
(2.11), which arises due to the omission of ∆xi, t from (2.10). The standard omitted
variable bias formula then yields plim cˆFE = γ + βη ≡ c, where η is defined by:
η =
Cov(∆yi, t, ∆xi, t)
V ar(∆yi, t)
=
(1− p)Cov(yi, t, xi, t|Fi,t = 1, α∗i ) + pCov(yi, t, xi, t|Fi,t = 0, α∗i )
(1− p)V ar(yi, t|Fi,t = 1, α∗i ) + pV ar(yi, t|Fi,t = 0, α∗i )
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and p is the probability that Fi, t = 1. Again, the difference in the current result
from that of Rigobon and Stoker (2009) for the OLS case is that the covariances and
variances are now conditioned on individual effects, α∗i , where the linear projection
of xi, t on the additional regressor is expressed as: xi, t = α
∗
i + ηyi, t + ri, t.
Hence, the parameter η, which measures how within-deviations of foreign equity
participation are proxied by the within-deviations of the additional regressor, deter-
mines the size of the bias in cˆ. As Rigobon and Stoker (2009) note, it is impossible
to assess the bias in terms of size and direction if one has no information regarding
the within-variation of xi, t. The probability limits for the other coefficients in (2.8)
are given by:
plim aˆi, FE = E[wi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]− cE[yi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]
= αi + βE[xi, t|Fi,t = 0, αi] + (γ − c)E[yi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]
= αi + β [E[xi, t|Fi,t = 0, αi]− ηE[yi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]]
plim bˆFE = E[wi, t|Fi, t = 1, αi]− E[wi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]
+cE[yi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]− cE[yi, t|Fi, t = 1, αi]
= αi + βE[xi, t|Fi,t = 1, αi] + γE[yi, t|Fi, t = 1, αi]
−αi − βE[xi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]− γE[yi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]
−c {E[yi, t|Fi, t = 1, αi]− E[yi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]}
= β [E[xi, t|Fi,t = 1, αi]− E[xi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]
−η {E[yi, t|Fi, t = 1, αi]− E[yi, t|Fi, t = 0, αi]}]
The bias in bˆFE thus depends on two extra terms compared to the single regres-
sor case: how the additional regressor covaries with x, and the distribution of the
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additional regressor conditional on censoring and αi. With additional regressors in
the picture, it is possible to have a case where bˆFE may actually have the wrong sign.
This will be the case whenever we have:
E[xi, t|Fi,t=1, αi]−E[xi, t|Fi, t=0, αi]
E[yi, t|Fi, t=1, αi]−E[yi, t|Fi, t=0, αi] < η. Hence,
with 0-1 censoring, it is possible to end up not only with a biased estimate of the
wage premium, but also with the wrong sign on it.
2.3 Panel Data on Turkish Manufacturing
Data on the Turkish manufacturing industry come from the Industrial Analysis
Database by the Turkish Statistical Office (TurkStat), which covers all manufacturing
plants in Turkey with more than ten employees, including plants controlled by foreign
investors. For this study, I focus on the period 1993-2001. The inclusion of plant
identification codes enables me to construct a panel and follow the plants over time.
The total number of manufacturing plants varied between 10,567 in 1993 and 11,311
in 2001 (see Table 2.7). The percentage of foreign plants in the sample, defined as
plants that have at least some level of foreign ownership, increased from 2.85 percent
to 3.88 percent over the same period. The measure of foreign ownership in this study
is the percentage of subscribed equity owned by the foreign investor, which varies
between 0 and 100 percent. The average foreign equity participation at plants owned
partially or fully by foreigners increased from 58.78 percent in 1993 to 64.33 percent
in 2001.
Figure 2.2 depicts the distribution of foreign ownership shares for all plant-year
observations for the subset of foreign plants in the sample. There is a substantial
degree of heterogeneity in how much control multinational firms exercise. While most
foreign plants seem to be majority owned, there is a significant number of plant-year
observations with multinationals owning less than 50 percent of the plant’s equity.
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Moreover, one sees the full range of ownership shares with sizable densities in each
bin of the distribution. Similar patterns can be seen when I reproduce Figure 2.2
for different industries or plant sizes (results not reported here). Informed by the
analytical results in the previous section, I expect this pattern in the level of foreign
ownership to bias estimates of the wage premium in a censored regression.
In addition to foreign ownership, the database contains yearly information on em-
ployment, inputs, output, value added, wages and compensation, sales, inventories,
additions to fixed assets, energy use, sector, and location. Plant size is measured as
the total number of paid workers at a plant in any given year. I observe the number
of production and non-production workers and total payments to each group in the
database. In all of the analyses, total yearly wages as reported by the plants are used
in the calculation of the average plant wage and the average wage for production and
non-production workers, excluding any additional benefits and compensation.7
A frequently mentioned source of possible selection bias is acquisitions of high-
wage domestic plants by multinational firms, also known as cherry picking (see Lipsey
and Sjoholm (2006) and Almeida (2007)). It could be the case that foreign plants
acquire domestic establishments that are already highly productive and large in size
and that therefore pay higher wages in general. Such selection bias would distort the
results of the empirical investigation if plant effects are not controlled for. Figure
2.3 provides the average yearly wage for plants that experienced a takeover in the
sample period by type of ownership and compares these values to the average wage
in the overall sample.
Figure 2.3 reveals that plants that experienced a takeover during the period 1993-
7Numbers of paid workers are reported for production and non-production workers four times during a
given year (in February, May, August, and November) and the average of these four observations constitutes
the average number of workers at the plant in a given year (i.e. the plant size).
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2001 were paying much higher wages to their workers compared to the plants in the
overall sample. This holds for such plants regardless of whether they were under
foreign or domestic ownership, which provides evidence to the oft-mentioned selection
bias of high-wage plants by foreigners. In this case, least squares estimates will tend
to capture the difference in levels between the traditionally high wage firms, which
are most likely to be acquired, and the traditionally low wage firms that will almost
always stay under domestic control. However, one can also see from Figure 2.3 that
wages were higher at plants that experienced a takeover when they were under foreign
ownership. This suggests that foreign ownership per se might have an impact on the
average wage, even though the estimated premium after controlling for the individual
firm effect is likely to be much smaller than least squares estimates.
2.4 Empirical Methodology
Two empirical findings characterize the activity of multinationals in Turkey with
respect to the level of control they exercise and the plants they acquire. First, for-
eign investors choose to own any percentage of subscribed capital (equity) when they
engage in FDI, allowing them to exercise various degrees of control at the acquired
plant. Second, regardless of the equity share they eventually own, they target do-
mestic plants which already pay wages that are much higher than the average. In
this section, I outline a three-step empirical strategy to analyze the link between for-
eign ownership and wages in light of these two regularities. I first describe how the
predictions of Section 2 on censoring are tested and then turn to provide estimates of
the foreign ownership premium that control for plant-level effects and endogeneity.
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2.4.1 Defining Different Thresholds
Observing foreign equity participation at the plant level allows me to define multi-
national status using different thresholds. In order to analyze how these different
thresholds affect the wage premium, I estimate the following censored equation:
(2.12) lnwijt = β0 + β1FDIP lantijt + α
′Xijt + Sector +Region+ Time+ εijt
where FDIP lantijt = 1[xijt > φ] indicates multinational status, xijt is foreign equity
participation and varies between 0 and 100 percent, φ is the threshold level, and
i, j, and t index plant, sector, and year, respectively. In equation (2.12), wijt is
the average yearly plant wage and Xijt is a vector of plant-specific characteristics
such as size and skill intensity. Sector dummy variables at the two digit level of
the ISIC Rev. 2, regional dummy variables, which classify each plant belonging to
one of the seven geographical regions in Turkey, and time dummy variables control
for sector, region and year specific wage effects, and εijt is a random plant-specific
error component. In all my specifications, I estimate the equation of interest for
three dependent variables: the average plant wage, the average wage for production
workers, and the average wage for non-production workers.
I estimate equation (2.12) by OLS and FE using four possible values of φ that
are arbitrarily chosen: 0%, 15%, 30%, and 50%. The goal of this exercise is to
demonstrate the bias in OLS and FE estimations that arises from using different
thresholds in the definition of a multinational plant. Varying estimates of β1 due to
the threshold level φ would indicate that the multinational wage premium depends
on this arbitrary definition of multinational status. In light of the analytical results in
section 2, this would suggest that the level of foreign equity participation is innately
tied to average wages. If this were not so, i.e. the level of foreign equity participation
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does not affect average wages, then we would see identical estimates and statistical
(in)significance of β1 regardless of the threshold level. This counterfactual case would
correspond to the absence of heterogeneity in the foreign ownership wage premium.
2.4.2 Nonparametric and Semiparametric Analysis
In my second round of estimations, I examine whether the true relationship be-
tween foreign equity participation and wages is linear. I first estimate this relation-
ship non-parametrically using the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (Lowess)
estimator of Cleveland (1979). Consider a regression of wages on foreign equity share,
given by the model:
(2.13) wi = m(xi) + εi, i = 1, ..., N
where the error term εi is i.i.d. Lowess is a standard local regression estimator,
whereby one lets m(xi) be linear in the neighborhood of a data point x so that
m(xi) = m+ β(xi − x). Cleveland (1979) suggested that one minimize:
(2.14)
N∑
i=1
{wi −m− β(xi − x)}2K
(
xi − x
h
)
with respect to m and β, where K(.) is a kernel weighting function. This can
be achieved by performing a weighted least squares regression of wi against z
′
i =
(1, (xi− x)) with weights K1/2i (Pagan and Ullah, 1999). The weighted least squares
regression estimates for each observation i are then used to predict the value of the
dependent variable to trace out the non-parametric relationship between w and x.
For implementing Lowess, I use the tricubic kernel as my weighting function, which
places less weight on points near the end of the sample, and I use a bandwidth of
0.8, which uses eighty percent of the sample for each regression.8 Despite its com-
8I also experimented with a bandwidth of 0.5 for both my nonparametric and semiparametric estimates,
which left my results unchanged.
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putational intensity, Lowess is preferable over kernel regression as it uses a variable
bandwidth, robustifies against outliers, and uses a local polynomial estimator to
minimize boundary problems (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
I implement Lowess in two different ways. The first set of Lowess regressions
is run on the pooled cross-section sample of plant-year observations using average
plant wage and foreign equity participation. In the second set of Lowess regressions,
I include plant level fixed effects in the model in (2.13). Accordingly, I transform
my data into within-plant deviations before estimating the non-parametric model,
which allows me to control for plant-specific effects. This means that the weighted
least squares estimates are identified from the within-plant variation in each local
regression. Hence, I am able to identify whether changes in the level of ownership at
a multinational plant over time affect the level of wages at the same plant or not.
One can question whether the relationship identified by the nonparametric analy-
sis is driven by some omitted variables. In order to overcome this concern, I next turn
to a semiparametric analysis where additional controls enter the true model paramet-
rically and are additively separable from the nonparametric component. Consider
the partially linear model:
(2.15) wi = m(xi) + α
′Xi + εi, i = 1, ..., N
where Xi is a vector of plant characteristics. I implement the difference-based
semiparametric estimator of Yatchew (1997), whereby m(.) is assumed to have a
bounded first derivative. Yatchew (1997) suggests ordering the data such that
x1 < x2 < ... < xN and taking the first difference of (2.15). The transformed equa-
tion is then estimable by ordinary least squares. First-differencing equation (2.15)
allows inference to be carried out on α′ as if there were no nonparametric component
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in the model. But once α′ is estimated, a variety of nonparametric techniques could
be applied to estimate m(.) as if α′ were known (Lokshin, 2006), that is, after con-
structing the differences wi− αˆ′Xi. In my estimations, the nonlinear function m(.) is
estimated by the Lowess procedure outlined earlier, using a bandwidth of 0.8. Addi-
tionally, a significance test on xi can be carried out, which tests the null hypothesis
that the regression function has the known parametric form g(x, δ) + α′Xi, where δ
is an unknown parameter, against the alternative semiparametric form m(xi)+α
′Xi,
where m(.) is unknown. Lokshin (2006) provides details on the test.
2.4.3 Estimating the Foreign Equity Participation Premium
If there is evidence that censoring xi returns biased estimates and that the true
relationship is linear, then I can expect the regressions with continuous observations
to provide more accurate estimates of the foreign ownership wage premium. In
this subsection, I focus on quantifying the impact of foreign equity participation
on average wages. For this purpose, I estimate the premium by running a set of
regressions on the subset of plants that have been under multinational control at any
point in the sample period. In this framework, I can test whether increases in foreign
equity share translate into higher wages at the plant level.
Two considerations are in place here. First, cherry-picking of high paying do-
mestic firms by foreign investors and the presence of unobservable firm characteris-
tics require the inclusion of plant-level fixed effects to the econometric specification.
Second, the assumption that foreign equity participation is independent of the id-
iosyncratic error term can be easily violated. While it is relatively easy to handle
endogeneity that arises from unobserved heterogeneity, it is much harder to handle
dynamic endogeneity whereby current and past levels of wages may affect the level
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of foreign ownership. In addition, endogeneity bias will arise if the level of foreign
ownership responds simultaneously to idiosyncratic shocks and in the case of mea-
surement error. This naturally calls for an instrumental variable estimation; yet, it
is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to come up with a valid instrument in such
plant level studies.
At this point, I take advantage of the panel data at hand to use exogenous re-
gressors in other time periods to instrument for endogenous regressors in the current
time period. Consider the dynamic model:
(2.16) lnwijt = γlnwij,t−1 + β1FEPijt + α′Xijt + δi + εijt, t = 2, ..., T
where δi denote time independent plant-level effects and we assume foreign equity
participation, FEPijt, to be endogenous. It is assumed that |γ| < 1 and εijt are seri-
ally uncorrelated. In order to tackle the endogeneity problem, one can first-difference
the model in (2.16) to purge δi, which in addition renders lagged values of lnwijt and
xijt to be valid instruments in the transformed equation. Consistent and efficient
estimation can then be achieved by GMM estimators that use all available lags at
each period as instruments for the equations in first differences (Arellano and Bond,
1991). Blundell and Bond (1998) extend the Arellano-Bond estimator to include
more instruments that are available by assuming that first differences of instrument-
ing variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, which greatly improves efficiency
and reduces the finite sample bias. However, the estimator can easily generate a large
number of instruments given the availability of lags and additional moment condi-
tions, which will lead to an overfit of the endogenous variables that tends to distort
inference in finite samples.9 In order to guard against problems due to a large num-
9The problem arises because a high number of instruments means a poorly estimated optimal weighting
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ber of instruments, I estimate (2.16) both using all available lags (and differences) as
instruments and with a restricted set of instruments (to two most immediate lags).
I implement the “system GMM” estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) in a two-
step procedure and apply the finite-sample correction of Windmeijer (2005) to the
standard errors. Traditionally, researchers using these GMM estimators have focused
on results for the one-step estimator, partly because simulation studies suggested very
modest efficiency gains from using the two-step version (Bond, 2002). The two-step
estimator also tends to return standard errors that are severely downward biased
when the number of instruments is large. However, Windmeijer (2005) finds that
the two-step efficient GMM estimator with the corrected variance estimate leads
to more accurate inference compared to the one-step estimator. For this reason, I
report estimates of the two-step procedure with the Windmeijer correction, but I also
conducted the estimation with the one-step estimator as a robustness check. The
results for the one-step estimator are very similar to the results reported here and
available upon request in an additional appendix.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Estimates with Different Thresholds
In my first set of regressions, I estimate equation (2.12) using a binary variable
that specifies whether a plant is classified as foreign (i.e. FDIP lant takes on the
value of unity) depending on the level of foreign equity participation.10 Table 2.1
matrix in the GMM estimator. See Roodman (2008) for a discussion of how ’instrument proliferation’ can
lead to serious problems when implementing these GMM estimators.
10In each regression, I control for a set of plant-level characteristics. These are: log plant size (as measured
by the total number of employees); skill intensity (given by the ratio of skilled workforce to total plant size);
ratio of production workers to total plant size; log value added per worker (data on value added provided by
TurkStat); log electricity used or log inputs; sector, year, and region dummies. Sector and region dummies
are replaced by plant-level effects for FE regressions. I also estimated all reported specifications controlling
for log inputs instead of log electricity and my results do not change. The full set of results for the OLS and
FE regressions with various thresholds, including the estimates for the controls and regression diagnostics,
can be found in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix.
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documents the differences in the estimates of the wage premium when various thresh-
olds are used. The threshold value used to define FDIP lant is given in rows (a)-(d),
while columns (1)-(3) present OLS estimates and columns (4)-(6) present FE esti-
mates for the three wage variables of interest. For example, the figure in row (b) and
column (1) indicates that the OLS estimate of the average plant wage premium to
multinational status is 51 percent when a plant is defined as foreign if it has at least
15 percent foreign equity participation. Controlling for plant-level effects, however,
reduces the estimate of the premium to 11 percent in row (b) and column (4) when
the same threshold is applied.11 It is immediate from this discrepancy that foreign
investors acquire plants that already pay high wages, justifying the motivation to
focus on a wage model with plant-specific effects.
Estimates from Table 2.1 indicate that the wage premium typically increases as
the threshold level φ gets higher. This holds true of all the OLS estimates, for
which the discrepancies between the estimated premia are greater across various
thresholds. The average plant wage premium is estimated to be 48 percent (row (a),
column (1)) when there are no thresholds, while it is estimated to be 57 percent (row
(d), column (1)) when φ = 50%. This implies that 9 percent of the average plant
wage premium is purely attributable to using different thresholds. When I repeat the
same exercise for production and non-production workers, I see similar discrepancies
between the estimated premia. The estimated premium ranges from 17 to 22 percent
for production workers (column (2)) and from 37 to 45 percent for non-production
workers (column (3)), suggesting a greater degree of heterogeneity in the premium
11If foreign investors acquire plants that already pay higher wages than the rest of the domestic plants,
then we should expect to see a modest wage premium to becoming multinational. This result is consistent
with the results by Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006), Almeida (2007), and Heyman et al. (2007), who find a lower
premium when they control for plant level effects. Almeida (2007) shows that foreign acquisitions have
small effects, typically less than 2%, on average wages at the acquired firms when “cherry-picking” is taken
into account.
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for the latter group of workers.
The problems with inference on a censored variable become more apparent in
the FE estimates of Table 2.1, columns (4)-(6). While the discrepancies between
the premium estimates for different thresholds are smaller, column (5) shows that
the statistical significance of the estimate can be affected by the threshold value. In
column (5), the wage premium to production workers is consistently positive, yet
it is significant only when φ = 15% (row (b)). Moreover, while the OLS estimates
demonstrate a higher premium when the threshold increases, the FE estimates in
columns (5) and (6) do not display such monotonicity. Similar to OLS results, how-
ever, there is greater heterogeneity in the wage premium of non-production workers
even after controlling for plant level effects. Column (6) indicates that the premium
estimate for this group ranges from 18 to 25 percent. Hence, Table 2.1 shows that
using different thresholds yields inconclusive evidence on whether there really exists
a wage premium at foreign plants for all groups of workers, and even if so, how large
this premium is.
As a further test of how different definitions of a foreign plant affect average plant
wages, I divide the sample of plants in the data into four categories depending on the
percentage of equity owned by the foreign investor. I assign a value of one to a plant
that has foreign equity participation from the range of intervals that I specify and run
a regression where I include these intervals simultaneously as independent variables.12
The heterogeneity in the wage premium due to the level of foreign control is more
pronounced in this set of regressions, reported in Table 2.2. Column (1) indicates
that the average wage premium at a plant with at least 50 percent foreign equity
participation is 58 percent, while it is 42 percent for a plant with foreign equity
12The intervals are 0-15%, 16-30%, 31-50%, and 51-100%.
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participation in the interval 31-50 percent, and 32 percent for a plant in the 15-30
percent interval. Controlling for plant-level effects, the estimated wage premia are
15 percent for plants with at least 50 percent foreign equity, and around 8 percent
for other foreign plants (column (4)), which suggests that obtaining majority control
creates an impact.
However, when I run the same regression for production and non-production
workers separately, I see that the effect of equity participation can be nonmonotonic.
In column (6), the estimated wage premia for non-production workers for the intervals
15-30 percent, 31-50 percent, and 51-100 percent are, 20 percent, 14 percent, and 28
percent, respectively. Hence, even after controlling for plant-level effects, up to 14
percent of the estimated wage premium can be explained by different levels of foreign
equity participation. Consistent with earlier findings, column (5) shows that whether
or not there is a wage premium for production workers is affected by the definition
of multinational status. I find that there exists a premium (around 7 percent) for
this group of workers only at plants that have at least 50 percent foreign equity
participation.
These results indicate that the methodology followed in classifying a plant as
foreign may significantly impact the estimated effect of foreign ownership on aver-
age wages. Censoring the foreign ownership variable in an arbitrary way hides the
heterogeneity in the wage premium due to the level of foreign equity participation.
Moreover, this heterogeneity may exist only for a certain group of workers, and such
information will be lost when econometric analysis is carried out with binary data.
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2.5.2 Nonparametric and Semiparametric Estimates
The results from the previous section suggest a monotonic and positive relation-
ship between foreign equity participation and average wages, however there is also
some evidence indicating nonlinearities. In order to see the true shape of the rela-
tionship, Lowess plots of equation (2.13) are presented in Figures 4 and 5, which use
the subset of plants that have been under foreign ownership at some point in the
sample period. Figure 2.4 depicts the relationship between foreign equity participa-
tion at the plant level versus (log) average wages in the pooled sample. Panel (a),
which shows the relationship for the average plant wage, indicates an upward slop-
ing Lowess plot line that is almost exactly the same as the linear fit. In panels (b)
and (c), a similar relationship is observed for the (log) average wage of production
workers and non-production workers, respectively. In all of the panels, the nonpara-
metric fit displays an upward trend. One can also see from panels (b) and (c) that
there is a larger dispersion of wages at all levels of foreign equity participation for
non-production workers compared to production workers.
If foreign investors acquire higher fractions of equity at domestic plants that pay
higher wages to start with, then this sort of a selection mechanism could drive the
relationship in Figure 2.4. To guard against such selection, Figure 2.5 presents the
Lowess estimates that control for plant level effects. I plot average wages against the
deviations from the within-plant mean value of foreign equity participation.13 Panel
(a) shows that higher levels of foreign equity participation are associated with higher
average plant wages, even when the multinational status of a plant is unchanged. This
13Notice that most of the deviations from within-plant mean equity participation are positive and away
from zero. This means that not only do levels of foreign ownership change at a plant over the sample period,
but also that most of these changes constitute increases in the foreign ownership level. This highlights the
importance of using uncensored versions of the foreign ownership variable, as the information from changes
to the level of foreign ownership within the firm is lost when censored variables are used.
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means that it is not simply being foreign that brings a premium with it, but also that
the size of this premium increases with the level of foreign equity paticipation. Similar
to the finding in Figure 2.4, the Lowess estimates with fixed effects are roughly in
line with the linear fit. Panels (b) and (c) show that the monotonic and positive
relationship holds likewise for average production and non-production worker wages.
It is possible that the observed relationship between average wages and foreign
equity participation is driven by some omitted factors. For instance, Aitken and
Harrison (1999) find that foreign equity participation is positively correlated with
plant productivity as measured by (log) output. If foreign plants pay their workers
competitively, then this positive correlation should also be reflected in average wages.
Figure 2.6 shows the Lowess estimates of m(xi) in equation (2.15) using the difference
based semiparametric estimator of Yatchew (1997), which control for additional plant
characteristics such as (log) value added per worker. The coefficient estimates from
the difference-based semiparametric regression of (2.15) for the three different groups
of workers are reported in Table 2.11 in the Appendix, along with the significance
test of the nonparametric variable under the V-stat.
Panels (a) and (c) of Figure 2.6 confirm the earlier findings that average plant
wages and average wages for non-production workers increase monotonically with
foreign equity participation. The significance tests reported in Table 2.11 indicate
that foreign equity participation is highly significant for average plant and average
non-production worker wages, with both tests delivering a p-value of zero (V-stats
are 21.064 and 9.402, respectively). While the significance test for average produc-
tion worker wages also returns a p-value of zero (V-stat is 5.850), panel (b) of Figure
2.6 casts doubt on a linear relationship for this group of workers. The estimated
Lowess plot line in panel (b) is fairly flat and shows only a slight upward trend at
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the high end of the foreign ownership distribution. Compared to the nonparamet-
ric estimates of Figures 4 and 5, this implies that any linear relationship between
wages of production workers and the level of foreign ownership is driven by other
plant characteristics, such as productivity or skill composition. These results sug-
gest that the level of foreign ownership significantly impacts the wage premium for
non-production workers but it has minimal impact for production workers. Accord-
ingly, the monotonic relationship between average plant wages and level of foreign
ownership is likely to be driven by the wage premium for non-production workers
only.
2.5.3 Estimates with Uncensored Regressors
My earlier results suggest that the size of the wage premium is affected by the
level of foreign ownership. This subsection presents accurate estimates of the wage
premium from the model in (2.16) with uncensored regressors, which not only controls
for plant level effects, but also accommodates the endogeneity of foreign ownership
and control variables.
My preferred set of results from system GMM estimation are reported in Table
2.3, where I treat all right hand side variables as potentially endogenous. This
specification generates GMM style instruments for all right hand side variables, which
results in close to two hundred instruments in some cases. While a larger number of
instruments tends to increase efficiency, using deeper lags as instruments may weaken
the strength of the instruments. In addition, instrument proliferation undermines the
Hansen test, which is typically used to check instrument validity. Estimates using
all available lags for the instrument set are given in columns (1), (3), and (5), while
estimates using the restricted subset of instruments to the two most immediate lags
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are given in columns (2), (4), and (6).14
The main result that comes out of Table 2.3 is that there exists a positive and
significant relationship between foreign equity participation and average wages only
for non-production workers. Column (5) indicates that a 10 percent increase in for-
eign equity participation leads to a 4 percent increase in the average non-production
worker wage. Restricting the instrument set to lags three and four in column (6)
yields an estimate of 5 percent. In the case where a plant goes from domestic own-
ership to being completely foreign owned (i.e. FEP goes from 0 to 100 percent),
columns (5) and (6) predict the wage premium for non-production workers to be be-
tween 39 and 54 percent. Once we take into account the endogeneity of the foreign
ownership variable, there is no longer an average plant wage premium due to the
level of foreign ownership. This result contrasts with the FE estimates from Tables
1 and 2, which return a positive and significant foreign ownership premium for the
average plant wage. Hence, simply controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the
plant level and failing to take into account other sources of endogeneity may generate
considerably different results.15
My estimates reported in Table 2.3 confirm earlier findings that non-production
workers are the primary beneficiaries of foreign ownership. Unlike previous studies,
however, I do not find a significant wage premium for production workers, as seen
from columns (3) and (4). In addition, my estimates for the hypothetical case for
a plant being completely foreign owned yield larger estimates compared to earlier
14Consistent estimation of equation (2.16) relies on the assumption that the idiosyncratic errors are
serially uncorrelated. Test statistics for this assumption are given in Table 2.3 as m1, m2, and m3 in terms
of their p-values, which are tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to detect first-order, second-order,
and third-order serial correlation in the differenced equation. Since the Arellano-Bond test statistics in
Table 2.3 reveal second-order serial correlation, I restrict the instrument set to lags three and deeper.
15Note that the point I make here is not due to censoring, but due to endogeneity only. A fixed effects
regression with the uncensored foreign ownership variable, not reported here, returns a significant estimate,
while controlling for endogeneity via system GMM removes this significance.
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findings and they provide an upper bound on the estimated premium. This is due
to the continuous nature of my foreign investment variable. For example, column
(5) suggests that a domestic plant at which a foreign investor owns 20 percent of the
equity will see the average non-production worker wage to be only 8 percent higher.
However, if the foreign investor owns 80 percent of the equity, then the estimated
wage premium is 32 percent. While the plant would be classified as multinational
under both cases, there is a significant difference between the wage premia depending
on how much of the plant equity is foreign owned. As can be seen from Figure 2.1,
most foreign plants in Turkey have a partial degree of foreign control; the wage
premia across these plants will therefore be uneven. As a result, previous studies
most likely capture some estimate that lies in the range reported here and thus hide
the heterogeneity in the wage premium that arises due to different levels of control.
The coefficient estimates for the controls in Table 2.3 are as expected, except for
(log) plant size, which seem susceptible to the specification of the instrument set.
The composition of the instrument set also affects the test statistics I use to check
instrument validity. The Hansen test statistics in Table 2.3 cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the set of GMM instruments used in estimation is valid, although
a large number of instruments tends to reduce the power of this test. I therefore
report additionally the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano
and Bond (1991) test statistics for serial correlation. Both of these additional tests
suggest that the sets of instruments used in the regressions are valid, although the
Sargan test rejects their validity in columns (4) and (6) at the one percent confidence
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level.16
Higher levels of foreign ownership may lead to higher wage premia if plants with
majority foreign control are inherently different than plants with minority control.
This could arise, for instance, if majority foreign equity participation is required
for bringing in technologies from the parent firm (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2006). In
addition, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) suggest that foreign owners may substitute
expatriate staff for local managers and introduce pay scales linked to performance.
Gaining majority control at a plant is likely to lead to such reshuffling of the plant’s
labor force, especially at the administrative level, and possibly more on the job
training. In order to test for such “sheepskin effects,” I estimate equation (2.16) with
an additional control, which is a dummy variable indicating majority ownership. The
results from this exercise are reported in Table 2.4, where all right hand side variables
are assumed to be endogenous.
The main result that there exists a significant wage premium only for non-
production workers is confirmed by Table 2.4. Having majority control is far from
being statistically significant in all my regressions. Column (5) indicates that condi-
tional on having majority control, a 10 percent increase in foreign equity participa-
tion is associated with a 7 percent increase in the average wage of a non-production
worker. A plant that is completely owned by foreign investors is predicted to have
a wage premium of 39 percent, which matches the estimate from the same column
of Table 2.3. Column (6) in Table 2.4 predicts the same wage premium to be 53
percent. The test statistics for instrument validity cannot reject the null hypothesis
16Roodman (2006) argues that the Sargan and Hansen tests should not be relied upon too faithfully as
they are prone to weakness. While the Sargan test is not vulnerable to instrument proliferation as is the
Hansen test, it requires homoskedastic errors for consistency, which is rarely the case in plant level studies.
Arellano and Bond (1991) also report greater power for their own proposed tests in identifying whether
serial correlation renders lagged instruments invalid when compared to the Sargan and Hansen tests.
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of exogenous instruments at the five percent confidence level, except for the Sargan
statistic in columns (4) and (6). These results show that the positive relationship
between average wages of non-production workers and the level of foreign ownership
is not driven by plants under majority foreign control.
Tables 3 and 4 document that average wages of production workers are unaffected
by the level of foreign control. In order to check whether such a relationship is
truly nonexistent, I estimate the model in (2.16) with a different dependent variable.
Instead of using the average yearly wage, I use the average hourly wage for production
workers to calculate the wage premium. Using hourly wage data has the advantage
of controlling for overtime work and can better capture the competitive wage.17
Additionally, one reason I don’t find a significant wage premium for production
workers might be if foreign plants employ a greater fraction of their production
workers on temporary contracts. Table 2.A6 in the Appendix shows the results of
this exercise.18 Consistent with my earlier estimates, I find no significant premium
for production workers in all of the specifications. However, I should note that both
Sargan and Hansen test statistics strongly reject the validity of the instruments,
which casts doubt on the reliability of these estimates.
The findings that only non-production workers benefit from multinational activity
and that the wage premium depends on the level of foreign ownership can help
identify which of the channels previously mentioned in the literature are at work.
Arnold and Javorcik (2009) argue that while foreign owners do not alter the skill
composition of labor at acquired plants, they are able to attract more experienced and
17One reason we are observing higher wages at foreign plants might be that workers at foreign plants
might be working longer hours on a given workday or might be taking leave on a less frequent basis than
their counterparts at domestic plants.
18The dynamic specification for this wage series seems to be clear of first-order serial correlation as
suggested by the Arellano-Bond test statistic m2. Therefore, I also present results from regressions that
use second lags and deeper as their set of instruments.
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motivated workers. My results suggest that multinationals attract such workers only
for white collar jobs and that higher foreign equity participation is likely to reshuffle
the labor force engaged in administrative work. Moreover, I interpret my findings as
providing evidence for profit-sharing arguments at multinational plants. According
to this branch of the literature, multinationals can afford to pay higher wages to their
workers if foreign ownership is associated with higher productivity and profitability.19
Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Takii and Ramstetter (2005) provide some evidence
for the positive relationship between foreign equity participation and productivity,
which seems to be the driver behind the wage premia observed at multinational
plants. However, my results suggest that profit sharing within a multinational is
limited to non-production workers.
Although some existing studies consider the impact of the level of foreign owner-
ship on the wage premium, they do not find conclusive evidence. Using panel data
from Indonesian manufacturing, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006) find that while both
majority- and minority-owned foreign plants pay higher wages than domestic plants,
majority-owned plants pay higher wages for white-collar workers but lower wages for
blue-collar workers. However, the authors argue that none of the differences between
the foreign majority and minority wages are significant at the 5% level. A similar
result is reported by Aitken et al. (1996), who find, using data from Venezuela, that
skilled workers receive around 4 percent higher wages at majority-owned plants com-
pared to minority-owned plants. Hence, the current study is the first in the literature
to identify systematic heterogeneity in the wage premium due to different levels of
foreign ownership.
19See, for instance, Egger and Kreickemeier (2010).
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Robustness Checks
System GMM estimates are usually sensitive to the assumptions made about
the variables of interest and other controls with regard to their exogeneity. These
assumptions determine how the right hand side variables enter the instrument matrix
in the construction of the GMM estimator and thus directly affect the number of
instruments created. I previously assumed that the control variables in (2.16), such
as skill intensity and (log) value added per worker, are potentially endogenous. This
results in a large number of instruments, which can lead to an overfitting of the
variables of interest. In my first round of robustness checks, I therefore provide
estimates for the model where additional controls are treated as exogenous, which
greatly reduces the number of instruments used in estimation.20 The results from
the baseline model in (2.16) with exogenous controls are reported in Table 2.5. Note
that foreign equity participation is still assumed to be endogenous.
Table 2.5 confirms the main findings from the previous section, but point esti-
mates for some variables of interest differ significantly from those in Table 2.3. I
again find that foreign equity participation significantly affects the average wages
of non-production workers only, but with a higher premium. Columns (5) and (6)
indicate that a 10 percent increase in foreign ownership leads to an increase in the
average non-production worker wage by 5.4 and 6.9 percent, respectively. The results
for the controls are generally similar to the ones in Table 2.3, except for plant size.
Under the assumption of exogeneity, plant size is negatively associated with the aver-
age plant wage (columns (1) and (2)), yet it generates a positive and significant wage
20Strict exogeneity rules out any feedback from current or past shocks to current values of the variable,
which is often not a natural restriction in the context of economic models relating to several jointly de-
termined outcomes (Bond, 2002). While one can imagine a case where the level of foreign ownership and
the skill intensity of the employees at a plant are determined concurrently, it is not as straightforward to
assume that the former variable will be determined at the same time as, for instance, plant size or inputs.
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premium for non-production workers (columns (5) and (6)). The Arellano-Bond test
statistics confirm the presence of second-order serial correlation, justifying the use
of third lags and deeper for the instrument set. However, the Sargan and Hansen
statistics for overidentifying restrictions point to weaker instrument validity. This is
despite the finding that the coefficients for the lagged wage term in Table 2.5 are
typically high, which corroborates the use of a system GMM estimator as opposed
to the simpler difference estimator.
I repeat the same robustness exercise, this time including a dummy variable in-
dicating majority control.21 The results, reported in Table 2.6, confirm my earlier
findings. Columns (5) and (6) predict that the wage premium at a plant with 100
percent foreign equity participation is 53 and 66 percent, respectively, which are
much higher estimates compared to the results in Table 2.4. The Hansen and Sargan
test statistics in Table 2.6 point to weaker instrument validity, although the Arellano-
Bond test statistics validate the use of third lags and deeper. As a result, treating
right hand side controls in the dynamic wage model as exogenous overestimates the
wage premium and undermines instrument validity. This is also suggested by Table
2.13, which shows the results for the average hourly wage for production workers when
controls are assumed to be exogenous. The estimates for FEP and LogWage t−1 are
highly susceptible to instrument specification for this wage series, as demonstrated
in the results across columns (1)-(4). Column (2) finds a marginally significant and
positive effect of the level of foreign ownership on average hourly wages. However,
both Sargan and Hansen test statistics strongly reject the validity of the instruments
used in the estimation.
In a second round of robustness checks, I repeat all of the system GMM estima-
21Differently from the other controls, however, majority control is assumed to be endogenous.
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tions reported here using a one-step estimator, which is not subject to the critique
of downward biased standard errors in small samples.22 The one-step results con-
firm my earlier findings and provide similar estimates for the wage premium for
non-production workers. The estimated coefficients on FEP are almost identical for
non-production workers regardless of whether the instrument set uses all available
lags or is restricted to the two most recent lags, and they suggest a wage premium
of 5 percent for a 10 percenage point increase in foreign equity participation. Inter-
estingly, the one-step results yield a negative and significant estimate for majority
control when the indicator variable is estimated along with the baseline dynamic
model.23
2.6 Conclusion
A large empirical literature has identified a persistent and significant difference
between average wages at multinational firms compared to their domestic counter-
parts. There exists a wage premium to being multinational even after controlling
for selection effects whereby foreign investors cherry-pick the plants they acquire. At
the time of acquisition or subsequently, the individual characteristics and experiences
of foreign investors are likely to impact the degree of control they want to exercise.
The level of control that foreign owners choose at newly acquired plants may also
have differential effects for its production and non-production workers. This requires
that empirical studies that explore the relationship between wages and foreign own-
ership would be better equipped if they explicitly consider different levels of foreign
22These results are available upon request in an additional appendix.
23As a further test of whether my results are driven by the variation in foreign ownership at a certain
subset of foreign plants, I experimented with system GMM regressions of the dynamic wage model in (2.16)
using only the subsamples of plants under minority and majority control separately. However, this exercise
runs into the problem of cutting the sample of plants used in estimation by around a half. As a result, the
number of plants (groups) used in the GMM estimation gets closer to the number of instruments generated,
which severely distorts inference. In my estimations on each subsample, I frequently observe a Hansen test
statistic of 1.0, which indicates the severity of this problem.
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equity participation and account for the endogeneity of foreign ownership. Most of
the previous literature worked with binary variables to indicate foreign ownership,
which might mislead researchers’ understanding of the impact of foreign ownership
on wages. Estimation with censored variables on the right hand side returns biased
results even after controlling for individual level effects. One implication is that one
cannot readily compare estimates from country studies with each other, as the distri-
bution of foreign ownership shares across firms and thresholds used in the definitions
of foreign ownership are likely to vary across countries.
My results provide more accurate estimates of the effect of foreign ownership on
wages by using continuous data for the variable under study at the same time as
controlling for endogeneity. This allows me to identify the heterogeneity in the wage
premium that arises due to different levels of foreign equity participation. I estimate
that a 10 percentage point increase in the level of foreign ownership is associated
with about a 4% increase in the average wage of a non-production worker. My re-
sults suggest that the identified wage premium at multinationals is primarily driven
by higher pay for the non-production workers. I do not find a wage premium for pro-
duction workers across a variety of empirical settings. In addition, failing to address
the endogeneity of foreign ownership returns misestimates of the wage premium. A
more informed choice of explanatory variables and econometric specification are thus
crucial to better understand both the impact and the size of the foreign ownership
wage premium. The heterogeneity identified in this paper also raises several issues
for further research, especially theoretical models of foreign direct investment. Why
are higher levels of foreign equity participation associated with higher wages? In ad-
dition, why is such a relationship only observed for non-production workers? Future
research that investigates these questions would be welcome.
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Table 2.1: OLS and FE Results: Wages and Multinational Status Defined at Various Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
OLS Estimates FE Estimates
All
Workers
Production
Workers
Non-
production
Workers
All
Workers
Production
Workers
Non-
production
Workers
Foreign Equity
Participation
Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0% (a)
.4839
(.0212)***
.1708
(.0164)***
.3728
(.0217)***
.1121
(.0214)***
.0441
(.0270)
.1802
(.0409)***
15% (b)
.5064
(.0228)***
.1839
(.0176)***
.4046
(.0233)***
.1144
(.0224)***
.0468
(.0280)*
.2142
(.0427)***
30% (c)
.5246
(.0242)***
.1946
(.0188)***
.4133
(.0251)***
.1165
(.0241)***
.0376
(.0288)
.2001
(.0461)***
50% (d)
.5677
(.0293)***
.2167
(.0235)***
.4513
(.0311)***
.1354
(.0307)***
.0611
(.0398)
.2505
(.0595)***
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates for the censored foreign ownership variable in the model in (2.12). The full set of results for the
OLS and FE regressions are in the Appendix, Tables A3 and A4, respectively. All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, clustered at
the plant level. Coefficients are given in the first line; standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include (log) plant size, skill intensity, ratio of production workers, (log) value added per worker, and (log) electricity
as controls. OLS regressions include sector, region, and year dummies, and FE regressions include individual plant effects and year dummies as
additional controls.
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Table 2.2: OLS and FE Results: Wages and Multinational Status Defined at Various Intervals
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
OLS Estimates FE Estimates
All
Workers
Production
Workers
Non-production
Workers
All
Workers
Production
Workers
Non-production
Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI dummy
(interval 15-30%)
.3231
(.0469)***
.0864
(.0376)**
.3033
(.0514)***
.0775
(.0342)**
.0625
(.0598)
.2008
(.0998)**
FDI dummy
(interval 31-50%)
.4191
(.0377)***
.1440
(.0294)***
.3220
(.0399)***
.0850
(.0268)***
.0131
(.0417)
.1351
(.0619)**
FDI dummy
(interval 51-100%)
.5846
(.0294)***
.2221
(.0236)***
.4656
(.0311)***
.1530
(.0320)***
.0662
(.0396)*
.2817
(.0603)***
Log Plant Size .1977
(.0038)***
.0628
(.0042)***
.0962
(.0059)***
.0138
(.0056)**
-.0246
(.0067)***
.0141
(.0099)
Skill Intensity .0040
(.0001)***
.0067
(.0002)***
.0037
(.0002)***
.0003
(.0001)***
.0051
(.0002)***
.0017
(.0002)***
Ratio of Production
Workers
.0008
(.0003)**
.0083
(.0024)***
.0116
(.0037)***
-.0006
(.0005)
.0070
(.002)***
.0102
(.0035)***
Log Value Added per
Worker
.2013
(.0037)***
.0673
(.0028)***
.0756
(.0035)***
.0897
(.0025)***
.0364
(.0029)***
.0241
(.0040)***
Log Electricity .0093
(.0013)***
.1091
(.0026)***
.1363
(.0041)***
.0043
(.0009)***
.1223
(.0026)***
.1524
(.0041)***
Model Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9151 0.8956 0.8416 0.8684 0.8847 0.8292
N 91,555 91,392 80,975 91,555 91,392 80,975
Notes: All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, clustered at the plant level. Coefficients are given in the first line; standard errors in
parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Model effects include sector, region, and year dummies for the
OLS regressions, and individual plant effects and year dummies for the FE regressions. All regressions include a constant term. Reference category:
FDI dummy (interval 0-15%).
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Table 2.3: Two-Step System GMM Results: Wages and Foreign Ownership (Endogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Wage t−1 .6898
(.0554)***
.7395
(.0630)***
.3378
(.0521)***
.3303
(.0646)***
.3880
(.0592)***
.4152
(.0749)***
Foreign Equity Participation
(%)
.0005
(.0006)
-.00008
(.0008)
.0013
(.0008)
.0007
(.0011)
.0039
(.0011)***
.0054
(.0013)***
Log Plant Size .0078
(.0277)
.0445
(.0338)
.0477
(.0528)
.1432
(.0649)**
-.0341
(.0688)
-.0333
(.0832)
Skill Intensity .0031
(.0009)***
.0039
(.0011)***
.0082
(.0019)***
.0084
(.0025)***
.0040
(.0023)*
.0047
(.0026)*
Ratio of Production Workers .0028
(.0085)
-.0015
(.0097)
.0985
(.0389)**
.1025
(.0475)**
.0763
(.0232)***
.0753
(.0198)***
Log Value Added per Worker .1048
(.0334)***
.0928
(.0480)*
.1788
(.0507)***
.2122
(.0745)***
.1091
(.0765)
.0247
(.0957)
Log Input .0289
(.0287)
-.0037
(.0372)
.1065
(.0450)**
.0431
(.0567)
.1668
(.0692)**
.1893
(.0870)**
m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.017 0.018 0.117 0.144 0.015 0.017
m3 (Pr>z) 0.736 0.791 0.219 0.209 0.801 0.902
Sargan 0.036 0.032 0.122 0.001 0.109 0.005
Hansen 0.424 0.610 0.314 0.146 0.141 0.154
Number of Instruments 197 127 197 127 197 127
Instrument Set lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3513 3513 3484 3484 3233 3233
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as endogenous. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer’s correction; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. m1, m2, and m3
are Arellano-Bond tests for first-order, second-order, and third-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0, 1). Sargan and Hansen are tests of the
overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically χ2; p-value is reported. These tests use the minimized value of the corresponding
two-step GMM estimators.
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Table 2.4: Two-Step System GMM Results: Wages and Foreign Majority Ownership (Endogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Wage t−1 .6675
(.0525)***
.7280
(.0627)***
.3375
(.0537)***
.3255
(.0646)***
.3667
(.0588)***
.4265
(.0723)***
Foreign Equity Participation
(%)
.0003
(.0011)
.0014
(.0014)
.0027
(.0021)
.0031
(.0027)
.0072
(.0025)***
.0081
(.0030)***
Majority Share Dummy .0218
(.0809)
-.1042
(.1030)
-.1204
(.1711)
-.2354
(.2261)
-.3285
(.2055)
-.2766
(.2410)
Log Plant Size .0068
(.0257)
.0443
(.0327)
.0496
(.0498)
.1326
(.0620)**
-.0458
(.0713)
-.0465
(.0816)
Skill Intensity .0029
(.0009)***
.0039
(.0010)***
.0078
(.0019)***
.0076
(.0025)***
.0033
(.0023)
.0041
(.0027)
Ratio of Production Workers .0015
(.0085)
-.0028
(.0098)
.0970
(.0390)**
.1019
(.0490)**
.0768
(.0249)***
.0760
(.0208)***
Log Value Added per Worker .1187
(.0307)***
.0889
(.0421)**
.1780
(.0494)***
.2299
(.0725)***
.1185
(.0756)
.0285
(.0893)
Log Input .0298
(.0256)
-.0005
(.0346)
.0997
(.0421)**
.0387
(.0568)
.1738
(.0666)***
.1841
(.0807)**
m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.017 0.019 0.127 0.170 0.020 0.013
m3 (Pr>z) 0.681 0.789 0.203 0.190 0.746 0.879
Sargan 0.090 0.127 0.065 0.000 0.156 0.006
Hansen 0.384 0.651 0.188 0.094 0.180 0.230
Number of Instruments 224 144 224 144 224 144
Instrument Set lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3513 3513 3484 3484 3233 3233
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as endogenous. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer’s correction. See notes to Table 2.3.
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Table 2.5: Two-Step System GMM Results: Wages and Foreign Ownership (Exogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Wage t−1 .6181
(.0988)***
.6496
(.0961)***
.5095
(.0566)***
.5114
(.0634)***
.5124
(.0755)***
.5317
(.0846)***
Foreign Equity Participation
(%)
.0014
(.0009)
.0011
(.0011)
.0016
(.0013)
.0008
(.0015)
.0054
(.0018)***
.0067
(.0020)***
Log Plant Size -.0294
(.0149)**
-.0280
(.0147)*
.0249
(.0186)
.0274
(.0195)
.0466
(.0242)*
.0467
(.0234)**
Skill Intensity .0018
(.0006)***
.0017
(.0006)***
.0085
(.0011)***
.0087
(.0011)***
.0032
(.0013)**
.0029
(.0013)**
Ratio of Production Workers .0021
(.0049)
.0020
(.0047)
.0942
(.0225)***
.0941
(.0220)***
.1156
(.0297)***
.1159
(.0274)***
Log Value Added per Worker .1041
(.0231)***
.1026
(.0225)***
.0697
(.0198)***
.0720
(.0208)***
.0916
(.0243)***
.0855
(.0241)***
Log Input .0660
(.0163)***
.0591
(.0162)***
.0535
(.0156)***
.0527
(.0168)***
.0553
(.0200)***
.0524
(.0198)***
m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.040 0.042 0.021 0.021 0.011 0.014
m3 (Pr>z) 0.729 0.765 0.184 0.193 0.883 0.842
Sargan 0.007 0.001 0.089 0.002 0.000 0.000
Hansen 0.070 0.029 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.004
Number of Instruments 67 47 67 47 67 47
Instrument Set lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3513 3513 3484 3484 3233 3233
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as exogenous. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer’s correction. See notes to Table 2.3.
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Table 2.6: Two-Step System GMM Results: Wages and Foreign Majority Ownership (Exogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Wage t−1 .5892
(.0840)***
.6574
(.0873)***
.4669
(.0599)***
.4815
(.0631)***
.4510
(.0768)***
.5045
(.0821)***
Foreign Equity Participation
(%)
.0013
(.0014)
.0018
(.0016)
.0044
(.0027)
.0042
(.0030)
.0087
(.0032)***
.0106
(.0034)***
Majority Share Dummy .0171
(.1011)
-.0523
(.1269)
-.1861
(.2145)
-.2810
(.2412)
-.3358
(.2556)
-.4008
(.2562)
Log Plant Size -.0248
(.0151)
-.0267
(.0147)*
.0239
(.0194)
.0269
(.0199)
.0454
(.0239)*
.0393
(.0234)*
Skill Intensity .0020
(.0005)***
.0017
(.0006)***
.00837
(.0012)***
.0085
(.0011)***
.0038
(.0013)***
.0033
(.0013)***
Ratio of Production Workers .0023
(.0046)
.0020
(.0045)
.0941
(.0227)***
.0957
(.0233)***
.1216
(.0322)***
.1173
(.0290)***
Log Value Added per Worker .1097
(.0214)***
.1018
(.0213)***
.0703
(.0202)***
.0812
(.0208)***
.1050
(.0242)***
.0922
(.0241)***
Log Input .0664
(.0138)***
.0559
(.0144)***
.0560
(.0163)***
.0511
(.0172)***
.0606
(.0206)***
.0559
(.0202)***
m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.037 0.037 0.039 0.034 0.019 0.014
m3 (Pr>z) 0.691 0.770 0.161 0.165 0.984 0.945
Sargan 0.091 0.025 0.079 0.001 0.002 0.000
Hansen 0.102 0.111 0.004 0.001 0.017 0.021
Number of Instruments 94 64 94 64 94 64
Instrument Set lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3513 3513 3484 3484 3233 3233
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as exogenous. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer’s correction. See notes to Table 2.3.
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Figure 2.1: Censoring the Level of Foreign Ownership
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Foreign Ownership Shares at the Plant Level, 1993-2001
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of Wages Across Plants that Experienced a Takeover
Notes: “Foreign” and “Domestic” refer to plants that were subject to a foreign takeover at one point
in the sample period and depict wages at these plants when they were under foreign and domestic
control, respectively. “Overall” depicts the pattern from the pooled sample of all plants.
115
Figure 2.4: Nonparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average Yearly Wage
and Share of Foreign Ownership: Pooled OLS Regression
(a) All Workers
(b) Production Workers
Continued on next page
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Figure 2.4 (continued): Nonparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average
Yearly Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Pooled OLS Regression
(c) Non-production Workers
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Figure 2.5: Nonparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average Yearly Wage
and Share of Foreign Ownership: Fixed Effects Regression
(a) All Workers
(b) Production Workers
Continued on next page
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Figure 2.5 (continued): Nonparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average
Yearly Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Fixed Effects Regression
(c) Non-production Workers
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Figure 2.6: Semiparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average Yearly Wage
and Share of Foreign Ownership: Fixed Effects Regression
(a) All Workers
(b) Production Workers
Continued on next page
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Figure 2.6 (continued): Semiparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average
Yearly Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Fixed Effects Regression
(c) Non-production Workers
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2.7 Appendix
Table 2.7: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Analysis by Type of Ownership
Foreign Domestic
Foreign Equity Participation N 3140 91434
(%) Mean 60.12 0
Std. Dev. 32.39 0
Average Plant Wage N 3140 91434
(Turkish Liras) Mean 3712.06 1038.28
Std. Dev. 5534.14 1651.31
Average Wage for N 3120 91225
Production Workers Mean 2783.73 972.94
(Turkish Liras) Std. Dev. 4562.69 1550.13
Average Wage for N 3003 79656
Non-Production Workers Mean 5816.05 1487.05
(Turkish Liras) Std. Dev. 9876.44 2807.87
(Log) Plant Size N 3140 91434
Mean 5.01 3.68
Std. Dev. 1.27 1.08
Skill Intensity (%) N 3126 91201
Mean 30.78 19.86
Std. Dev. 21.41 17.12
Ratio of Production Workers N 3140 91434
Mean 0.78 1.54
Std. Dev. 1.58 5.91
(Log) Value Added per Worker N 3102 90049
Mean 8.69 7.24
Std. Dev. 1.76 1.75
(Log) Input N 3140 91414
Mean 13.97 11.62
Std. Dev. 2.34 2.33
Notes: A foreign plant is defined as a manufacturing plant which has any positive ratio of foreign
equity in the plant’s ownership. In the sample, the minimum share of foreign ownership was 1%
and the maximum share was 100%.
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Table 2.8: Foreign Presence in the Turkish Manufacturing Sector
Year
Number of
Foreign
Plants
Number of
Domestic
Plants
Total
Number of
Plants
Foreign
Presence (%)
Average Share of
Foreign
Ownership at
Foreign Plants
(%)
1993 301 10,266 10,567 2.85 58.78
1994 312 9,815 10,127 3.08 58.95
1995 325 9,904 10,229 3.18 59.96
1996 326 10,264 10,590 3.08 58.48
1997 362 11,003 11,365 3.19 57.04
1998 416 11,905 12,321 3.38 59.25
1999 406 10,856 11,262 3.61 60.08
2000 414 10,700 11,114 3.73 62.01
2001 439 10,872 11,311 3.88 64.33
Notes: A foreign plant is defined as a manufacturing plant which has any positive ratio of foreign
equity in the plant’s ownership. In the sample, the minimum share of foreign ownership was 1%
and the maximum share was 100%. Foreign Presence is the ratio of Number of Foreign Plants to
Total Number of Plants.
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Table 2.9: OLS Results: Wages and Multinational Status Defined at Various Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-production Workers
FDI
Threshold
(1)
0%
(2)
15%
(3)
30%
(4)
50%
(5)
0%
(6)
15%
(7)
30%
(8)
50%
(9)
0%
(10)
15%
(11)
30%
(12)
50%
FDI Dummy
.4839
(.0212)***
.5064
(.0228)***
.5246
(.0242)***
.5677
(.0293)***
.1708
(.0164)***
.1839
(.0176)***
.1946
(.0188)***
.2167
(.0235)***
.3728
(.0217)***
.4046
(.0233)***
.4133
(.0251)***
.4513
(.0311)***
Log Plant Size
.1959
(.0038)***
.1975
.(0038)***
.1989
(.0038)***
.2016
(.0038)***
.0623
(.0042)***
.0627
(.0042)***
.0631
(.0042)***
.0641
(.0042)***
.0952
(.0059)***
.0962
(.0059)***
.0974
(.0058)***
.0996
(.0058)***
Skill Intensity
.0040
(.0001)***
.0040
(.0001)***
.0040
(.0001)***
.0041
(.0001)***
.0067
(.0001)***
.0067
(.0001)***
.0067
(.0001)***
.0067
(.0002)***
.0037
(.0002)***
.0037
(.0002)***
.0037
(.0002)***
.0037
(.0002)***
Ratio of
Production
Workers
.0007
(.0003)**
.0008
(.0003)**
.0008
(.0003)**
.0008
(.0003)**
.0083
(.0023)***
.0083
(.0024)***
.0083
(.0024)***
.0083
(.0024)***
.0116
(.0037)***
.0116
(.0036)***
.0116
(.0037)***
.0116
(.0037)***
Log Value
Added per
Worker
.2011
(.0037)***
.2016
(.0037)***
.2022
(.0037)***
.2047
(.0037)***
.0674
(.0028)***
.0674
(.0028)***
.0675
(.0028)***
.0684
(.0028)***
.0758
(.0035)***
.0758
(.0035)***
.0765
(.0035)***
.0785
(.0035)***
Log Electricity
.0091
(.0013)***
.0092
(.0013)***
.0093
(.0013)***
.0093
(.0013)***
.1090
(.0026)***
.1091
(.0026)***
.1091
(.0026)***
.1091
(.0026)***
.1362
(.0041)***
.1362
(.0041)***
.1363
(.0041)***
.1363
(.0041)***
Sector/Year/
Region
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9151 0.9150 0.9149 0.9144 0.8955 0.8955 0.8956 0.8955 0.8415 0.8416 0.8415 0.8412
N 91555 91555 91555 91555 91392 91392 91392 91392 80975 80975 80975 80975
Notes: All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (cluster at plant level). Coefficients are given in the first line; standard errors in
parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant term.
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Table 2.10: FE Results: Wages and Multinational Status Defined at Various Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-production Workers
FDI
Threshold
(1)
0%
(2)
15%
(3)
30%
(4)
50%
(5)
0%
(6)
15%
(7)
30%
(8)
50%
(9)
0%
(10)
15%
(11)
30%
(12)
50%
FDI Dummy
.1121
(.0214)***
.1144
(.0224)***
.1165
(.0241)***
.1354
(.0307)***
.0441
(.0270)
.0468
(.0280)*
.0376
(.0288)
.0611
(.0398)
.1802
(.0409)***
.2142
(.0427)***
.2001
(.0461)***
.2505
(.0595)***
Log Plant Size
.0136
(.0056)**
.0136
(.0056)**
.0138
(.0056)***
.0143
(.0056)***
-.0247
(.0067)***
-.0247
(.0067)***
-.0246
(.0067)***
-.0244
(.0067)***
.0139
(.0099)
.0137
(.0099)
.0143
(.0099)
.0151
(.0099)
Skill Intensity
.0003
(.00008)***
.0003
(.00008)***
.0003
(.00008)***
.0003
(.00008)***
.0051
(.0002)***
.0051
(.0002)***
.0051
(.0002)***
.0051
(.0002)***
.0017
(.0002)***
.0017
(.0002)***
.0017
(.0002)***
.0017
(.0002)***
Ratio of
Production
Workers
-.0006
(.0005)
-.0006
(.0005)
-.0006
(.0005)
-.0006
(.0005)
.0070
(.0020)***
.0070
(.0020)***
.0070
(.0020)***
.0070
(.0021)***
.0102
(.0031)***
.0102
(.0035)***
.0102
(.0035)***
.0102
(.0035)***
Log Value
Added per
Worker
.0897
(.0025)***
.0897
(.0025)***
.0897
(.0025)***
.0897
(.0025)***
.0364
(.0029)***
.0364
(.0029)***
.0364
(.0029)***
.0364
(.0029)***
.0242
(.0040)***
.0242
(.0040)***
.0242
(.0040)***
.0241
(.0040)***
Log Electricity
.0044
(.0010)***
.0044
(.0010)***
.0044
(.0010)***
.0043
(.0010)***
.1223
(.0026)***
.1222
(.0026)***
.1222
(.0026)***
.1223
(.0026)***
.1524
(.0041)***
.1524
(.0041)***
.1524
(.0041)***
.1524
(.0041)***
Time and
Fixed Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.8683 0.8681 0.8680 .8677 0.8846 0.8846 0.8845 0.8846 0.8288 0.8289 0.8287 0.8285
N 91,555 91,555 92,887 92,887 91,392 91,392 91,392 91,392 80,975 80,975 80,975 80,975
Notes: All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (cluster at plant level). Coefficients are given in the first line; standard errors in
parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant term.
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Table 2.11: Results from Difference-Based Semiparametric Regression
Dependent Variable: (Log) Average Yearly Wage
All Workers
Production
Workers
Non-Production
Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Log Plant Size
.0555
(.0249)**
.0519
(.0318)
.0073
(.0386)
Skill Intensity
.0044
(.0005)***
.0109
(.0007)***
.0052
(.0008)***
Ratio of Production
Workers
.0059
(.0053)
.0807
(.0067)***
.1045
(.0082)***
Log Value Added per
Worker
.3095
(.0124)***
.1514
(.0158)***
.1605
(.0197)***
Log Input
.0959
(.0108)***
.0659
(.0138)***
.0950
(.0172)***
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
V-stat
(p-value)
21.064
(0.000)
5.850
(0.000)
9.402
(0.000)
R2 0.8941 0.8722 0.8431
N 4237 4217 4042
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. V-stat is a
significance test of the nonparametric component in the regression, foreign equity participation,
and is asymptotically N(0, 1). See Yatchew (1997). Both the test statistic and corresponding
p-value are reported.
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Table 2.12: Two-Step System GMM Results: Hourly Wages and Foreign Ownership (En-
dogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Hourly Wage for Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Wage t−1 .1246
(.0195)***
.0971
(.0193)***
.2665
(.0363)***
.2516
(.0410)***
Foreign Equity Participation
(%)
-.0007
(.0015)
.0001
(.0018)
.0014
(.0014)
.0005
(.0018)
Log Plant Size .0051
(.0740)
.0497
(.0940)
-.0233
(.0843)
.0325
(.0969)
Skill Intensity .0096
(.0026)***
.0120
(.0029)***
.0080
(.0030)***
.0093
(.0039)**
Ratio of Production Workers .3814
(.1676)**
.4183
(.2027)**
.4528
(.1757)***
.5150
(.1986)***
Log Value Added per Worker .2025
(.0800)**
.1813
(.0896)**
.0287
(.0772)
.0133
(.1242)
Log Input .0995
(.0644)
.0909
(.0805)
.1749
(.0665)***
.1634
(.0836)*
m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.573 0.353 0.957 0.742
m3 (Pr>z) 0.194 0.216 0.107 0.089
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Number of Instruments 253 148 197 127
Instrument Set lags 2+ lags 2 and 3 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3474 3474 3474 3474
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as endogenous.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer’s
correction. See notes to Table 2.3.
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Table 2.13: Two-Step System GMM Results: Hourly Wages and Foreign Ownership (Ex-
ogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Hourly Wage for Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Wage t−1 .1026
(.0228)***
.0738
(.0221)***
.5489
(.0474)***
.5610
(.0490)***
Foreign Equity Participation
(%)
.0028
(.0020)
.0038
(.0022)*
.0006
(.0021)
.0005
(.0025)
Log Plant Size -.1763
(.0466)***
-.1841
(.0472)***
-.0238
(.0373)
-.0271
(.0369)
Skill Intensity .0080
(.0022)***
.0080
(.0022)***
.0081
(.0022)***
.0078
(.0023)***
Ratio of Production Workers .4380
(.1305)***
.4601
(.1461)***
.4290
(.1069)***
.4337
(.1041)***
Log Value Added per Worker .1434
(.0373)***
.1362
(.0377)***
.0998
(.0361)***
.0870
(.0372)**
Log Input .1150
(.0321)***
.1189
(.0317)***
.0722
(.0304)**
.0818
(.0307)***
m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.251 0.128 0.142 0.141
m3 (Pr>z) 0.127 0.127 0.071 0.065
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Instruments 83 53 67 47
Instrument Set lags 2+ lags 2 and 3 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3474 3474 3474 3474
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as exogenous.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer’s
correction. See notes to Table 2.3.
CHAPTER III
Emerging Market Business Cycles and Home Bias in Capital
3.1 Introduction
Business cycles in emerging markets are markedly different from business cycles
in developed economies. In particular, the business cycle displays much greater
volatility along several dimensions in emerging markets, which has been at odds
with the standard models. Earlier studies highlighted the role of real interest rates
and shocks to trend growth to explain the larger volatility of output and net exports
in this set of economies, as well as their strongly countercyclical current account
balances (see Neumeyer and Perri (2005) for real interest rates, and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) for trend growth). In this paper, we document further empirical
regularities that characterize the business cycle in emerging markets, which again
deviate from earlier findings for small open economies of the West. Motivated by
our empirical findings and the fact that intermediates trade constitutes bulk of world
trade, we develop an international real business cycle model that incorporates traded
investment goods and home bias in capital. Differing levels of home bias in capital
goes a long way in explaining the business cycles observed in both developed and
emerging economies.
Using quarterly data from the last two decades, we identify some new empirical
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regularities that describe the behavior of the real exchange rate, exports, and imports
in developed and emerging economies. Several consistent findings present themselves
as challenges to current models of international real business cycles. First, exports
are highly procyclical in developed economies, whereas they are acyclical in emerging
economies. Second, while the correlation between exports and real exchange rate is
positive in developed economies, it is negative in emerging economies. Third, the
real exchange rate is much more procyclical in emerging economies. Fourth, imports
are strongly procyclical in both sets of countries, but more so in emerging economies.
Fifth, trade balance (defined as the ratio of net exports to output) is consistently and
highly negatively correlated with the real exchange rate, and more so in emerging
economies.
We also confirm findings by earlier studies and extend some of these findings to the
emerging markets. For instance, trade balance is highly counter-cyclical in emerging
economies, which was documented in earlier literature (see, for instance, Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007)), and only mildly counter-cyclical in developed economies. This
pattern seems to be driven by the fact that while both sets of countries increase
their imports in the face of high output, it is only in developed countries where
exports also rise. The fact that exports do not respond, at least in the short term,
to output shocks in emerging economies makes these economies especially dependent
on capital flows to fund their burgeoning trade deficits. In addition, we extend the
findings of Engel and Wang (2011) about the volatility of exports and imports in
OECD economies to the emerging markets. While the behavior of net exports is
well known, the behavior of exports and imports have rarely been studied separately
in the literature. We find that exports and imports are much more volatile than
output in emerging markets, which mirror the findings of Engel and Wang (2011).
130
Our model can account for these additional findings on volatility, while explaining
the major discrepancies between developed and emerging markets we highlight in
our empirical work.
We develop a two-country model with tradable intermediate and final goods and
economic shocks are transmitted internationally through terms of trade adjustment.
While we build on the standard framework of Backus et al. (1994), our analysis shows
that excluding the investment sector in an otherwise standard framework fails to
capture the volatility in the trade variables and has difficulty matching correlations
of the major variables. Including the investment good sector goes a long way in
matching the OECD data on several fronts and resolves these anomalies when we
calibrate the investment good sector to have only moderate home bias in capital.
This is surprising, since it is well known that OECD countries typically display
high home bias in capital and that they are the primary producers and exporters of
capital (see, for instance, Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Engel and Wang (2011)).
When we calibrate the model to have large home bias in capital, the simulation
results match very closely the empirical regularities that we identify for the emerging
markets business cycles. In particular, a larger home bias leads to more volatility of
the components of trade and net exports, and it can replicate the correlations across
a wide range of business cycle variables in emerging markets. Hence, our model
can explain the behavior of trade and business cycles in both OECD and emerging
markets with minimal changes to calibration.
We extend the analysis of international business cycles in the literature along
two additional dimensions. First, we study the behavior of exports and imports
separately. While the countercyclicality of net exports is a fairly well established
phenomenon in both emerging and developed economies, studying the elements of
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the trade balance separately enables us to explain why it is much more counter-
cyclical in the former set of economies. Engel and Wang (2011) conduct a thorough
analysis of the business cycle properties of exports and imports, however their study
is restricted to OECD economies. Second, we explicitly study the real exchange rate
and how it is driven by intermediate and final goods trade. Existing models of inter-
national business cycles tend to be silent on the real exchange rate and they focus
on the behavior of the terms of trade, which serves as the transmission channel for
productivity shocks across borders (see, for example, Backus et al. (1994), Mendoza
(1995), and Heathcote and Perri (2002)).
Our study is related to a large literature on international business cycles. Per-
haps the closest counterparts are Boileau (1999), who study an IRBC model with
an equipment sector, and Engel and Wang (2011), who study the importance of
durable goods in international business cycles. Both of these papers focus on OECD
economies. While we also investigate trade movements and the business cycle in
OECD economies, our empirical work highlights some previously unknown regular-
ities that characterize the emerging markets. In that sense, the current study joins
the group of papers that include Neumeyer and Perri (2005), who focus on shocks
to interest rates, and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), who draw attention to shocks to
trend growth as a channel to explain the markedly different behavior of emerging
economy business cycles. Our work differs from existing studies on emerging mar-
kets with its focus on the real exchange rate and the behavior of exports and imports
separately.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details our empirical
findings on trade and the business cycle in developed and emerging markets. We
develop our model in Section 3, and report simulation results in Section 4. Section
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5 concludes. All theoretical results and the derivation of the model are relegated to
the Appendix.
3.2 Empirical Findings
Below are some empirical regularities that relate the dynamics of real exchange
rate to movements in output and trade balance. We conduct an exercise that is sim-
ilar to the ones in Backus et al. (1994) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005). We analyze
empirical regularities in a subset of developed and emerging economies. The sample
of developed economies consists of the following small open economies: Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden. The emerging economies consist of: Argentina,
Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. In all of the tables and figures we report, we use data
from the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts, IMF’s International Financial Statis-
tics, and the Bank for International Settlements. All variables are logged (except for
Net Exports) and Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 3.1 shows the correlations of key business cycle variables with the real
exchange rate. We highlight some of our findings:
• The real exchange rate (RER) is much more procyclical in emerging economies
compared to developed economies (correlation coefficients are 0.63 and 0.31,
respectively).
• Trade balance (NX/GDP) is negatively correlated with the real exchange rate
in both sets of economies; however, the correlation is much more negative in
emerging economies. Similarly, while consumption and investment are posi-
tively correlated with the real exchange rate in all economies, the degree of
correlation is much higher for both variables in emerging economies. In par-
ticular, the correlation between RER and consumption (investment) is at an
133
average of 0.68 (0.59) in emerging economies, while this figure is only 0.44 (0.43)
in developed economies.
• The correlations between RER and exports and imports individually show
great variation among economies in both subsets. While RER and imports co-
move positively in both sets of countries (perhaps a little stronger in emerging
economies), RER and exports seem to comove negatively (with the exception of
Korea) in emerging economies but slightly positively in developed economies.
• Table 3.2 shows the correlations of key business cycle variables with GDP. As in
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), consumption and investment are highly and posi-
tively correlated with GDP in both sets of countries. The correlations are much
stronger in emerging economies, typically over 0.9. Trade balance is, on average,
negatively correlated with GDP in both emerging and developed economies, al-
though this correlation is much more (significantly) negative in the emerging
world. The correlation between trade balance and GDP seems to be weak in
developed economies. Another fact that Table 3.2 reveals is that while imports
are highly and positively correlated with GDP in both countries, exports cor-
relate much more positively with GDP in developed economies compared to
emerging economies. The correlation between exports and GDP is only around
9% for emerging economies, while it is around 84% for imports, which implies
that the high negative correlation between trade balance and GDP is primarily
driven by imports.
Figures 3.1-3.22 show the comovement and cross-correlations of the business cycle
variables in developed and emerging markets. The first two figures demonstrate the
movements of the real exchange rate index (RER) and output (GDP). Note that a
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higher RER corresponds to a stronger domestic currency. We highlight some of our
findings:
• Figure 3.2 reveals the strong comovement of GDP and RER in emerging economies,
while Figure 3.1 shows no such pattern in developed economies. This comove-
ment seems to weaken slightly in Argentina and Turkey during times of financial
crises, around 2001 for both countries and in 1994 for Turkey. The average cor-
relation coefficient between GDP and RER in emerging economies is 0.63 as
opposed to 0.31 in developed economies.
• Figures 5 and 6: With the exception of Argentina in emerging economies (due
primarily to default in 2001?), Imports and RER strongly comove with each
other. In developed economies, this comovement is similarly strong. The aver-
age correlation coefficient in the emerging economies is 0.49 compared to 0.46
in developed economies, although the average is brought down for emerging
economies due to Argentina’s negative value.
• Figures 7 and 8 indicate a negative comovement between trade balance and real
exchange rates. The negative comovement seems to be stronger in emerging
economies. The average correlation coefficient is -0.76 in emerging economies
compared to -0.49 in developed economies.
We also look at the cross-correlations for leads and lags up to a year. The plots for
cross-correlations with the real exchange rates and GDP start with Figure 3.9. Some
observations:
• Figures 9 and 10 depict the cross-correlations between GDP and Real Exchange
Rates. Figure 3.10 shows that real exchange rates are pro-cyclical in emerging
economies, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.53 in Argentina to 0.74 in
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Korea, with an average correlation coefficient of 0.62. In developed economies,
real exchange rates are only mildly procyclical and show a lot of variation.
While the correlation coefficient is 0.04 in Canada, it is 0.60 in New Zealand,
pointing to huge variation (average correlation in developed economies is 0.31).
In Korea and Mexico real exchange rates lead the cycle by one to two quarters,
while in Argentina, it lags the cycle by a quarter. In Turkey, the two series seem
to be moving concurrently with the cycle. The pattern for emerging economies
suggests a roughly inverse-V shape.
• Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show that there is a V-shape with the cross-correlations
between real exchange rates and trade balance (NX/GDP). This V-shape is
much more pronounced in emerging economies.
• Figure 3.15 displays a hump shape for the cross-correlations between imports
and the real exchange rate, with Sweden displaying a different pattern. The
figure suggests that RER might be leading imports by a quarter. In figure 3.16,
Argentina is a significant outlier. With the other three countries, however, there
is a nice inverse-V shape.
• Figure 3.17 shows that, with the exception of Australia, exports and GDP
are positively correlated and depict a hump shape. There is no clear pattern
between exports and GDP in emerging economies (see Figure 3.18).
• Figures 3.19 and 3.20 show that GDP and imports are positively correlated
in both sets of economies. While the cross-correlation patterns depict more
of an inverse U in developed economies, they depict an inverse V in emerging
economies. The average correlation coefficient between GDP and imports is
0.69 in developed economies and 0.84 in emerging economies.
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• Figure 3.21 shows that trade balance (NX/GDP) and GDP seem to be mildly
counter-cyclical developed economies. However, Figure 3.22 shows that they are
highly negatively correlated in emerging economies and they depict a V shape.
This is perhaps the most striking difference between developed and emerging
economies.
3.3 The Model
The model builds on the stochastic growth framework of Backus et al. (1994) with
complete markets. There are two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign, each of
which is populated by the same measure of identical and infinitely lived households.
Each country has two production sectors with their own technology and specializes in
the production of a consumption good and a final investment good. Labor and capital
are internationally immobile, while consumption and investment goods can be freely
traded. The final investment good cannot be traded, however, and is simply used to
augment the country-specific capital stock. All firms are perfectly competitive with
flexible prices. In the notation that follows, we classify the Home country as country
1 and the Foreign country as country 2.
Preferences
Households supply labor and rent capital to final consumption good producing
firms. The representative household in each country i maximizes the expected value
of lifetime utility given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(cit,1− nit)
where U(c, 1 − n) = [cµ(1 − n)1−µ]γ/γ, and cit and nit are consumption and hours
worked in country i at time t. Leisure, lit = 1− nit, follows from our normalization
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of the period endowment of time to 1.
Technology
There are two production sectors in each country. The representative firm in
each country specializes in the production of a final good, which can be used either
as a consumption good, labelled a, or as an intermediate investment good, labelled
b. Consumption and investment goods are produced using capital, k, and labor, n,
with identical linear homogeneous production functions:
aH1t + a
F
1t + b
H
1t + b
F
1t = y1t = z1tk
θ
1tn
1−θ
1t(3.1)
aH2t + a
F
2t + b
H
2t + b
F
2t = y2t = z2tk
θ
2tn
1−θ
2t(3.2)
where the superscripts on the goods denote the country (Home or Foreign) in which
they are consumed or used as an input for the final investment good production. For
instance, aF1t is the country 1 consumption good consumed in the Foreign country,
and bH2t is the country 2 investment good used in the Home country. Equations (3.1)
and (3.2) embody both the market clearing conditions for each country’s final good
and their technologies. In (3.1) and (3.2), (z1t, z2t) is a vector of stochastic shocks
to productivity, which are the source of fluctuations in the model economy. The two
underlying shocks to the economy are governed by the bivariate autoregressions:
zt+1 = Azt + ε
z
t+1
where A is a 2× 2 matrix, z = (z1, z2) and εz is a 2× 1 vector of random variables
distributed normally and indepently over time with variance-covariance matrix Vz.
The final investment good is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite
of Home- and Foreign-investment goods:
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x1t =
[
α1(b
H
1t)
(η1−1)/η1 + (1− α1)(bH2t)(η1−1)/η1
]η1/(η1−1)
x2t =
[
(1− α2)(bF1t)(η2−1)/η2 + α2(bF2t)(η2−1)/η2
]η2/(η2−1)
where ηi is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign investment goods
in country i, and αi determines the extent of home bias in the composition of do-
mestically produced final investment goods in country i. We choose this form of
aggregation for the final investment good sector for its flexibility over the choice
of the home bias parameter, α, and the elasticity of substitution between the two
intermediate goods, η. In addition, it implies that an efficient production frontier
will require the bulk of cross-border trade to constitute of investment goods as we
see in the data (citation?). We abstract from capital adjustment costs in our bench-
mark model, so the final investment good is used to augment the capital stock in the
standard way:
k1,t+1 = (1− δ)k1t + x1t
k2,t+1 = (1− δ)k2t + x2t
Absorption
Consumption of final goods is a CES composite of Home- and Foreign-final goods:
c1t =
[
ω1(a
H
1t)
−ρ1 + (1− ω1)(aH2t)−ρ1
]−1/ρ1
c2t =
[
(1− ω2)(aF1t)−ρ2 + ω2(aF2t)−ρ2
]−1/ρ2
where ρi ≥ −1, and σi = 1/(1 + ρi) is the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods in country i. The parameter ωi > 0.5 indicates the extent of home
bias in consumption in country i.
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Prices and the Trade Account
Let q1t be the price of the consumption good produced at Home and q2t be the
price of the consumption good produced at Foreign. Since final consumption is a
composite of Home and Foreign goods, the consumer price index in each country
that corresponds to the preferences above is:
PC1t =
[
ωσ11 q
1−σ1
1t + (1− ω1)σ1q1−σ12t
]1/(1−σ1)
PC2t =
[
(1− ω2)σ2q1−σ21t + ωσ22 q1−σ22t
]1/(1−σ2)
Given that final output can be used either as a consumption or an investment
good, equations (3.1) and (3.2) imply that the investment goods prices are identical
to those of the final consumption goods (this follows simply from the operation of
perfectly competitive firms with identical marginal cost for both uses of the final
good). That is, the price of b1 is q1t and the price of b2t is q2t. Given the CES
technology in the final investment good sector, the investment price indices are given
by:
P I1t =
[
αη11 q
1−η1
1t + (1− α1)η1q1−η12t
]1/(1−η1)
P I2t =
[
(1− α2)η2q1−η21t + αη22 q1−η22t
]1/(1−η2)
Terms of trade for country i is defined as the price of imports divided by the
price of exports, which is given by pit = qjt/qit, since country i’s consumption and
investment goods (i.e. the tradables it produces) command the same price. The
overall price index in country i is defined by:
Pit =
(
PCit
)piiC (P Iit)piiI
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where piiC is the steady state expenditure share of final consumption and piiI is the
steady state expenditure share of final investment in country i. While this definition
of the overall price index is not based on utility, it is closer to how it is measured in
national accounts. We define the real exchange rate for country i to be the ratio of
country j’s overall price index to that of country i: Eit = Pjt/Pit. This ensures that
a higher value for Eit implies the appreciation of country i’s currency.
As we plan to estimate the behavior of exports and imports separately in our
calibration, it is worth mentioning how we measure the components of trade. In the
model, we measure exports, imports, and net exports (trade balance) the same way
we do in the data, i.e. in terms of domestic country prices. For instance, country 1’s
exports are given by aF1t + b
F
1t, its imports by (q2t/q1t)(a
H
2t + b
H
2t), and its net exports
by
(
aF1t + b
F
1t − (q2t/q1t)(aH2t + bH2t)
)
/y1t.
Solution Concept
The equilibrium of our two-country model is characterized by exploiting the equiv-
alence between the competitive equilibria and the Pareto optima. We calculate a
symmetric steady state equilibrium by solving numerically a second-order approxi-
mation to a social planner’s problem that weights equally the utility of the consumers
in the two countries. Let λ1 and λ2 be the social weights on country 1 and 2, re-
spectively. Combining some of the equilibrium conditions above, the social planner
maximizes the joint utility of consumers in the two countries subject to domestic and
international market clearing conditions:
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max
∑∞
t=0 β
t
λ1
(
[ω1(aH1t)−ρ1+(1−ω1)(aH2t)−ρ1 ]
−µ/ρ1 (1−n1t)1−µ
)γ
γ
+λ2
(
[(1−ω2)(aF1t)−ρ2+ω2(aF2t)−ρ2 ]
−µ/ρ2 (1−n2t)1−µ
)γ
γ

s.t. aH1t + a
F
1t + b
H
1t + b
F
1t = z1tk
θ
1tn
1−θ
1t
aH2t + a
F
2t + b
H
2t + b
F
2t = z2tk
θ
2tn
1−θ
2t
k1,t+1 − (1− δ)k1t =
[
α1(b
H
1t)
(η1−1)/η1 + (1− α1)(bH2t)(η1−1)/η1
]η1/(η1−1)
k2,t+1 − (1− δ)k2t =
[
(1− α2)(bF1t)(η2−1)/η2 + α2(bF2t)(η2−1)/η2
]η2/(η2−1)
Goods prices that would obtain in the competitive equilibrium are calculated
from the marginal value of each good derived from the resource constraints above.
As such, we define the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints to be q1t, q2t, r1t, and
r2t, respectively. Note that rit represents the price of country i’s final investment
good, thus we have rit = P
I
it.
The first order conditions to the above program and the market clearing conditions
characterize the solution to the social planner’s problem. In computing a second-
order approximation around a steady state, we first log-linearize the equilibrium
conditions and then use Dynare to carry out a further approximation given the
linearized system. This means that we don’t have to solve for the steady state values
of all endogenous variables but for a number of ratios describing them. The solution
to the model’s steady state and the linearized system can be found in Appendix A.
3.4 Simulation Results
3.4.1 Calibration
We follow Backus et al. (1994) and the convention in the literature to pick the
parameters of the model. The most important parameters in the calibration are the
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home share values of consumption and investment (ωi and αi, respectively), and the
elasticity of substitution for final goods consumption and capital goods (σi and ηi, re-
spectively). It is well known that substitutability between home and foreign country
goods plays a crucial role in the model dynamics, and there is considerable uncer-
tainty over what value trade elasticity should take.1 We therefore report simulation
results for three different values of each elasticity (hence, a total of 9 simulations).
We calibrate home bias in capital goods, α, by the share of home investment spend-
ing in total investment spending, which is given at the steady state by (for country
1): q1b
H
1 /(q1b
H
1 + q2b
H
2 ) = 1/(1 + ((1− α1)/α1)η1).2
We assume a symmetric steady state where both countries in the model have
the same technologies both in their consumption and investment good sectors. This
means that in the final investment good sector we have α1 = α2 and η1 = η2,
and for the consumption aggregator we have ω1 = ω2 and σ1 = σ2. This implies
identical home bias across the two countries in consumption and in investment as
well as identical elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in both
aggregates.
The values used for the calibration of Case 1 are given in Table 3.4. The produc-
tivity process that provides the underlying shocks to the economy are taken directly
from Backus et al. (1994), which imply persistent disturbances to productivity with
some moderate spillover across countries. Note that this specification of technology
shocks is estimated to mimic the business cycle in the developed world. Hence, it will
1Hooper et al. (2000) report estimates that range from 0.1 to 2 for the G-7 countries, while Heathcote
and Perri (2002) estimate an elasticity of 0.9.
2It is worth noting that there are different ways that researches calibrate home bias in the literature. In
this paper, we build home bias in capital exogenously by picking the share of home investment spending
in total investment spending. An alternative way to calibrate home bias would be via iceberg trade costs,
which would endogenously lead to a bigger share of home consumption and investment. While this would
be a closer picture of reality, it would introduce more wrinkles into the trade elasticities and home bias in
consumption and investment.
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naturally underestimate volatilities for the emerging market business cycles, while
we expect it to closely match those for the developed markets.
3.4.2 Simulation 1 - Importance of the Investment Goods Sector
We initially assume no home bias in capital goods, and therefore set α1 = α2 =
0.5. Regardless of the elasticity of substitution for investment goods, this implies
that the share of home investment spending in total investment spending is one half.
All results are HP filtered, etc.
In interpreting the results of the simulation, we focus on the case where σ = 1.5
and η = 1.5 (the literature typically assumes σ = 1.5; there is no certain evidence
on the value of η - Bems (2008) suggests it is similar in rich and poor countries and
close to 1, which implies a Cobb-Douglas technology). The model with no home bias
in capital goods can match the basic features of the business cycle for an average
OECD economy. The model replicates the within-country correlations between the
major macroeconomic variables with the correct sign and similar magnitude, except
for that between output and terms of trade (in the data, terms of trade are acyclical,
while the model produces strongly procyclical terms of trade - this is a very typical
failing of IRBC models with traded goods only). In particular, the model generates
the joint behavior of exports, imports, output, and the real exchange rate with good
success. In terms of volatility, the model can generate the observed pattern of more
volatile export and import behavior compared to output, while it fails to capture the
high volatility of the real exchange rate and terms of trade. Overall, the model with
no home bias in capital seems to fit the OECD data well.
What does the impulse response analysis tell us? Figure 3.23 shows the behavior
of the model variables in response to a one percent shock to home country’s tech-
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nology. In the face of a positive shock in the home country (country 1), the price of
home consumption and investment goods decreases (relative to foreign). The home
terms of trade jump immediately as a result. This leads to substitution from country
2 consumption goods to country 1 consumption goods in both home and foreign.
The price of the final investment good decreases by the same amount in both home
and foreign, owing to the symmetric setup in the investment sector. Both home and
foreign investment goods used at home (country 1) increase, driving imports up and
sustaining large imports at home, while they drop on impact at foreign (country 2)
only to recover with a lag. The persistence of the shock and the spillover create a
wealth effect for country 2, which increases the consumption of both country goods
at foreign. This works to increase exports at home, leading to the familiar counter-
cyclical behavior of net exports. Because the overall price level is lower at home than
foreign, the real exchange rate of home increases.
A rather puzzling finding from the impulse responses is the kinked response of the
investment goods (bH1 , b
F
1 , b
H
2 , b
F
2 ). The one period kink arises from the fact that it
takes one period for invested goods to turn into usable capital. With no adjustment
costs present in the model, the behavior is not smooth at all, although it will turn
out in the next section that the investment goods follow a smooth path when there is
large home bias in capital (more on this below). We know that the kinked behavior
is not due to the presence of spillovers, since when we turn off the spillover channel
we still get the same impulse responses. The kink probably reflects the fact that
investment is very lumpy when there are no adjustment costs.
Why does introducing an investment good sector increase the volatility of prices?
In a standard IRBC model, the prices of consumption goods would not be very
responsive to technology shocks since such models typically work with risk-averse
145
consumer preferences that are designed for consumption smoothing. When the only
traded good in a model is the final consumption good, then the volatility of terms
of trade would also be small. In contrast, the prices of investment goods would
respond more to technology shocks as they readily reflect the changes to marginal
productivities and they would be more responsive the smaller costs to adjusting
capital are. In our model, because the final output of a country can be traded freely
and used both for consumption and as an investment good, the two goods command
the same price. Hence, when cross-border trade is mostly composed of trade in
investment goods due to a technology shock, terms of trade become more volatile as
prices respond to changes in marginal returns of capital.
What role does the elasticity of substitution play? In the data, we typically
observe higher volatility in international prices compared to output, which standard
business cycle models cannot reproduce. Our model shares this shortcoming with
earlier models, while being able to account for more volatile quantities. The model
can generate higher volatility in the terms of trade compared to output when the
elasticity of substitution for investment goods is sufficiently low. The intuition comes
from the fact that a smaller elasticity of substitution is associated with a smaller
impact of technology shocks on traded quantities, hence the bulk of the adjustment
takes place through the terms of trade.
3.4.3 Simulation 2 - Importance of Home Bias in Capital
The previous section studied the importance of introducing an investment goods
sector to a canonical international RBC model. In this section, we start studying
how differences in home bias in the investment goods sector affects the system. We
maintain the assumption of a symmetric steady state. In OECD economies, there
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is strong bias in capital towards home investment goods (approx. 70%, Engel and
Wang (2011). The same scenario is very likely to hold in the emerging economies
as well, however we do not have empirical evidence yet). Since the share of home
investment spending in total investment spending is given by q1b
H
1 /(q1b
H
1 + q2b
H
2 ) =
1/(1+((1−α1)/α1)η1) at the steady state for country 1, we solve for α1 equating the
left hand side to 70% given η1. Assuming an intermediate value of η1 = 1.5, we get
α1 ' 0.64. Note that home bias increases with the elasticity of substitution, but for
the simulations we will fix α1 = 0.65, and let elasticity of substitution vary as before.
The other values used for the calibration of Simulation 2 are the same as before.
In interpreting the results of the simulation, we focus on the case where σ = 1.5
and η = 1.5. The model with large home bias in the investment sector does a very
good job in matching the within-country correlations of macroeconomic variables
in emerging economies. In particular, we can replicate the acyclicality of exports
and the negative correlation between exports and the real exchange rate in emerging
economies, which are the two most distinctive patterns observed in this group com-
pared to OECD countries. Moreover, the asymmetry in the investment sector helps to
account for greater procylicality of imports (and thus the greater counter-cyclicality
of net exports) in emerging economies as well as matching the behavior of the real
exchange rate with success. The model also matches the volatilities of exports and
imports in emerging economies well, although it shares with other IRBC models in
grossly underestimating the volatility of the terms of trade and real exchange rate.
What does the impulse response analysis tell us? Figure 3.24 shows the behavior
of the model variables in response to a one percent shock to home country’s tech-
nology. In the face of a positive shock in the home country (country 1), the price of
home consumption and investment goods decreases (relative to foreign). The home
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terms of trade jump immediately as a result, although this jump is not as pronounced
as in Simulation 1. This leads to substitution from country 2 consumption goods
towards country 1 consumption goods in both home and foreign. The price of the
final investment good decreases in both countries, but by more at home due to the
large home bias. This leads to substitution towards home investment goods in both
countries, and both country 1 and country 2 investment goods increase at home,
while they drop on impact at foreign. Home bias in the investment sector ampli-
fies the wealth effect for home, and thus demand for country 2’s consumption good
jumps (compare to Simulation 1), which leads to even greater imports. The same
mechanism implies a weak wealth effect at foreign, which sees less demand for coun-
try 1’s consumption good and a bigger decline in country 1’s investment good. This
essentially rules out any opportunity for home to export its goods until demand picks
up again at foreign, hence leading to acyclical exports at home. This also creates a
strongly counter-cyclical trade balance. As before, the real exchange rate increases
as prices at home are lower in general compared to foreign.
Notice that the impulse responses for certain variables show differences from Sim-
ulation 1. Specifically, we see a humped shape pattern in the terms of trade for
country 1, whereby the home bias in capital implies a more persistent relative price
effect for country 1. This serves to smooth out the response of the investment goods
(bH1 , b
F
1 , b
H
2 , b
F
2 ), as more home investment goods are produced for a longer time
taking advantage of the persistence of the technology shock. Looking at other vari-
ables such as net exports, we see that they too display a much smoother path in
this case compared to Simulation 1. Thus, home bias in capital renders the relative
price of the home investment goods more favorable for a longer period of time when
a shock hits the economy, which makes the production of home investment goods
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more persistent.
3.5 Conclusion
Business cycles in emerging markets display a number of empirical discrepancies
compared to developed economies. Exports are acyclical, they correlate negatively
with the real exchange rate, and the real exchange rate is much more procycli-
cal in emerging markets. In addition, imports are more procyclical, leading to the
well-known strong countercyclicality of net exports in emerging markets. Standard
dynamic general equilibrium models are unable to replicate these disparate regu-
larities of the business cycle in emerging and developed economies. We develop a
two-country model that embodies trade in investment goods and accounts for busi-
ness cycle characteristics in both sets of economies. Our premise is that the two
sets of economies have different levels of home bias in their final investment goods
sector, which implies that terms of trade adjustments to technology shocks differ
significantly in the two sets of economies. Our findings suggest that varying levels of
home bias in capital are an important determinant of business cycle properties. In
future research, we plan to work on extending the model developed here to account
for varying levels of home bias in capital in different countries. We also plan to
take into account how differences in country size in an otherwise standard symmetric
model affect the model dynamics.
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Table 3.1: Comovements in Trade and Business Cycle: Correlations with GDP
Exports Imports NX/GDP Consumption Investment
Developed Economies:
Australia -0.0824 0.6079 -0.5326 0.6524 0.7386
Canada 0.8938 0.7187 0.0096 0.7963 0.6699
New Zealand 0.3159 0.6275 -0.4567 0.7794 0.8817
Sweden 0.8050 0.8250 0.0517 0.7492 0.8699
Average 0.4831 0.6947 -0.2320 0.7443 0.7900
Emerging Economies:
Argentina -0.3006 0.6858 -0.7453 0.9422 0.9201
Korea 0.3063 0.9112 -0.8304 0.9174 0.9105
Mexico -0.1326 0.9080 -0.8343 0.9113 0.9539
Turkey 0.4949 0.8729 -0.6785 0.9067 0.8613
Average 0.0920 0.8445 -0.7721 0.9194 0.9115
Emerging Economies (Crisis Years Excluded):
Argentina -0.3488 0.7640 -0.7569 0.9543 0.9283
Korea 0.4478 0.8594 -0.6892 0.8112 0.8229
Mexico 0.1586 0.9047 -0.7034 0.8636 0.9199
Turkey 0.5320 0.7984 -0.4593 0.8833 0.8300
Average 0.1974 0.8316 -0.6522 0.8781 0.8753
Notes: Data are from OECD, IFS, and BIS. All variables are logged (except for Net
Exports) and HP filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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Table 3.2: Comovements in Trade and Business Cycle: Correlations with Real Exchange
Rate
GDP Exports Imports NX/GDP Consumption Investment
Developed Economies:
Australia 0.2617 0.1022 0.4922 -0.3671 0.3183 0.3156
Canada 0.0475 0.1750 0.5439 -0.7142 0.2509 0.4282
New Zealand 0.6003 0.1166 0.5674 -0.5178 0.7508 0.5995
Sweden 0.3364 0.0209 0.2419 -0.3965 0.4566 0.4094
Average 0.3115 0.1037 0.4614 -0.4989 0.4442 0.4382
Emerging Economies:
Argentina 0.5365 -0.9026 -0.1290 -0.8119 0.7055 0.4250
Korea 0.7399 0.2552 0.7773 -0.7244 0.7219 0.6449
Mexico 0.6733 -0.4078 0.7091 -0.8395 0.7377 0.7517
Turkey 0.5540 -0.0593 0.6217 -0.6894 0.5648 0.5743
Average 0.6259 -0.2786 0.4948 -0.7663 0.6825 0.5990
Emerging Economies (Crisis Years Excluded):
Argentina 0.6837 -0.8361 0.2397 -0.8430 0.8111 0.7012
Korea 0.6536 0.3969 0.6527 -0.5037 0.5708 0.4950
Mexico 0.5562 -0.3155 0.5422 -0.8062 0.6902 0.6200
Turkey 0.3863 -0.1611 0.4786 -0.5699 0.4588 0.4158
Average 0.5700 -0.2290 0.4783 -0.6807 0.6327 0.5580
Notes: Data are from OECD, IFS, and BIS. All variables are logged (except for Net
Exports) and HP filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 3.3: Calibration Values
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
µ 0.34 Consumption share
γ -1 Risk aversion
θ 0.36 Capital share
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
ω1 = ω2 0.76 Home bias in consumption
α1 = α2 0.50; 0.65 Home bias in investment
σ1 = σ2 0.5; 1.5; 2.5 Elasticity of substitution between consumption goods
η1 = η2 0.5; 1.5; 2.5 Elasticity of substitution between investment goods
Productivity Process Taken from Backus et al (1994)
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Table 3.4: Results for Simulation 1, No Home Bias in Capital
Correlations
(nx,y) (nx,p) (y,p) (nx,rer) (y,rer) (exp,y) (imp,y) (exp,rer) (imp,rer)
Data (OECD) -0.29 -0.46 0.03 -0.50 0.31 0.48 0.69 0.10 0.46
Data (Emerging) -0.77 - - -0.77 0.63 0.09 0.84 -0.28 0.49
Elasticity of Subst.
for Final Goods
Elasticity of Subst.
for Capital Goods
σ = 0.5 η = 0.5 0.18 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.52 0.28 0.62 -0.20
η = 1.5 0.19 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.47 0.76 0.65 0.61 0.09
η = 2.5 -0.06 -0.11 0.53 -0.11 0.53 0.99 0.99 0.47 0.49
σ = 1.5 η = 0.5 0.43 0.80 0.54 0.80 0.54 0.99 0.96 0.52 0.29
η = 1.5 -0.13 -0.23 0.59 -0.23 0.59 0.48 0.65 0.04 0.39
η = 2.5 -0.13 -0.22 0.63 -0.22 0.63 0.20 0.44 -0.09 0.31
σ = 2.5 η = 0.5 0.38 0.70 0.54 0.70 0.54 0.97 0.87 0.52 0.11
η = 1.5 -0.12 -0.21 0.59 -0.21 0.59 0.42 0.60 -0.04 0.33
η = 2.5 -0.13 -0.21 0.63 -0.21 0.63 0.15 0.39 -0.11 0.28
Notes: This table reports the results of Simulation 1, where α1 = α2 = 0.5. Entries are theoretical moments. Statistics are based on
logged (except for Net Exports) and HP filtered data. nx: Net Exports; p: Terms of Trade; y: Output; rer: Real Exchange Rate; exp:
Exports; imp: Imports.
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Table 3.5: Results for Simulation 1, No Home Bias in Capital
Standard Deviation (percent)
nx y p rer exp† imp†
Data (OECD)? 1.06 1.53 2.92 5.00 2.65 3.08
Data (Emerging) 2.48 3.20 - 9.85 7.27 9.65
Elasticity of Subst.
for Final Goods
Elasticity of Subst.
for Capital Goods
σ = 0.5 η = 0.5 2.44 1.14 1.71 0.36 3.76 3.04
η = 1.5 1.09 1.20 1.46 0.30 2.15 1.72
η = 2.5 0.12 1.25 1.29 0.27 1.34 1.35
σ = 1.5 η = 0.5 0.14 1.26 1.37 0.71 1.77 1.59
η = 1.5 1.08 1.31 1.22 0.64 2.66 2.88
η = 2.5 2.13 1.36 1.11 0.58 4.60 4.82
σ = 2.5 η = 0.5 0.24 1.26 1.42 0.94 2.29 1.96
η = 1.5 1.04 1.32 1.25 0.83 3.57 3.79
η = 2.5 2.13 1.37 1.13 0.75 6.55 6.77
Notes: This table reports the results of Simulation 1, where α1 = α2 = 0.5. Entries are
theoretical moments. Statistics are based on logged (except for Net Exports) and HP
filtered data. nx: Net Exports; p: Terms of Trade; y: Output; rer: Real Exchange Rate;
exp: Exports; imp: Imports.
? The figures for nx, y, and p are from Backus et al. (1994), rer is our own calculation, exp
and imp are from Engel and Wang (2011).
† The figures for (real) exports and imports are from Engel and Wang (2011), and expressed
relative to GDP. In Engel and Wang (2011), the mean (median) standard deviation of GDP
is 1.51 (1.36).
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Table 3.6: Results for Simulation 2, Home Bias in Capital
Correlations
(nx,y) (nx,p) (y,p) (nx,rer) (y,rer) (exp,y) (imp,y) (exp,rer) (imp,rer)
Data (OECD) -0.29 -0.46 0.03 -0.50 0.31 0.48 0.69 0.10 0.46
Data (Emerging) -0.77 - - -0.77 0.63 0.09 0.84 -0.28 0.49
Elasticity of Subst.
for Final Goods
Elasticity of Subst.
for Capital Goods
σ = 0.5 η = 0.5 -0.44 -0.86 0.46 -0.86 0.46 0.61 0.81 -0.19 0.84
η = 1.5 -0.59 -0.72 0.53 -0.72 0.53 0.28 0.94 -0.26 0.72
η = 2.5 -0.63 -0.66 0.52 -0.66 0.52 0.39 0.99 -0.13 0.61
σ = 1.5 η = 0.5 -0.44 -0.56 0.58 -0.56 0.58 0.12 0.80 -0.31 0.63
η = 1.5 -0.57 -0.44 0.55 -0.44 0.55 0.02 0.91 -0.23 0.49
η = 2.5 -0.58 -0.28 0.49 -0.28 0.49 0.16 0.96 -0.06 0.34
σ = 2.5 η = 0.5 -0.45 -0.56 0.59 -0.56 0.59 0.03 0.78 -0.38 0.61
η = 1.5 -0.57 -0.43 0.55 -0.43 0.55 -0.09 0.88 -0.29 0.46
η = 2.5 -0.58 -0.26 0.49 -0.26 0.49 0.01 0.92 -0.12 0.29
Notes: This table reports the results of Simulation 2, where α1 = α2 = 0.65. Entries are theoretical moments. Statistics are based on
logged (except for Net Exports) and HP filtered data. nx: Net Exports; p: Terms of Trade; y: Output; rer: Real Exchange Rate; exp:
Exports; imp: Imports.
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Table 3.7: Results for Simulation 2, Home Bias in Capital
Standard Deviation (percent)
nx y p rer exp† imp†
Data (OECD)? 1.06 1.53 2.92 5.00 2.65 3.08
Data (Emerging) 2.48 3.20 - 9.85 7.27 9.65
Elasticity of Subst.
for Final Goods
Elasticity of Subst.
for Capital Goods
σ = 0.5 η = 0.5 1.01 1.20 1.81 0.45 1.34 2.44
η = 1.5 0.78 1.34 0.98 0.31 1.31 1.83
η = 2.5 0.43 1.39 0.65 0.24 1.03 1.28
σ = 1.5 η = 0.5 1.17 1.32 1.28 0.72 2.76 3.39
η = 1.5 0.72 1.41 0.70 0.44 2.22 2.47
η = 2.5 0.37 1.44 0.47 0.32 1.59 1.68
σ = 2.5 η = 0.5 1.15 1.33 1.32 0.93 3.99 4.66
η = 1.5 0.69 1.41 0.71 0.55 3.40 3.67
η = 2.5 0.35 1.44 0.47 0.39 2.52 2.62
Notes: This table reports the results of Simulation 2, where α1 = α2 = 0.65. Entries
are theoretical moments. Statistics are based on logged (except for Net Exports) and HP
filtered data. nx: Net Exports; p: Terms of Trade; y: Output; rer: Real Exchange Rate;
exp: Exports; imp: Imports.
? The figures for nx, y, and p are from BKK, rer is my own calculation, exp and imp are
from Engel and Wang (2011).
† The figures for (real) exports and imports are from Engel and Wang (2011), and expressed
relative to GDP. In Engel and Wang (2011), the mean (median) standard deviation of GDP
is 1.51 (1.36).
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Figure 3.1: Output and Real Exchange Rates in Developed Economies
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Figure 3.2: Output and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging Economies
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Figure 3.3: Exports and Real Exchange Rates in Developed Economies
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Figure 3.4: Exports and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging Economies
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Figure 3.5: Imports and Real Exchange Rates in Developed Economies
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Figure 3.6: Imports and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging Economies
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Figure 3.7: Net Exports and Real Exchange Rates in Developed Economies
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Figure 3.8: Net Exports and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging Economies
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Figure 3.9: Cross-Correlations between GDP and Real Exchange Rates in Developed
Economies
Figure 3.10: Cross-Correlations between GDP and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging
Economies
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Figure 3.11: Cross-Correlations between NX/GDP and Real Exchange Rates in Devel-
oped Economies
Figure 3.12: Cross-Correlations between NX/GDP and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging
Economies
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Figure 3.13: Cross-Correlations between Exports and Real Exchange Rates in Developed
Economies
Figure 3.14: Cross-Correlations between Exports and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging
Economies
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Figure 3.15: Cross-Correlations between Imports and Real Exchange Rates in Developed
Economies
Figure 3.16: Cross-Correlations between Imports and Real Exchange Rates in Emerging
Economies
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Figure 3.17: Cross-Correlations between Exports and GDP in Developed Economies
Figure 3.18: Cross-Correlations between Exports and GDP in Emerging Economies
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Figure 3.19: Cross-Correlations between Imports and GDP in Developed Economies
Figure 3.20: Cross-Correlations between Imports and GDP in Emerging Economies
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Figure 3.21: Cross-Correlations between Net Exports and GDP in Developed Economies
Figure 3.22: Cross-Correlations between Net Exports and GDP in Emerging Economies
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Figure 3.23: Impulse Responses for Simulation 1, No Home Bias in Capital
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Figure 3.24: Impulse Responses for Simulation 2, Home Bias in Capital
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3.6 Appendix A
This appendix contains some intermediate results and the solution of the model
as described in the body of the text. See the text for details on the setup of the
model. Let λ1 and λ2 be the social weights on country 1 and 2, respectively. The
social planner solves the following problem:
max
∑∞
t=0 β
t
λ1
(
[ω1(aH1t)−ρ1+(1−ω1)(aH2t)−ρ1 ]
−µ/ρ1 (1−n1t)1−µ
)γ
γ
+λ2
(
[(1−ω2)(aF1t)−ρ2+ω2(aF2t)−ρ2 ]
−µ/ρ2 (1−n2t)1−µ
)γ
γ

s.t. aH1t + a
F
1t + b
H
1t + b
F
1t = z1tk
θ
1tn
1−θ
1t
aH2t + a
F
2t + b
H
2t + b
F
2t = z2tk
θ
2tn
1−θ
2t
k1,t+1 − (1− δ)k1t =
[
α1(b
H
1t)
(η1−1)/η1 + (1− α1)(bH2t)(η1−1)/η1
]η1/(η1−1)
k2,t+1 − (1− δ)k2t =
[
(1− α2)(bF1t)(η2−1)/η2 + α2(bF2t)(η2−1)/η2
]η2/(η2−1)
Define the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints to be q1t, q2t, r1t, and r2t,
respectively. Note that qit represents the price of country i’s consumption and in-
vestment goods, while rit represents the price of its final investment good. Thus, we
have rit = P
I
it. For notational ease, let φ1 = (η1 − 1)/η1 and φ2 = (η2 − 1)/η2. The
current value Lagrangian associated with the above program is:
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L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
λ1
γ
[
ω1(a
H
1t)
−ρ1 + (1− ω1)(aH2t)−ρ1
]−µγ/ρ1
(1− n1t)(1−µ)γ
+
λ2
γ
[
(1− ω2)(aF1t)−ρ2 + ω2(aF2t)−ρ2
]−µγ/ρ2
(1− n2t)(1−µ)γ
+ q1t
[
z1tk
θ
1tn
1−θ
1t − aH1t − aF1t − bH1t − bF1t
]
+ q2t
[
z2tk
θ
2tn
1−θ
2t − aH2t − aF2t − bH2t − bF2t
]
+ r1t
[(
α1(b
H
1t)
φ1 + (1− α1)(bH2t)φ1
)1/φ1 − k1,t+1 + (1− δ)k1t]
+ r2t
[(
(1− α2)(bF1t)φ2 + α2(bF2t)φ2
)1/φ2 − k2,t+1 + (1− δ)k2t]}
The first order conditions associated with the Lagrangian are given by:
∂aH1t : λ1(1− n1t)(1−µ)γµ
[
ω1(a
H
1t)
−ρ1 + (1− ω1)(aH2t)−ρ1
]−µγ
ρ1
−1
ω1(a
H
1t)
−ρ1−1 = q1t
∂aH2t : λ1(1− n1t)(1−µ)γµ
[
ω1(a
H
1t)
−ρ1 + (1− ω1)(aH2t)−ρ1
]−µγ
ρ1
−1
(1− ω1)(aH2t)−ρ1−1 = q2t
∂aF1t : λ2(1− n2t)(1−µ)γµ
[
(1− ω2)(aF1t)−ρ2 + ω2(aF2t)−ρ2
]−µγ
ρ2
−1
(1− ω2)(aF1t)−ρ2−1 = q1t
∂aF2t : λ2(1− n2t)(1−µ)γµ
[
(1− ω2)(aF1t)−ρ2 + ω2(aF2t)−ρ2
]−µγ
ρ2
−1
ω2(a
F
2t)
−ρ2−1 = q2t
∂bH1t : r1t
[
α1(b
H
1t)
φ1 + (1− α1)(bH2t)φ1
] 1
φ1
−1
α1(b
H
1t)
φ1−1 = q1t
∂bH2t : r1t
[
α1(b
H
1t)
φ1 + (1− α1)(bH2t)φ1
] 1
φ1
−1
(1− α1)(bH2t)φ1−1 = q2t
∂bF1t : r2t
[
(1− α2)(bF1t)φ2 + α2(bF2t)φ2
] 1
φ2
−1
(1− α2)(bF1t)φ2−1 = q1t
∂bF2t : r2t
[
(1− α2)(bF1t)φ2 + α2(bF2t)φ2
] 1
φ2
−1
α2(b
F
2t)
φ2−1 = q2t
∂n1t : λ1
[
ω1(a
H
1t)
−ρ1 + (1− ω1)(aH2t)−ρ1
]−µγ
ρ1 (1− µ)(1− n1t)(1−µ)γ−1 = (1− θ)q1tz1tkθ1tn−θ1t
∂n2t : λ2
[
(1− ω2)(aF1t)−ρ2 + ω2(aF2t)−ρ2
]−µγ
ρ2 (1− µ)(1− n2t)(1−µ)γ−1 = (1− θ)q2tz2tkθ2tn−θ2t
∂k1,t+1 : r1t = βEt
[
(1− δ)r1,t+1 + θq1,t+1z1,t+1kθ−11,t+1n1−θ1,t+1
]
∂k2,t+1 : r2t = βEt
[
(1− δ)r2,t+1 + θq2,t+1z2,t+1kθ−12,t+1n1−θ2,t+1
]
Domestic and international market clearing conditions are given by:
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aH1t + a
F
1t + b
H
1t + b
F
1t = z1tk
θ
1tn
1−θ
1t
aH2t + a
F
2t + b
H
2t + b
F
2t = z2tk
θ
2tn
1−θ
2t
k1,t+1 − (1− δ)k1t =
[
α1(b
H
1t)
φ1 + (1− α1)(bH2t)φ1
]1/φ1
k2,t+1 − (1− δ)k2t =
[
(1− α2)(bF1t)φ2 + α2(bF2t)φ2
]1/φ2
The first order conditions and the market clearing conditions above characterize
the solution to the social planner’s problem. Before log-linearizing the above system
of equations, I list the steady-state conditions, which will help us in solving for some
identities helpful for the calibration. I drop the bars and time subscripts from the
endogenous variables to simplify the notation. At the steady state:
λ1(1− n1)(1−µ)γµ
[
ω1(a
H
1 )
−ρ1 + (1− ω1)(aH2 )−ρ1
]−µγ
ρ1
−1
ω1(a
H
1 )
−ρ1−1 = q1
λ1(1− n1)(1−µ)γµ
[
ω1(a
H
1 )
−ρ1 + (1− ω1)(aH2 )−ρ1
]−µγ
ρ1
−1
(1− ω1)(aH2 )−ρ1−1 = q2
λ2(1− n2)(1−µ)γµ
[
(1− ω2)(aF1 )−ρ2 + ω2(aF2 )−ρ2
]−µγ
ρ2
−1
(1− ω2)(aF1 )−ρ2−1 = q1
λ2(1− n2)(1−µ)γµ
[
(1− ω2)(aF1 )−ρ2 + ω2(aF2 )−ρ2
]−µγ
ρ2
−1
ω2(a
F
2 )
−ρ2−1 = q2
r1
[
α1(b
H
1 )
φ1 + (1− α1)(bH2 )φ1
] 1
φ1
−1
α1(b
H
1 )
φ1−1 = q1
r1
[
α1(b
H
1 )
φ1 + (1− α1)(bH2 )φ1
] 1
φ1
−1
(1− α1)(bH2 )φ1−1 = q2
r2
[
(1− α2)(bF1 )φ2 + α2(bF2 )φ2
] 1
φ2
−1
(1− α2)(bF1 )φ2−1 = q1
r2
[
(1− α2)(bF1 )φ2 + α2(bF2 )φ2
] 1
φ2
−1
α2(b
F
2 )
φ2−1 = q2
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λ1
[
ω1(a
H
1 )
−ρ1 + (1− ω1)(aH2 )−ρ1
]−µγ
ρ1 (1− µ)(1− n1)(1−µ)γ−1 = (1− θ)q1z1kθ1n−θ1
λ2
[
(1− ω2)(aF1 )−ρ2 + ω2(aF2 )−ρ2
]−µγ
ρ2 (1− µ)(1− n2)(1−µ)γ−1 = (1− θ)q2z2kθ2n−θ2
r1(
1
β
− 1 + δ) = θq1z1kθ−11 n1−θ1
r2(
1
β
− 1 + δ) = θq2z2kθ−12 n1−θ2
Steady state values for the market clearing conditions are:
aH1 + a
F
1 + b
H
1 + b
F
1 = z1k
θ
1n
1−θ
1
aH2 + a
F
2 + b
H
2 + b
F
2 = z2k
θ
2n
1−θ
2
δk1 =
[
α1(b
H
1 )
φ1 + (1− α1)(bH2 )φ1
]1/φ1
δk2 =
[
(1− α2)(bF1 )φ2 + α2(bF2 )φ2
]1/φ2
We compute the equilibrium numerically by a second-order approximation around
the steady state. We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions by hand (first order),
and Dynare carries out a further approximation given the linearized system (second
order). This way, we don’t have to solve for the steady state values of all endogenous
variables but for a number of ratios describing them. For notational ease, define
leisure to be lit = 1 − nit. The log-linearized system looks as follows (in terms of
notation, I drop the time subscripts and omit bars for steady state values, and tildes
mean log deviations):
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(
1 +
ω1
1− ω1
(
aH2
aH1
)ρ1)(
(1− µ)γl˜1t − q˜1t
)
=
(
1 + ρ1 + (1− µγ) ω1
1− ω1
(
aH2
aH1
)ρ1)
a˜H1t
−(µγ + ρ1)a˜H2t(
1 +
1− ω1
ω1
(
aH1
aH2
)ρ1)(
(1− µ)γl˜1t − q˜2t
)
=
(
1 + ρ1 + (1− µγ)1− ω1
ω1
(
aH1
aH2
)ρ1)
a˜H2t
−(µγ + ρ1)a˜H1t(
1 +
1− ω2
ω2
(
aF2
aF1
)ρ2)(
(1− µ)γl˜2t − q˜1t
)
=
(
1 + ρ2 + (1− µγ)1− ω2
ω2
(
aF2
aF1
)ρ2)
a˜F1t
−(µγ + ρ2)a˜F2t(
1 +
ω2
1− ω2
(
aF1
aF2
)ρ2)(
(1− µ)γl˜2t − q˜2t
)
=
(
1 + ρ2 + (1− µγ) ω2
1− ω2
(
aF1
aF2
)ρ2)
a˜F2t
−(µγ + ρ2)a˜F1t
r˜1t − q˜1t = φ1 − 1
1 + α1
1−α1
(
bH1
bH2
)φ1 (b˜H2t − b˜H1t)
r˜1t − q˜2t = φ1 − 1
1 + 1−α1
α1
(
bH2
bH1
)φ1 (b˜H1t − b˜H2t)
r˜2t − q˜1t = φ2 − 1
1 + 1−α2
α2
(
bF1
bF2
)φ2 (b˜F2t − b˜F1t)
r˜2t − q˜2t = φ2 − 1
1 + α2
1−α2
(
bF2
bF1
)φ2 (b˜F1t − b˜F2t)
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µγ
1 + 1−ω1
ω1
(
aH1
aH2
)ρ1 a˜H1t + µγ
1 + ω1
1−ω1
(
aH2
aH1
)ρ1 a˜H2t = q˜1t + z˜1t + θk˜1t − θn˜1t − ((1− µ)γ − 1)l˜1t
µγ
1 + ω2
1−ω2
(
aF1
aF2
)ρ2 a˜F1t + µγ
1 + 1−ω2
ω2
(
aF2
aF1
)ρ2 a˜F2t = q˜2t + z˜2t + θk˜2t − θn˜2t − ((1− µ)γ − 1)l˜2t
1
β
r˜1t = (1− δ)r˜1,t+1 + ( 1
β
− 1 + δ)(q˜1,t+1 + z˜1,t+1 + (θ − 1)k˜1,t+1 + (1− θ)n˜1,t+1)
1
β
r˜2t = (1− δ)r˜2,t+1 + ( 1
β
− 1 + δ)(q˜2,t+1 + z˜2,t+1 + (θ − 1)k˜2,t+1 + (1− θ)n˜2,t+1)
l1
n1
l˜1t = −n˜1t
l2
n2
l˜2t = −n˜2t
Log-linearizing the market clearing conditions:
aH1
y1
a˜H1t +
aF1
y1
a˜F1t +
bH1
y1
b˜H1t +
bF1
y1
b˜F1t = z˜1t + θk˜1t + (1− θ)n˜1t
aH2
y2
a˜H2t +
aF2
y2
a˜F2t +
bH2
y2
b˜H2t +
bF2
y2
b˜F2t = z˜2t + θk˜2t + (1− θ)n˜2t
k˜1,t+1 − (1− δ)k˜1t = δ
1 + 1−α1
α1
(
bH2
bH1
)φ1 b˜H1t + δ
1 + α1
1−α1
(
bH1
bH2
)φ1 b˜H2t
k˜2,t+1 − (1− δ)k˜2t = δ
1 + α2
1−α2
(
bF2
bF1
)φ2 b˜F1t + δ
1 + 1−α2
α2
(
bF1
bF2
)φ2 b˜F2t
The technology shocks process follows:
z˜1,t+1 = A11z˜1t + A12z˜2t + εt+1
z˜2,t+1 = A12z˜1t + A11z˜2t + εt+1
We incorporate the behavior of consumption, terms of trade, price indices, and
real exchange rate to the linearized model:
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c˜1t =
1
1 + 1−ω1
ω1
(
aH1
aH2
)ρ1 a˜H1t + 1
1 + ω1
1−ω1
(
aH2
aH1
)ρ1 a˜H2t
c˜2t =
1
1 + ω2
1−ω2
(
aF1
aF2
)ρ2 a˜F1t + 1
1 + 1−ω2
ω2
(
aF2
aF1
)ρ2 a˜F2t
p˜1t = q˜2t − q˜1t
p˜2t = q˜1t − q˜2t
P˜C1t =
1
1 +
(
1−ω1
ω1
)σ1 (
q2
q1
)1−σ1 q˜1t + 1
1 +
(
ω1
1−ω1
)σ1 (
q1
q2
)1−σ1 q˜2t
P˜C2t =
1
1 +
(
ω2
1−ω2
)σ2 (
q2
q1
)1−σ2 q˜1t + 1
1 +
(
1−ω2
ω2
)σ2 (
q1
q2
)1−σ2 q˜2t
P˜1t = pi1CP˜
C
1t + pi1I r˜1t
P˜2t = pi2CP˜
C
2t + pi2I r˜2t
E˜1t = P˜2t − P˜1t
E˜2t = P˜1t − P˜2t
Finally, total output, exports, imports, and net exports are added to the linearized
model following the definitions earlier (note that net exports are not deviations from
steady state - we express net exports in terms of the linearized variables):
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y˜1t =
aH1
y1
a˜H1t +
aF1
y1
a˜F1t +
bH1
y1
b˜H1t +
bF1
y1
b˜F1t
y˜2t =
aH2
y2
a˜H2t +
aF2
y2
a˜F2t +
bH2
y2
b˜H2t +
bF2
y2
b˜F2t
˜exp1t =
1
1 + bF1 /a
F
1
a˜F1t +
1
1 + aF1 /b
F
1
b˜F1t
˜exp2t =
1
1 + bH2 /a
H
2
a˜H2t +
1
1 + aH2 /b
H
2
b˜H2t
˜imp1t = p˜1t +
1
1 + bH2 /a
H
2
a˜H2t +
1
1 + aH2 /b
H
2
b˜H2t
˜imp2t = p˜2t +
1
1 + bF1 /a
F
1
a˜F1t +
1
1 + aF1 /b
F
1
b˜F1t
nx1t =
aF1
y1
ea˜
F
1t−y˜1t +
bF1
y1
eb˜
F
1t−y˜1t − a
H
2
y1
ep˜1t+a˜
H
2t−y˜1t − b
H
2
y1
ep˜1t+b˜
H
2t−y˜1t
nx2t =
aH2
y2
ea˜
H
2t−y˜2t +
bH2
y2
eb˜
H
2t−y˜2t − a
F
1
y2
ep˜2t+a˜
F
1t−y˜2t − b
F
1
y2
ep˜2t+b˜
F
1t−y˜2t
So in order to calibrate the model correctly, we need to solve for the following
ratios of steady state values (the other ratios appearing above can be inferred):
aH1
aH2
,
aF1
aF2
,
bH1
bH2
,
bF1
bF2
,
ni
li
,
aHi
yi
,
aFi
yi
,
bHi
yi
,
bFi
yi
Some immediate results from the steady state conditions:
(3.3)
q1
q2
=
ω1
1− ω1
(
aH2
aH1
)ρ1+1
=
1− ω2
ω2
(
aF2
aF1
)ρ2+1
=
α1
1− α1
(
bH1
bH2
)φ1−1
=
1− α2
α2
(
bF1
bF2
)φ2−1
Some intermediate results:
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bH1
k1
= δ
(
q1
α1r1
) 1
φ1−1
= δαη11
[
αη11 + (1− α1)η1
(
q2
q1
)1−η1] η11−η1
bH2
k1
= δ
(
q2
(1− α1)r1
) 1
φ1−1
= δ(1− α1)η1
[
(1− α1)η1 + αη11
(
q1
q2
)1−η1] η11−η1
αη11 + (1− α1)η1
(
q2
q1
)1−η1
=
(
θ
1
β
− 1 + δ
)1−η1
(z1k
θ−1
1 n
1−θ
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
y1/k1
)1−η1
αη22 + (1− α2)η2
(
q1
q2
)1−η2
=
(
θ
1
β
− 1 + δ
)1−η2
(z2k
θ−1
2 n
1−θ
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
y2/k2
)1−η2
µ
1− µω1
1− n1
n1
(1− θ) y1
aH1
= ω1 + (1− ω1)
(
aH1
aH2
)ρ1
(3.4)
We assume a symmetric steady state where both countries in the model have
the same technologies both in their consumption and investment good sectors. This
means that in the final investment good sector we have α1 = α2 and η1 = η2,
and for the consumption aggregator we have ω1 = ω2 and σ1 = σ2. This implies
identical home bias across the two countries in consumption and in investment as
well as identical elasticities of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in
both aggregates.
In a symmetric steady state, y1 = y2, q1 = q2, a
H
1 = a
F
2 , a
H
2 = a
F
1 , b
H
1 = b
F
2 , and
bH2 = b
F
1 . This implies a steady state value of one for the terms of trade and pins
down most of the ratios we need for the calibration (see equation (3.3)). Some of the
intermediate results above simplify to:
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bH1
k1
= δαη11 [α
η1
1 + (1− α1)η1 ]
η1
1−η1
bH2
k1
= δ(1− α1)η1 [αη11 + (1− α1)η1 ]
η1
1−η1
k1
y1
=
θ
1
β
− 1 + δ [α
η1
1 + (1− α1)η1 ]−
1
1−η1
k2
y2
=
θ
1
β
− 1 + δ [α
η2
2 + (1− α2)η2 ]−
1
1−η2
These results imply:
bH1
y1
=
bF2
y2
=
δθ
1
β
− 1 + δ
1
1 +
(
1−α1
α1
)η1
bH2
y2
=
bF1
y1
=
δθ
1
β
− 1 + δ
1
1 +
(
α1
1−α1
)η1
Using the market clearing conditions and the results above, we get:
aH1
y1
=
aF2
y2
=
1− δθ
1/β−1+δ
1 +
(
1−ω1
ω1
)σ1
aH2
y2
=
aF1
y1
=
1− δθ
1/β−1+δ
1 +
(
ω1
1−ω1
)σ1
Using the intermediate result (3.4), we get:
l1
n1
=
l2
n2
=
1− µ
µ
1
1− θ
(
1− δθ1
β
− 1 + δ
)
Also useful for the calibration, we calculate the steady state expenditure shares
of consumption and investment (we calculate by piC1 = P
C
1 c1/(P
C
1 c1 + r1x1), and
similarly for piI1), which is useful in calculating the overall price index:
piC1 = pi
C
2 = 1−
δθ
1
β
− 1 + δ
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piI1 = pi
I
2 =
δθ
1
β
− 1 + δ
Using the properties of the symmetric steady state, we rewrite the log-linearized
system as follows.
First order conditions:
(
1 +
(
ω1
1− ω1
)σ1)(
(1− µ)γl˜1t − q˜1t
)
=
(
1
σ1
+ (1− µγ)
(
ω1
1− ω1
)σ1)
a˜H1t
−(µγ + 1
σ1
− 1)a˜H2t(
1 +
(
1− ω1
ω1
)σ1)(
(1− µ)γl˜1t − q˜2t
)
=
(
1
σ1
+ (1− µγ)
(
1− ω1
ω1
)σ1)
a˜H2t
−(µγ + 1
σ1
− 1)a˜H1t(
1 +
(
1− ω2
ω2
)σ2)(
(1− µ)γl˜2t − q˜1t
)
=
(
1
σ2
+ (1− µγ)
(
1− ω2
ω2
)σ2)
a˜F1t
−(µγ + 1
σ2
− 1)a˜F2t(
1 +
(
ω2
1− ω2
)σ2)(
(1− µ)γl˜2t − q˜2t
)
=
(
1
σ2
+ (1− µγ)
(
ω2
1− ω2
)σ2)
a˜F2t
−(µγ + 1
σ2
− 1)a˜F1t
r˜1t +
1/η1
1 +
(
α1
1−α1
)η1 (b˜H2t − b˜H1t) = q˜1t
r˜1t +
1/η1
1 +
(
1−α1
α1
)η1 (b˜H1t − b˜H2t) = q˜2t
r˜2t +
1/η2
1 +
(
1−α2
α2
)η2 (b˜F2t − b˜F1t) = q˜1t
r˜2t +
1/η2
1 +
(
α2
1−α2
)η2 (b˜F1t − b˜F2t) = q˜2t
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µγ
1 +
(
1−ω1
ω1
)σ1 a˜H1t + µγ
1 +
(
ω1
1−ω1
)σ1 a˜H2t = q˜1t + z˜1t + θk˜1t − θn˜1t − ((1− µ)γ − 1)l˜1t
µγ
1 +
(
ω2
1−ω2
)σ2 a˜F1t + µγ
1 +
(
1−ω2
ω2
)σ2 a˜F2t = q˜2t + z˜2t + θk˜2t − θn˜2t − ((1− µ)γ − 1)l˜2t
1
β
r˜1t = (1− δ)r˜1,t+1 + ( 1
β
− 1 + δ)(q˜1,t+1 + z˜1,t+1 + (θ − 1)k˜1,t+1 + (1− θ)n˜1,t+1)
1
β
r˜2t = (1− δ)r˜2,t+1 + ( 1
β
− 1 + δ)(q˜2,t+1 + z˜2,t+1 + (θ − 1)k˜2,t+1 + (1− θ)n˜2,t+1)
l1
n1
l˜1t = −n˜1t
l2
n2
l˜2t = −n˜2t
Market clearing conditions:
aH1
y1
a˜H1t +
aF1
y1
a˜F1t +
bH1
y1
b˜H1t +
bF1
y1
b˜F1t = z˜1t + θk˜1t + (1− θ)n˜1t
aH2
y2
a˜H2t +
aF2
y2
a˜F2t +
bH2
y2
b˜H2t +
bF2
y2
b˜F2t = z˜2t + θk˜2t + (1− θ)n˜2t
k˜1,t+1 − (1− δ)k˜1t = δ
1 +
(
1−α1
α1
)η1 b˜H1t + δ
1 +
(
α1
1−α1
)η1 b˜H2t
k˜2,t+1 − (1− δ)k˜2t = δ
1 +
(
α2
1−α2
)η2 b˜F1t + δ
1 +
(
1−α2
α2
)η2 b˜F2t
Simplifying further some of the other equations of the system:
c˜1t =
1
1 +
(
1−ω1
ω1
)σ1 a˜H1t + 1
1 +
(
ω1
1−ω1
)σ1 a˜H2t
c˜2t =
1
1 +
(
ω2
1−ω2
)σ2 a˜F1t + 1
1 +
(
1−ω2
ω2
)σ2 a˜F2t
P˜C1t =
1
1 +
(
1−ω1
ω1
)σ1 q˜1t + 1
1 +
(
ω1
1−ω1
)σ1 q˜2t
P˜C2t =
1
1 +
(
ω2
1−ω2
)σ2 q˜1t + 1
1 +
(
1−ω2
ω2
)σ2 q˜2t
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We code the above system of linearized equations into Dynare for the second-order
approximation and to retrieve the simulation results.
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3.7 Appendix B
In this appendix, we try to answer the question: How much can existing models
explain? As a first step, we simulate an endowment economy version of the model
in Backus et al. (1994). Table 3.8 shows the cross-country correlations for three
different calibrations of the model, highlighting the role of country size.
With the endowment economy, there are several salient features that lie in stark
contrast with what we observe in the data. First, there is perfect correlation between
exports and output, which one can prove theoretically. Accordingly, the correlation
between exports and output is always greater than the correlation between imports
and output. Second, net exports and output are positively correlated. A third
anomaly with the endowment economy is that real exchange rates correlate almost
perfectly (and positively) with net exports.
Calibrating the model for different country sizes helps us explain some findings
from the data; for instance, imports and output are much more correlated for a small
economy compared to a big one. Moreover, real exchange rates are more procyclical
in a small economy. However, we are still faced with an additional puzzle, which is
that imports are negatively correlated with the real exchange rate in the big economy.
In addition, the correlation between real exchange rate and net exports seem to be
fairly unresponsive to country size. We therefore turn to test whether the addition of
capital, as in the BKK model, can help explain the behavior of real exchange rates.
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Table 3.8: Endowment Economy
Correlation
(Ex,Y) (Im,Y) (NX, Y) (Rer, Y) (Rer, Ex) (Rer, Im) (Rer, NX)
Similar Countries
ω1 = 0.8, ω2 = 0.2 1 0.89 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.30 0.99
ω1 = 0.6, ω2 = 0.4 1 0.89 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.31 0.99
Small Country
ω1 = 0.8, ω2 = 0.2 1 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.9515 0.8941 0.9946
ω1 = 0.6, ω2 = 0.4 1 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.9507 0.8948 0.9973
Big Country
ω1 = 0.8, ω2 = 0.2 1 0.5306 0.3101 0.3063 0.3063 -0.6308 0.9962
ω1 = 0.6, ω2 = 0.4 1 0.5306 0.3101 0.3084 0.3084 -0.6307 0.9990
BKK (No Capital) 0.66
Notes: The stochastic endowments are drawn using the same seed for the random number generator;
as such, notice that the standard deviation of output is the same in the first two lines. A change
in ω’s does not affect the correlations between Exports and Output, Inports and Output, and Net
Exports and Output. Statistics are averages over 20 states of 400 periods each.
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